A game which was ultimately decided by a scrappy goal from a set piece. There were plenty of chances for both teams throughout the game as neither of them could stop the other’s offensive strategy. Newcastle’s man-marking in defense and Arsenal’s lack of pressure on the ball made this and open game.

Newcastle’s Man-Marking

The starting lineups

In Arsenal’s build-up phase it was Ramsey who dropped most frequently into the defensive line to provide stability in the first line and try to move the team forward. Whenever he did this, he would be followed by whichever Newcastle central midfielder was closest to him – this is what most obviously revealed Newcastle’s man-marking scheme. Colback moved out of his deep central position to follow Ramsey earlier in the game, but it was most often Wijnaldum who was closest to him as he played right behind Mitrovic up top. Wijnaldum man-marked Ramsey in a more loose sense of the term as he frequently looked to put Ramsey in his cover shadow while pressing one of the central defenders (if Ramsey hadn’t dropped deep yet).

Tiote as the deepest central midfielder most often marked Ozil while Colback marked Flamini for most of the game. Newcastle’s fullbacks also man-marked Arsenal’s wingers and followed them into the center of the pitch whenever they moved inside. This Newcastle side is the team which most heavily relies on man-marking that I’ve seen in the EPL in a while, which might explain their lack of stability and poor results recently.

This type of defending ultimately left them vulnerable to vacating important spaces due to Arsenal’s rotations and being unable to track runs off of the ball. The most frequent and dangerous breakthroughs occurred when Ramsey (or another of Arsenal’s central midfielders) would be followed deep and open the center while Oxlade or Walcott (whoever was playing on the right flank at the time – as they switched flanks throughout the game) moved into the opened central space to receive the ball and drag their fullback inside with them. This left Bellerin isolated again Perez on the flank with space to run into – and Bellerin would make runs from deep which were difficult to track during Arsenal’s halfspace combinations and was played through the defense in the end and broke into the box for dangerous crosses.

Arsenal is particularly difficult to man-mark and remain stable while doing so due to their heavy reliance on quick combinations out of poor positional structures. Poor spacing in possession obviously isn’t something you want in every game – but if your opponent is following you while you have poor positioning, they’re inevitably going to leave some huge holes open which have the potential to be exposed by Arsenal’s dribbling and combinations. For example, in one scene both Flamini and Ramsey were very far on the left side of the pitch (don’t ask me why) and they were followed by Wijnaldum and Colback which left the entire center of the field open. Giroud dropped off into this space (central defenders didn’t want to follow him so deep) and was able to turn with the ball and play a diagonal out to Oxlade who was supported by Bellerin to attempt to break into the box.

Tiote would even go as far to move away from the direction the ball is moving while the team shifted across the pitch in order to mark Ozil, this obviously left the near-side halfspace wide open, and Giroud did well to drop into this space and combine with Chamberlain to potentially breakthrough the wing or move towards the center. Both Ozil and Giroud took advantage of the Newcastle fullbacks man-marking Arsenal’s wingers and frequently made runs down the side of the field into open space to push The Gunners up the pitch.

Arsenal’s Lack of Pressure

Arsenal’s defensive block was the usual 4-4-2 with Ozil and Giroud up front. Both Ozil and Giroud weren’t very active once the ball bypassed them, meaning Arsenal’s first line of pressure was most often taken out of the game quickly. The block itself wasn’t poor in regards to the positioning, but the compactness of pressure did not exist. For example, I could stand closely in a midfield line with MR and RM, but if the ball is getting close to me and I don’t pressure with intensity and they don’t seek to double/triple up and help me pressure – we will have problems stopping the opponent from moving the ball how they want to. Within/around a compact team’s block the ball must always be under pressure from the collective defense – which results in forcing a ball loss or a favorable outcome.

Newcastle often progressed into a 3-4-2-1 structure in possession out of their 4-3-3 type shape. Tiote dropped between the central defenders while the fullbacks pushed high up. This allowed Perez and Sissoko to move inside toward the halfspaces while Wijnaldum and Colback occupied the center of the field and Mitrovic remained as the central 9. The base of 3 played out of the back quickly bypassed Arsenal’s front 2 as I mentioned earlier due to no real intensity or support.

Newcastle very easily gained space against Arsenal and forced them into a deep shape where they could implement their go-to offensive strategy. Newcastle looked to move close to the box and then play long diagonals to the far post with multiple runners overloading that area. Mitrovic was particularly dangerous in this regard as he got his head onto a few balls but wasn’t able to connect properly enough – but the warning signs were there.

Even though Newcastle were able to use Colback and Wijnaldum in the center to avoid pressure and provide stability to the circulation through central areas, they had connection problems (particularly on the flanks). The wingers would mostly be supported only by the fullback – especially on the left flank early in the game – which resulted in predictable passing and Arsenal was able to force the circulation back towards the goalkeeper and gain control of valuable space.

Had these two isolated wing players had better resistance under pressure and dynamic movement in combination with each other, Newcastle would’ve been much more dangerous for Arsenal. Though when Colback or Wijnaldum properly supported the flanks the team was able to take advantage of Arsenal’s poor pressing out of midfield and launch diagonals towards the far post quite often.

Conclusion

After the goal Arsenal immediately switched to a deep 4-5-1 press in an attempt to crowd the center and hopefully establish some better access to the ball there. Newcastle progressed into a more aggressive positional structure in a 3-2-4-1 where the right fullback pushed very high up as the right central defender moved wide, the left fullback remained on the left, and Colback and Tiote dropped next to the lone central defender in the middle. Perez moved inside from the left flexibly while Sissoko and Wijnaldum played in the center and Mitrovic remained up top – this ultimately didn’t yield any results but was an interesting progression which Newcastle should look to try again in the future.

The rest of the match was uneventful – Newcastle’s brightest moment came when Ramsey received the ball and turned while being man-marked in the defensive halfspace and then played a poor pass to Ozil towards the right wing where Perez intercepted the ball, dribbled diagonally inside, and played a through ball into Wijnaldum who missed a 1 on 1 opportunity against Cech. This was an example of poor group tactical movement from Arsenal. Nevertheless, Arsenal obtained 3 more points in the league and are now 6 points ahead of who many consider to be their main competitors for the title – Manchester City.

There was huge excitement as these two teams came off the back of 3-3 draws in midweek to play the biggest derby fixture in the Best League In The World™. Unfortunately it wasn’t the most entertaining of derbies, with both teams recording an xG (expected goals) of under 1 (0.8 and 0.7 respectively). This piece will focus on two of the main issues that have been on the minds of all Premier League fans this season: why are United so rubbish in attack? and why do they concede so few chances. I’ll also have a look at Liverpool’s attacking strategy.

There weren’t too many shocks in either coaches’ choice of starting line-up, both being restrained by injuries. The biggest surprise was probably Van Gaal’s selection of Lingard. The teams are below:

4-3-2-1 for Liverpool with Firmino as a false 9 and Lallana and Milner operating across the width of the pitch behind him. United set up in a 4-2-3-1 with a rotating three in midfield.

Manchester United Dreadful On The Ball

United’s attacking phase was back to its old harmless self. They adopt a fairly flat U-shape around the middle third of the pitch and pass along it slowly without any real aim. They constantly make pointless horizontal passes due to both simply not taking enough risks, as well as having poor off-the-ball movement, no structure, and lousy individual positioning. They are an example of a team that plays a possession-based game but without crucial Juego de Posicion concepts such as positional staggering, rotation, in-between-lines positioning and overloads. Even if they did create some overloads or peel away an opposition defender to create space, they don’t play with the passing intensity necessary to exploit such possibilities. They are a more extreme version of Vicente Del Bosque’s Spain team in that they use possession much more successfully as a defensive concept rather than an attacking one. Yes, the other team can’t score while you have the ball, but you can only win the match if you score some goals for yourself. Here are some visual examples of United’s poor possessional structure:

Manchester United’s flat build-up shape.

As they always under Van Gaal, United aim to progress up the wings in build up play. They attempt to do this by passing from side to side until they find space to progress up the pitch. The problem with the above shape is by the time that they’ve passed it all the way through from Blind to Smalling, Liverpool’s defence has shuffled and United cannot play it up the field. United’s lack of staggering (the placement of players on different horizontal and vertical axes, thus creating triangles and rhombuses that make for a competent structure for possession football) means that they can be pressed by a flat line of Liverpool players, with there being no chance to beat this line of pressure with one vertical pass between two of the pressing players.

No inside option for Young

Here, Van Gaal’s side have managed to find some space wide and progressed with the ball over the halfway line. United are too wide orientated however and Liverpool have simply gone man-to-man on the flank, with Moreno tight to Lingard and Can tight to Herrera. Young has no inside option with Herrera hugging the touchline for some reason, and Schneiderlin, who should be acting as a pivot, occupying Sakho. Young is forced to play a speculative long ball forward which reaches no-one. This is typical of United’s strange possessional structure.

Pretty amateur.

This one doesn’t need much explaining. Anyone can see that Herrera has nowhere to go. United have a straight line up the flank from Darmian to Martial. They have made about ten passes in the build-up to this moment. Again, Herrera is on the touchline for some reason, meaning United have only one player in the opposition half that is in the left halfspace or centre. There is no way United can penetrate Liverpool’s back four, never mind doing so centrally, with this sort of structure. United are also far too static when they have possession, with no players looking to make runs into space or behind the Liverpool defence. Wayne Rooney’s recent spark of form was nowhere to be seen (until he finished well to score the winner late on) and he was regularly outpaced by Kolo Toure. A desperate state of affairs.

United’s poor structure, especially when building up in their own half, made them very easy for Liverpool to press. Fellaini was often used as United’s outlet when forced back to De Gea while under pressure. The below map shows how often a long, high pass was played to Fellaini.

If in doubt, hit the big Belgian.

United Defensively Solid

Manchester United don’t concede many chances. A lot of this is to do with the pure numbers that they get behind the ball, and the depth at which they defend at times, which hampers their threat during attacking transition. However, United do have a solid and effective defensive structure.

United’s middle third defensive organisation.

United don’t press the ball when it’s at the feet of the opposition centre-backs, they hold their midfield line at around the halfway line. They are very man-orientated however, moving around with their men, even if it moves them out of the zone they should be occupying. Young has pushed up and is marking Moreno while Martial has dropped back to left-back to create a back four. Martial often takes up this left-back position with his role in the match being similar to that of a left-wing back. This meant he often couldn’t receive the ball high up the field in space during a counter attack as his starting position was too deep due to these defensive duties. Man United’s tight marking of Sakho’s immediate options mean that when they receive the ball, they will not be able to turn. However, giving Sakho so much time on the ball does give him lots of time to assess his options and it gives Liverpool a chance to create a space in United’s defensive line.

United man-to-man on Sakho’s options

Man United’s players will stay tight to any players who could directly receive the ball. Above, Blind has moved out of his line to stay tight to Firmino. Martial moves back towards his left-back area which allows Darmian and Smalling to move together to close the gap that Blind has left. Due to Blind’s tight marking of Firmino, when he receives the ball he can only play it back to Sakho. United regularly limited Liverpool’s build-up play to Liverpool’s own half.

Man United’s compactness.

Manchester United committed many bodies back to defending throughout the whole match. They players with great horizontal compactness and had minimal spaces between players. The above situation shows how they have a 9v6 situation in their favour around the ball. Although this increases their chance of shutting Liverpool out, a 3:2 ratio is somewhat unnecessary and makes them less of a threat on the counter attack, especially with main threats Martial and Lingard within 25 yards of their own goal. United were arguably too deep at times, allowing Liverpool 12 shots from outside the penalty area. These shots have a lower xG of course, but they still do hold some danger, especially having seen Roberto Firmino’s goal against Arsenal last Wednesday.

Liverpool’s Final Third Play

Liverpool were more centrally orientated in attack than they have been and it didn’t work too well considering how United were content to hold a horizontally compact central shape. Firmino, playing as a false 9 would drop deep to receive the ball however he was flanked by Lallana and Milner. Neither of these players are wingers or have lightening pace so playing Firmino as a false 9 meant Liverpool had three players that weren’t keen to make penetrating runs behind United’s defence. Milner would move to either side of the field to link up play behind Firmino, decreasing Liverpool’s presence on United’s last line of defence.

Conclusion

Liverpool will be disappointed with this home defeat as they didn’t deserve to lose. On the other hand, they didn’t really deserve to win either as they didn’t create many dangerous chances and failed to penetrate United’s organised defence. Manchester United somehow get away with a win but LVG’s worries about their attacking play continue. He needs to either make a big change  to his attacking approach or leave the club, as their current style is too predictable and ineffective.

Arsenal played hosts to Leicester in a match which highlighted the superiority of team-tactical strengths over individual abilities. Leicester are one of the strategically strongest teams in England this year through their stable defending and great transition game whilst Arsenal’s structuring issues again were on show. It took a dismissal for the control of the game to shift as Wenger’s side took advantage of their numerical superiority after Simpson saw a second yellow.

The starting formations

Ranieri picked the same starting eleven for the sixth consecutive match as they featured in their usual 4-4-2 formation whilst Arsenal made two changes to the lineup as Coquelin and Mertesacker returned to the 4-2-3-1.

Leicester’s Zonal Defence

Whilst more attention has been payed to Leicester excellent transition game through Vardy and Mahrez, one must not overlook their strong defensive organisation which is crucial in making these transitions possible. Ranieri’s side have been a welcome change in the Premier League as they employ a zonal marking system with man-orientations which sees them stay stable and compact in a 4-4-1-1 shape.

For more on the different forms of zonal marking, click the image to be taken to RM’s excellent theory article.

Within such a defence, a team will organize themselves zonally where the primary reference point for the defenders is the opposition. When not tasked with covering a nearby attacker, the team will maintain their shape in their base positions and cover the space in a zonal structure. However when a forward moves within a defender’s vicinity they will flexibly orient themselves within their space to cover this player by keeping a certain distance away from them where they can apply pressure on a position level.

It’s clear to see the difference between this scheme and man-marking where the defender simply tracks his man with little recognition of structure and spatial aspects. Instead, the team maintain their zonal shape and cover the space whilst adjusting to simultaneously cover a nearby player too.

Through this defence, Leicester maintained a generally good access to the Arsenal midfield and attack whilst maintaining stability and a strong shape. The flexibility of this defensive scheme stopped them from becoming disorganised against Arsenal’s movement off of the ball as they maintained good balance before the red card.

Another component of their defence which separates them from the majority of English clubs is the defensive support of the two wide players. Countless comments have been made on their hard-working nature but far more important is their orientation within the structure. Whilst Kanté is excellent in defence (whilst being very strong with the ball too, something largely overlooked for his physical and defensive attributes) and Drinkwater also strong, they received good support from the wingers as the team defended well as a group.

Through their zonal defence, they maintained a clear shape and the wingers didn’t closely mark the Arsenal full-backs – a role which most wingers are accustomed to in the English leagues. Instead they would maintain good spacing between the full-back and the centre of the pitch, meaning that they could provide strong support to the midfield pairing. Whilst most wingers are disconnected in their individualist man-marking role, Mahrez and Albrighton are important to the collective stability through supporting the centre and helping them achieve good spatial control in the middle of the pitch.

Leicester’s compactness must also be noted as it plays an important role in their organisation. Through the zonal scheme they maintain their shape and do so with strong distances both horizontally and vertically. There were some issues in the spatial compactness, with some open spaces between the midfield and defence but they generally restricted Arsenal’s access through good pressure.

Ranieri’s side did show some issues in their defensive access during moments when neither forward could support the central midfielders. Usually it was Okazaki dropping into the 10 area where he would cover an Arsenal midfielder and maintain access through their man-orientations.

However when this support was not on offer, Leicester showed some problems. As Drinkwater and Kante were occupied with their own coverage of the likes of Özil and Oxlade-Chamberlain, they weren’t in a position to create sufficient defensive access in the now-open 10 space. Fortunately for the away side, it was most often Coquelin who had these opportunities and the 6 wasn’t able to take advantage.

Arsenal Struggle in Possession

Arsenal’s possession game has been plagued for seasons now by a weak structure with the ball which is poorly co-ordinated. Their shape is rather free-form as the midfield have freedom to roam from their positions quite commonly whilst Aaron Ramsey makes his usual forward movements up field. Arsenal’s dominance of possession against Leicester’s mid-low block suggests a control that they very rarely had, which was in many ways because of their sub-par spacing.

A scene from the 11th minute.

They again showed inappropriate distances between the structure with weak spatial occupation and staggering. It was common to see straight lines consisting of 3-4 Arsenal players in possession as the connections were few and far between. The lack of passing options caused difficulties in movement of the ball as their switches were ineffective whilst integration of Özil was difficult. In some cases they were more ball-oriented in their shape though this was ultimately counterproductive as it made further example of their weak spatial occupation with too short distances between players.

Many of the attacks resorted to possession through wide areas as their lack of connections made access difficult through the middle. They vary rarely looked able to circulate the ball through the centre of the pitch as the inside players failed to space themselves appropriately to enable the ball to move between themselves correctly. In these wider attacks they showed some promise when moving the ball back inside through half-space combinations but that wasn’t sufficient against a stable Leicester defence.

The weak structuring in possession translates to issues upon turnover of the ball too. The lack of passing options with the ball results in a lack of defensive connections upon losing it as counterpressing becomes difficult to execute. Although it wasn’t exploited to its fullest by Leicester, their inability to exert immediate pressure gives them great instability in transition with particularly large distances between players in midfield.

Developments after the Red Card

Danny Simpson’s dismissal was a pivotal moment in the game as Leicester moved to a 4-4-1 with Gray and Wasilewski replacing Mahrez and Okazaki. Wenger made his own changes too with Walcott replacing Coquelin whilst Ramsey moved deeper.

With Leicester a man down their spatial coverage became progressively worse as open gaps were more prevalent between the two lines of four. Their man-orientations became more difficult to maintain and stability was lost as Arsenal moved more players forward and were able to create chances much better with greater access between the lines.

Conclusion

Leicester made another tactically and strategically good performance and controlled the game without the ball up until the red card. Though Arsenal were poor for the majority of the game, they capitalised on Simpson’s dismissal and were able to dominate from then onwards. Within this final period they created well and ultimately the final result wasn’t so much of a surprise as they created 2xg once it became 11v10.

The story of the match was the Simpson red. A bad error in itself, LCFC compounded the problem and Arsenal pounced. pic.twitter.com/6dufWlUTky

— Michael Caley (@MC_of_A) February 14, 2016

Tottenham have really exceeded expectations this season. With Leicester deservingly taking most of the back page headlines this season, the heroics Mauricio Pochettino and his men have performed so far this season have arguably gone slightly under the radar. They have just come off the back beating 2014/14 champions Manchester City, putting them in second place just two points behind leaders Leicester. Spurs shouldn’t only be given credit for this league position they find themselves in, but also for the style which has delivered them this success.

I’ll be taking a look initially at the Positional Play in the attacking phase that Pochettino has successfully put in place this season, and then at Spurs’ pressing strategy when the opposition are building play in their own half. First, however, below is Tottenham’s general starting line-up this season (with potential replacements right of the forward slash). Pochettino has also used a 4-4-2 with both Son and Kane playing as centre forwards at times.

Spurs XI.

Juego de Pochettino

Tottenham play an attacking, possession based game similar to that of Pep Guardiola or Thomas Tuchel, with added influences from Marcelo Bielsa, whom he played under for both Newell’s Old Boys and Argentina.

As you’d expect from a team using these principles, they build up from deep with short passes from the centre-backs and pivots. It is the pivot’s job to create triangles and rhombuses, making it easy for Spurs to pass the ball around the opposition’s pressing lines and up the pitch. Below is an example of this.

Impressive play from Dembele.

A good structure in possession will allow the ball carrier to have immediate open options as soon as he receives the ball, meaning he can move the ball on more quickly, and make for a more effective and entertaining possession game. In the above example Dembele creates this cohesive structure with his link up play and movement.

Firstly, we can see how Dier, the pivot, has moved into the right back position while Walker moves higher up field. This is a routine part of Spurs’ positional play. It allows the attack-orientated Walker to play higher up the field and stretch the opposition both horizontally and vertically while Dier covers behind him, using his good passing and awareness skills in build-up as well as his defensive instincts in defensive transition.

Dembele starts just in front of the centre-backs, moves to create a triangles with Dier and Alderweireld as well as Dier and Walker, receives the ball and finally creates the passing triangle with Walker and Son. Walker can play a long pass behind Palace’s defence to Son.

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Spurs aren’t reliant on the pivots in early build-up phases however as they have a variety of fantastic ball-playing centre-backs in their squad. Giving their centre-backs time on the ball higher up the pitch means that the defender on the ball has more players in front of him to choose from than a pivot would in this situation. This means the defensive team have more lines of players to press. Below is an example of how Tottenham use their pivots to create space for their centre-backs to play in:

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In the first image, the centre-backs are wide apart and Walker is high up the pitch. Walker moves higher up the field and Dier moves out to fill his space, while Carroll also moves higher up the pitch. This pulls away Kone and Lukaku for Everton, giving space for Aldeweireld and Vertonghen as shown in the third image. Everton’s intention for their centre-forwards to tightly mark Spurs’ pivots is clear however Spurs have used this to create space for their centre-backs to find a pass into the final third.

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When in possession in the opposition’s half, Spurs use spatial concepts similar to that of many sides that adopt a form of Juego De Posicion.

Alli causing problems in between the lines.

Above we can see that Tottenham have four main horizontal lines across the field in which they are playing, three of them highlighted (the other is the centre-backs when they are in possession). This is against the three horizontal defensive lines of Crystal Palace. As a pass is made from the centre-backs to Dembele, Palace have two midfield lines that are ordered to stay as a line versus three sets of horizontal staggering from Spurs. With Kane and Son holding back the Palace defence that are unwilling to move forward to play him offside, and Dembele holding possession just a few yards ahead of the halfway line, this has opened up space in between the lines for Alli. A lot of Spurs’ middle-third to final-third conversion play is them moving the ball along this second of for horizontal lines, aiming to move it into Alli in between the lines. Above, the ball gets played into Alli and Palace are on the back foot and their centre-backs are stretched.

Eriksen, although billed as a left-sided attacker on the teamsheet, rarely finds himself on the flanks and normally roams in central and deep areas. He makes sure Tottenham have numerical superiority in deeper build-up, giving them passing options aplenty.

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Although they use what would seem as a rigid attacking structure, Tottenham are actually extremely fluid in their positioning. Walker adopts a normal right-back position in the defensive phase however moves almost onto the last line of attack when Spurs have the ball, with Dier playing almost as a half-back behind him. Alli moves into the halfspace adjacent to where the ball is on the field. Dier is still instructed to attack in the right halfspace however, often acting as a deeper outlet in the opposition half on the ball before moving up to underlap Walker or create overloads. Below is an example of this kind of movement:

1.Dier with ball on flank.

2. Tottenham rotation of positions.

Above, Dier has the ball in the flank where Tottenham have a potential 3v2 overload. To help utilise this overload and ultimately create space in Everton’s back four, the three Spurs players simultaneously rotate positions. It starts with Walker dropping to receive the ball from Dier, to help maintain Spurs’ width high up the pitch, and to prevent Palace from having an extra player, Alli runs into the space Walker has vacated. After passing the ball into Walker, Dier moves into the space Alli is leaving to create this 3v2 overload on the flank. All this happens too quickly for Everton to deal with and is something that Pochettino would have worked on as part of his positional play schedule in training. The ball subsequently gets played into Dier who is unmarked and can move it into the middle of the field, where Spurs now have a 3v2 overload of Dier, Carroll and Eriksen on two Everton centre-midfielders.

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One thing that many football coaches forget is that the goal is in the centre of the pitch. Therefore the best way to attack is centrally. The reason why many teams leave space on the flanks when defending is that the ball is harmless when it is in that area. Crossing into static players in the penalty area is also likely to prove ineffective as it will be too easy for a competent centre-back pairing to deal with. Spurs try to open up space in the centre of the pitch and attack with a combination of low vertical passes and short combinations to try to penetrate the oppositions defence. Despite having high possession statistics, Tottenham are 16th for crosses per game in the Premier League this season, a stat which shows their central orientation in the final third. Also, they have the highest percentage of shots from outside the penalty area of any team and take the most per game with 7.8. This shows that they are effective at opening up so-called ‘Zone 14’ space and moving the ball into space in this area of the field. The fact they have scored the second most goals from outside the penalty area of any team (9) shows that they are creating good chances in this area, not just taking speculative efforts. There is an example of how Spurs penetrate a back four with quick combinations in the GIF below:

Spurs penetrate centrally.

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In this first image, Eriksen pulls a player away from Dier, giving him time. Alderweireld and Dembele have pushed up in halfback positions to provide access to the halfspaces. Spurs have each fullback wide, high enough to draw the interest of the opposition defence, but also deep enough to be a viable passing options in two rhombuses that have formed (Adeweireld, Eriksen, Trippier, Son and Dembele, Eriksen, Alli and Davies).

The ball is switched to Alderweireld. Tottenham have a 3v2 overload in the wing and halfspace (ignore Kane) which can be utilised if Alderweireld carried the ball forward. Most teams would probably play wide to Trippier at this point. Alderweireld does neither.

Instead, Alderweireld takes a touch and shifts it back to Dier. Palace are now less centrally compact. A passing lane has formed in between Alli and Eriksen, Kane peels off the centre-backs to receive the ball and then combines quickly with Eriksen who plays Alli in on goal. Alli, who played in a deeper midfield role for MK Dons, thrives playing off the shoulder of Harry Kane for Tottenham.

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Weaknesses

Spurs are an efficient attacking force and some of their players naturally need fine tuning as to how to play in an attacking structure like this. Dembele and Dier aren’t highly intelligent as to when to get the ball into overloaded areas quickly and at times play the ball too slowly. After a left-back, I would say Pochettino should prioritise adding an elite pivot to his squad should he still be Tottenham manager going into next season.

Tottenham also play too many long diagonal balls. They do this to create 1v1s in wide areas and progress up the pitch however they are often misplaced or generally not effective. As I have mentioned before, just because the space is out wide, it doesn’t mean that this is the area the ball should be put into.

Pressing

Spurs’ pressing is perhaps less tactically complex and intense than that of a team such as Roger Schmidt’s Bayer Leverkusen however it is far ahead of any pressing scheme the Premier League has possibly ever seen. It’s more of a  semi man-orientated system where the man with the ball at feet and his immediate options will be pressed as and when applicable while the overall defensive shape is held. Spurs’ pressing is very local to where the ball is and is aimed at preventing the opposition from progressing up the field vertically as well as at times forcing them to play to isolated players on the touchlines.

Spurs’ horizontally compact pressing.

Here, the Palace player receives the ball on the left flank. The whole Tottenham team moves up onto the nearest man to restrict the player’s options and force him to play the rushed pass. Notice how Tottenham have overloaded the flank with five players, making sure there is no way Palace can play the ball vertically through this area successfully. Son presses the ball while also preventing the pass up the touchline. The other key point is that the team all push up towards the ball and restrict the ball player’s space. Most Premier league teams would drop off into their organised 4-4-1-1 defensive shape and have one or two players feebly pressing the area the ball is in when the opposition has the ball this high up the pitch.

Here we have another example of how Spurs force the opposition to switch play by remaining horizontally compact in the column of the pitch the ball is in:

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In ‘1.’ we can see Tottenham’s high line and compact coverage, again there is no way Everton can proceed up the line. They are forced to switch play over to Baines at left-back who is isolated. Tottenham shuffle across more effectively than Everton do and stick tight to his options, forcing him play to Kone who is challenged and Tottenham win the ball. This is an example of how Tottenham’s pressing is aimed at diverting the ball out of an area which is potentially dangerous into one where Tottenham have control.

The GIF below sums up their basic but effective pressing style. Ball-local, preventing turns and preventing them switching play.

Palace forced into isolated player.

Similar to the previous images, Spurs force Palace to play square balls along the back and then into a player who is isolated and marked tightly by Danny Rose. He cannot turn.

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As the opposition travels with the ball over the halfway line, Tottenham then tend to settle into an extremely vertically compact 4-4-1-1 shape with Alli and Kane pressing while the other players block passing lanes to potential players in between the lines. They have quite good lateral coverage of the pitch as shown below. They play with a high-ish defensive line which allows them to have this vertical compactness. Their centre-backs are man-orientated on the opposition’s centre-forwards and this vertical compactness allows a central midfielder to step into the defensive line should the centre-backs be pulled too far apart.

Spurs’ 4-4-1-1 defensive shape.

Weaknesses

Tottenham’s pressing, because of its lack of structure, is sometimes weak and easy to pass around. It also sometimes lacks co-ordination and would obviously benefit from a bit more work in training, especially for newer players such as Heung-Min Son.

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Leicester have the ball in an area which Tottenham have controlled due to good man-orientated coverage. As the ball is played forward to a dropping man however, Son tries to press the man, engaging in the ball-orientated pressing he was trained in at Leverkusen with Schmidt. This player wouldn’t need to be pressed by Son as Trippier has him covered. The player simply plays back to the man he has received from who plays it to the player Son has vacated to wrongly press the first receiver. This, if anything, is an example of how, contrary to some popular belief, pressing schemes must be strategically worked on and it isn’t enough for a manager to just tell his team to “press”. Pochettino no doubt does work hard on his pressing strategy in training although in this example Son has reverted to old habits and engaged in the wrong pressing strategy.

Conclusion

I hope I’ve given a brief outline on how Tottenham structure their attack and defence. Mauricio Pochettino has really proved himself to be a fantastic ‘coach’ who takes the players he has and works with them in training to produce fantastic things on the pitch. The fact that they have also scored more goals than any other team in the league from set pieces is testament to this. In attack, they use basic Juego De Posicion principles to harbour a successful yet entertaining possession game, and in defence they use local compactness and pressing to stop the opposition progressing up the field in certain areas and guiding them to areas which Spurs themselves can control.

I will be fascinated to see if their positional play can be as effective against some of the top defences in Europe and if their basic pressing strategy will be found out against sides that can move the ball very efficiently. It looks as if Tottenham’s Champions League spot is nailed on so this is an exciting prospect for next season for fans of attractive possession football. I also believe they have all the credentials to mount a serious title challenge for this season, a goal which I think they’ll be successful in achieving.

I hope you enjoyed this post. If anyone would like the screenshots from the scenarios I’ve shown above, or if you have any other comments or queries, please use the section below.

Tottenham hosted Manchester United on Sunday evening knowing that only a victory would keep their slim hopes alive in their attempts to keep pace with leaders Leicester City who built a 10 point lead with a 2-0 win over Sunderland.  The stakes were high for United as well who could remain one point behind rivals Manchester City in the race to secure a top four finish.

Line-ups

Fosu-Mensah’s role & United’s narrowness

From the beginning of the game one of the more interesting aspects was the positioning of United’s nominal right back; Timothy Fosu-Mensah. He was seen acting primarily in the right half space both out of possession and when United had the ball on the left side appearing as a third centre back or defensive midfield player.

In possession he often drifted centrally and created a situational back 3 which gave United a more centrally-oriented build-up, despite an unclean structure, as opposed to circulating in unstable wide areas. The temporary back 3 meant United could outnumber Spurs’ two forward pressing scheme without use of the midfielders who could then occupy higher positions within Tottenham’s block theoretically giving United more vertical options to progress.

With Mata often on the touchline when United had the ball on the right side the passes from right back to right wing would be diagonal giving Mata the chance to receive on the half turn from where he could move infield. Eriksen could be seen defending quite centrally in reaction to his direct opponent which at times meant Mata was isolated against Danny Rose. For a player with the skill set necessary to beat opponents in such situations this movement would have been helpful. However for Mata these moments were quite unfavourable.

At times Mensah would overlap Mata diagonally after passing to him thus creating space for Mata to move infield towards the half space giving United more dynamic positioning in attack. It also gave United the chance to provoke more reactions from the hosts’ defence who would have to decide quickly whether to follow their direct opponents and end up in unnatural positions or switch quickly.

Upon turnovers Fosu-Mensah’s central positioning gave Smalling the chance to mark Kane tightly with adequate cover behind him. This was vital given that Kane’s hold up play in these situations are integral to Spurs’ counter attacks as he can retain the ball under pressure and lay it off into advancing team mates. There were also one or two situations whereby his positioning allowed him to make interceptions and prevent counter attacks due to acting in positions like a defensive midfielder as opposed to more common high and wide positioning whereby he would have to recover his position upon possession turnovers.

This in addition to Mata’s variable role from a nominal right wing position meant United often had an extremely narrow shape which had some interesting effects.

Offensively it gave United the potential for quick combination play due to the proximity of players to one another. United seemed keen to exploit this and attempted to force the ball into congested areas with the nearby team-mates offering an option to release the inevitable mounting pressure after a vertical progression. With Mata roaming from the right wing United’s attacks were, as usual, heavily focused on the left wing where Martial’s ability to beat an opponent and instigate quick interactions could be fully exploited. This offensive behaviour differed quite starkly to United’s usual possession game whereby fairly large distances are covered with often sub-optimal connections and the potential to switch the play and stretch an opposition defence is always maintained.

While United’s narrowness harmed their ability to switch the ball and manipulate Spurs’ defence through long shifts it gave them quite a high level of stability in defensive transitions. Counterpressing is of course easier to execute when there are shorter distances between players and a favourable numerical situation in relation to your opponents. Whilst playing directly into congested areas and combining was an atypically unstable approach for United’s possession game this was balanced out by their enhanced ability to counterpress.

With at least numerical equality around the ball, United prevented counter attacks with an interesting counterpressing scheme. Upon turnovers United’s forwards would attack the ball fairly aggressively whilst aiming to cover opponents in their cover shadow, Carrick and Schneiderlin would maintain a central position remaining behind the ball, however they also pushed up to either intercept or attack recipients of vertical passes. The first layer worked well to rush the ball carrier which in turn made the jobs of the midfielders in the second layer simpler who often completed the ball recoveries.

This gave United a somewhat sterile dominance of the opening exchanges and although Spurs gradually got a foothold in the game they were largely unable to expose the inherent flaws in United’s heavily man-oriented defence in the first half.

Spurs’ initial progression issues

For much of the first half, and indeed the game, Spurs struggled to build-up cleanly against United’s trademark man-orientations despite having a fairly clean positional structure. In the first half they were often caught in midfield with Lingard, Schneiderlin and Carrick having strong coverage of their direct opponents and building high resistance to progressions. At other times they were forced wide and the full-backs had to drop and occupy deep positions.

This was not effective for Tottenham and they were often trapped into playing long from these areas which was, of course, was not suitable for maintaining possession. With the full-backs acting deeper than usual and the team frequently losing possession Tottenham experienced suffered from a territorial disadvantage. This of course translated into difficulty in offensive transitions upon gaining possession as their deep positioning meant they lacked an out ball and they thus spent large periods of the first period within their own half.

Positional rotations are of course one of the most effective methods of unsettling a man-marking scheme. Such rotations challenge the opponents to maintain coverage against a moving opponent or to regain coverage of a different nearby opponent quickly so as not to lose access and compromise the team’s efforts.

In building situations Dembele, Dier and Alli/Eriksen lacked effective movement to lose their markers and their fairly static positioning made the lives of United’s man-oriented midfielders easier. Whilst they were not completely static their movements were made at a low intensity which meant it was not particularly challenging to mark them.

Furthermore it gave United time to re-orient themselves in the case of their initial man moving too far out of their normal positions. Due to United’s access-creating man-orientations, practically every pass Spurs made in their build-up was made under pressure and generally they lacked individual press resistance with Van Gaal’s side generally coming on top in the duels. On the rare occasions where they managed to retain possession under pressure they could advance deep into United’s half and create potentially hazardous situations.

Spurs bypass the press

With building through the midfield particularly difficult Spurs had to find an alternative to beat United’s press and create offensive possibilities. Pochettino instructed his full-backs to revert to a more advanced position after the interval in a bid to gain territorial dominance and provide an outlet against United’s pressure. They found some respite by drawing United in and switching to the under-loaded side where Rose or Walker were often available to receive. With United’s narrow shape in possession translating into a fairly ball-oriented shape out of it they created access fairly well but on the occasions where they did not prevent the switch they could not build access quickly on the far side due to the big distances they needed to make up. This gave Tottenham time to build attacks and the likes of Eriksen and Dembele moved to support the receiver to prevent them being isolated and to consolidate possession in these areas.

When Spurs managed to consolidate possession deep into their opponents’ half United’s man-orientations were less effective and easier to manipulate. With the full-backs acting in very advanced positions United’s man-oriented wingers were at times dragged into deep and wide positions sometimes even joining the back line and creating a situational 6-chain. This was very unstable as United thus lacked control of the centre. Despite Pochettino’s men enjoying superiority in the centre in these moments they failed to fully exploit the opportunities it threw up mainly through hasty decision making.

In the above situation Dier attempts a first time shot which given the distance, the goalkeeper and the sheer number of bodies in the way was not a great idea. While no options seem immediately appealing, if he took the ball forward and committed an opponent such as Rojo or Martial to come forward Kane or Walker could have become viable options in potentially dangerous positions.

The aforementioned long switches being used as a means of bypassing United’s press was particularly evident in the third and final goal of the game. Spurs began their build-up right on the edge of their box with Walker positioned centrally as part of a back 3.

When a team are ball-oriented and subsequently horizontally compact they need to establish access to prevent the opponents from easily exploiting the far side through switches. Perhaps through a combination of fatigue and Walker’s slightly odd positioning United failed to do so after Alderweireld’s excellent curled pass bypassed Martial’s attempt to shadow Walker. This gave Walker time to pick out a long diagonal switch from where Rose also had time to pick out a low cross which Lamela converted. This is Fosu-Mensah’s presence was missed, without wishing to overstate his influence United conceded all three goals within 10 minutes of his substitution. Part of it is due to his characteristics as Mensah is a physically imposing defender who enjoys getting tight to opponents backing his pace to recover, whilst his replacement, Darmian, excels in other aspects.

Conclusion

Whilst the game lacked a certain level of quality this was at times due to the compactness and intensity of both sides in pressing and counterpressing situations and a low level of press resistance leading to several turnovers of possession. These elements of the game were clear in the frankly ridiculous passage of play below.

I analysed #Spurs 3-0 win over #Mufc https://t.co/LdNuE2MZE0
The game was at times typically chaotic pic.twitter.com/qVyUpEPoE0

— Judah Davies (@1415football) April 11, 2016

Despite the margin of victory Spurs were not particularly impressive in possession or offensively and the score line flattered them to an extent. What was impressive however was their defensive resolve limiting United’s, admittedly blunt, attack to one real chance all game. Furthermore they demonstrated an impressive mentality to press home their advantage whilst United were rocking. As for United they were typically blunt offensively rarely troubling Tottenham even when they had a level of control in the first half which may prove to be a setback in their revived top four challenge.

After a tense first leg, both teams faced up at Anfield in a much greater attacking focus and the result was a more chaotic game. It was decided by intelligent changes from Klopp in the second half as he produced another miracle, yet this time from the opposite dugout.

The formation changes by both coaches.

Formational Changes

It was interesting two see changes in shape from both dugouts after the stalemate in Germany. The most surprising adaption came from Tuchel, who abandoned the 3-chain which we saw in the first leg as he opted for a much more orthodox 4-2-3-1 shape; one similar to what we saw throughout the hindrunde. Piszczek moved into a more standard full-back role whilst Castro joined Weigl as a double pivot. Kagawa came into the 10 position and was headed by the attack of Reus, Mkhitaryan and Aubameyang.

Klopp also moved away from his 4-3-2-1 shape used in the first clash and opted for a similar 4-2-3-1 shape. Roberto Firmino came into the aside in place of Jordan Henderson as he moved to a position on the right side of the attack. Being back at Anfield, this was immediately a more attacking set-up from the now-hosts as they looked to create better support around Origi who was often isolated in the first leg with Liverpool’s direct ‘smash-and-grab’ game.

Tuchel’s Defensive Shift

Another big change from the last match was Tuchel’s defensive strategy as his team now defended in not only a largely different shape, but in a significantly lower block too. During Liverpool’s construction they were more passive and there were many less attempts to actively create defensive access (an ability to press the ball effectively) when there wasn’t any before.

With the change of shape, Dortmund dropped into what was between a 4-4-2 and a 4-4-1-1 based on the positioning of Shinji Kagawa. The two forwards were primarily passive and would cover any passing angles into the Liverpool pivot with their cover shadows. On the occasions they would move up, it would only when defensive security was sufficient and the rest of the block rarely followed higher.

Through a deeper-situated defence, Dortmund ended up winning back possession in deeper positions and therefore often had greater space to counter-attack into. During offensive transition, they worked to exploit the problems Liverpool caused themselves through their weak shape and broke well through the centre.

Liverpool’s structure before losing the ball for the first goal. Counterpressing is near-impossible.

This change was ultimately successful, or at least in the opening stages of the game, as Dortmund put themselves into an early 2-0 lead. Both goals came from regains in deep positions followed by fast counter-attacks with the attacking quartet playing a large role in both.

The first came after an attack inside Dortmund’s third broke down with a misplaced pass on the wing. Liverpool were very poorly structured to form any counterpress and Dortmund were able to break quickly towards the opposition goal.

Reus beats a succession of defenders and opens space to play the through-ball to Aubameyang for the 2-0.

In the second, Liverpool’s structure was improved but still quite weak with particularly poor vertical staggering. The breakthrough came more from some strong dribbling by Reus who was then able to thread Aubameyang through into space behind, after the Gabonese forward initially had moved away to create a separation from Sakho on his blind-side.

Liverpool Exploit Compactness Issues

In comparison to the first leg, Liverpool’s attacking ability improved by some distance as a result of Klopp’s adaptions as well as some deficiencies in the German shape.

Defending in their 4-4-2 formation, Dortmund possessed some issues with compactness when they were without the ball and were particularly stretched horizontally. This was to some extent influenced by the orientation of the two wide midfielders as both Mkhitaryan and Reus were situationally oriented to the respective Liverpool full-backs. The result of this was quite a poor coverage of the half-spaces during these moments and Dortmund’s control of the three central columns was lacking. Although their coverage of the full-back was not as tight as you see in most teams, it created somewhat of a disconnect between the winger and his ball-near 8 at times which gave Liverpool opportunity to take advantage.

When the wingers weren’t focused on covering a wider player, Tuchel’s side still had some issues in spatial coverage which stemmed more from weak staggering of the midfield as well as a similar level of low compactness across the whole block. Aside from the orientation of the wingers, the man-oriented nature of Weigl and Castro was also momentarily problematic for Dortmund when faced with Liverpool’s central trio.

In their own right however, Liverpool were much stronger with the ball than the first leg. Away in Dortmund, Klopp took on much more of a ‘smash-and-grab’ strategy and looked to disrupt Dortmund’s defence through numerous long balls to Origi – something which ultimately payed off as the Belgian striker opened the scoring.

Back at home, their attack was much more multi-faceted and their now-occasional direct game was complemented with better ball circulation on the floor too. The formational change supported Liverpool’s attempts too as they benefited from better occupation of the attacking midfield zone with improved spacing across the attack. Their extra attacking midfielder was important in Liverpool progressing the ball between the Dortmund lines and they were more often able to find the ball behind the pairing of Weigl and Castro, often in the half-spaces which were left unprotected as I mentioned above.

Although their possession was often somewhat restricted to the flanks against Dortmund’s 4-4-2, Liverpool spaced the wings quite well and with situational overloads through the movements of the ‘3’ were able to move the ball back inside through the half-spaces. Their attacking shape commonly allowed at least 2 forwards to shift over to the ball-near half-space and with the support of a full-back and ball-near 8

Dortmund’s Improved Attack

Dortmund themselves were also better in possession with the switch to a 4-2-3-1 helping their cause at Anfield. The issues they faced with the defensive line in the first leg were no longer in effect and they had greater presences in higher zones too. With Weigl now supported by Castro in the first line of midfield, Tuchel’s side were more able to progress the ball out of the build-up phase with stronger overloads being created around the Liverpool press.

Their biggest improvement came in the higher areas where the introduction of Kagawa in place of Durm resulted in a more dynamic attack based around breaking through the left of the pitch. The Japanese 10 frequently moved towards the left where he could combine with Reus and Schmelzer whilst Castro moved forward into the centre from a deeper position. Dortmund were able to focus their attacks around particular spaces and their capacity to structure themselves for combinations was improved too.

Moved out to a position on the right, Mkhitaryan was isolated at times but dealt better with this role than in previous performances. He frequently moved inside towards the centre where he could act as a free man and occupy spaces which Kagawa left whilst when he was in possession on the right he was more successful in dribbles whilst his capacity to keep the ball helped too.

Whilst Liverpool’s change of shape gave them better presence in the half-spaces, their own protection of the same areas was decreased in defence. The ‘2’ of Milner and Can were unable to cover the midfield as widely as they had done with Henderson last week and Milner’s tendencies to man-mark out of possession often left his teammate stranded in deeper positions. Whilst their horizontal compactness in midfield had been such an important factor in their defensive stability in Dortmund, they were much more stretched last night and Dortmund had greater success between the lines.

Klopp’s Changes and Dortmund’s Loss of Control

Klopp’s change to a narrow 4-2-2-2/4-1-2-1-2 shape.

After the interval, the game became much more hectic as Klopp’s side looked to cause a more chaotic game which, at 0-2, would give them a good chance to get back into the game. Tuchel’s Dortmund are a team which depends largely on control of the game and tempo in possession of the ball with their philosophy on positional play. When they don’t have control over the rhythm, they tend to struggle quite significantly with and without possession of the ball.

In possession of the ball, Liverpool’s midfield became significantly narrower with smaller distances between the forwards whilst Milner was given even more licence to take up advanced positions off of the ball. This adaption gave the hosts greater presence in attack and disrupted the stability of the game with their greater attacking focus which made both teams less secure in defence. In chase of the game, the intensity of their pressing also became greater and Dortmund’s already-limited ability to construct possession from deep became even more restrained.

Just after the game moved into the final 30 minutes, Klopp made a clearer change as Liverpool moved into a loose 4-2-2-2 shape through the introduction of Sturridge and Allen. Milner and Can (later Leiva) acted in the first line of midfield whilst Allen and Coutinho played extremely attacking roles higher up. Daniel Sturridge came into the game and played high alongside Divock Origi.

The result of these substitutions was an extremely attacking formation which created large numbers in attacking areas. Liverpool tempo in possession increased massively and looked to use this increased presence in attack to use combinations through the centre of the pitch and have better success when they took a direct approach. The impact was almost immediate as a fast exchange of passes in the 65th minute resulted in a Coutinho shot which beat Weidenfeller’s left hand to make it 3-4 on aggregate.

Klopp changed shape in the 62nd for greater presence in the central attacks allowing for better combinations #lfc pic.twitter.com/UrAFEdoica

— Tom Payne (@TomPayneftbl) April 15, 2016

With an overload of players in the attacking zones, destabilised much of the remaining order in the game and played extremely vertical as they looked to constantly attack the Dortmund box. The German side’s already-weak control was progressively diminishing as the second half wore on and their defence simply didn’t cope against the strong offensive pressure from Klopp’s team.

Tuchel’s reaction to the game’s rhythm changes was quite poor and also had a part to play in the final result. In reaction to Liverpool’s heightened attacking focus, Dortmund sat deeper and deeper and placed little pressure on the opposition in deeper spaces. The hosts dominated the counterpressing and could restart many attacks immediately after a clearance whilst Dortmund’s ability to maintain possession was nowhere to be seen against opposition pressing.

The switch to a 5-man defensive line only emphasised the issues Dortmund previously had and the introduction of Gündogan was far too late as by that time, Liverpool were completely in control of the match. His decision to replace Kagawa for Ginter to achieve greater defensive presence immediately backfired too, as they conceded from corner to the front post where Kagawa had intercepted every single one previously.

Conclusion

In summary, Klopp’s strong tactical changes in the second half inspired a complete turnaround in the game. He deprived Dortmund of the one thing they require most and the rhythm of the game changed entirely. The switch to increase attacking presence created significant pressure on the Dortmund defence until a cleverly-worked deep free-kick resulted in Lovren winning the quarter-final tie for the hosts.

They are leading the Premier League by a margin of seven points and seem to be the hottest thing in English football right now. This is the Spielverlagerung analysis of Leicester City…

I personally remember Claudio Ranieri when he was the Chelsea head coach in the early 2000s. In a Champions League semi-final encounter with Monaco in 2004, Didier Deschamps outcoached him roundly. It was the time when Roman Abramovich became the man in charge at the Blues, and there was no room for a dinosaur such as Ranieri who could not keep up with young guns like Deschamps or José Mourinho, his eventual successor.

Ranieri continued his journey across Europe, managing six clubs in the next ten years. He ended up in Greece, where the football association appointed him as national coach after the 2014 FIFA World Cup, only to fire him a few months later following a defeat against the Faroe Islands, of all teams.

At this point, a coach in his sixties should probably think about retirement. Ranieri, however, returned to England. On July 13 2015, Leicester City, who had barely escaped relegation from the Premier League the season before, announced him as the club’s new manager on a three-year contract.

A supposedly washed-up coach with a bunch of journeymen wanted to solidify their position in the league. They have beaten all expectations, including their own. Leicester’s fans now chant Ranieri’s name with passion. The old man earned the respect of many. Is it a modern football fairy tale or just the consequence of circumstances?

Squad

In a wider European context, one could question if a club that signs players such as Shinji Okazaki or Gökhan Inler can even be considered the underdog. Okazaki was an important piece of the puzzle at Mainz before he joined Leicester. Inler was linked to teams like Schalke prior to his signing. Maybe Leicester are an underdog in the Premier League, where huge television deals provide money clubs in the rest of Europe, even in the Bundesliga, simply don’t have. Yet, on a grand scale, this team possesses significant quality.

The Foxes spent almost £40m last summer. The old core of the team remained unchanged, yet the club added important players to their squad, who turned out to be crucial for their success this season. Having said that, Leicester have a relatively small roster that got even thinner in the winter when Ritchie de Laet and Andrej Kramarić left on loan deals.

Unlike his stint at Chelsea, where constant rotation earned him the moniker of “the Tinkerman,” Ranieri now seemingly likes to operate with a small circle of players. He barely changes the starting XI or makes use of a heavy rotation policy. He trusts the 16 to 20 players who have carried his system so far. Many of them flew under the radar prior to his season. The likes of Riyad Mahrez and Jamie Vardy didn’t even play for first division teams before they came to Leicester. Now they, as well as team-mate N’Golo Kanté are among the six nominees for the PFA Players’ POTY.

Line-up

Ranieri consistently sticks to the system he introduced when beginning his stint at the club. Leicester’s 4-4-2 is a classic English formation that usually has significant flaws, especially when employed by a team who want to put emphasis on possession football. In Leicester’s case, the 4-4-2 serves very well as a base for their concept.

The Italian head coach changed his team’s shape only a few times, e.g. against Manchester City last December when he utilised a 4-1-4-1 formation which, however, limited the lone striker’s influence and isolated him from the rest of the team.

Ranieri’s 4-4-2 provides more presence upfront, while it is also easy to maintain spatial compactness in defence. The shape does not change after turning the ball over, though it can be referred to as 4-4-1-1 in defence, but this is just a matter of how one uses numbering in regards to formations.

Formation | Positions & Passing Network

Players’ influence

From back to front, let’s take a quick look at Ranieri’s key players on the pitch. Both centre-backs, Robert Huth and skipper Wes Morgan, usually have an advantage in aerial duels, but the two rather inflexible defenders should not leave the centre too often. Their skill sets certainly suit Leicester’s defensive approach, although a lack of speed hinders them from playing a higher back line to squeeze the space between them and the midfielders even more. Both Huth and Morgan are normally at the end of an opponents’ attacking play, when Leicester’s centre-backs only have to clear crossed passes in a best-case scenario, as the Foxes intend to contain central attacks at all cost.

Left-back Christian Fuchs is regarded as one of the best full-backs in England these days, only months after he seemed to be a player on the decline when leaving Schalke. The Austria international is one-dimensional, yet has almost perfect attributes to serve Ranieri’s system well, given his durability and solid speed compared to other full-backs. Fuchs ousted home-grown player Jeff Schlupp after the first phase of the season and has not lost his spot since. Danny Simpson on the other side of the back four possesses similar strengths.

In midfield, Kanté and Danny Drinkwater complement each other beautifully, so there is no conflict of interest due to similar intentions on the pitch. Kanté is the workhorse in a more defensive role, while Drinkwater, not less persistent, has become a box-to-box authority who links up with every team-mate on the pitch.

On the wings, Marc Albrighton has a better understanding of group-tactical processes than Mahrez, who appears to be the best pure footballer of the team, but is not gifted with the highest football IQ, which doesn’t hinder him from breaking through opposing defences on a regular basis. He often acts as a soloist who is isolated from the rest of the team and has no connection to his team-mates. That’s why he appears to be out on his own on many occasions.

Albrighton, on the other side, is not as talented with the ball at his feet as Mahrez, but the 26-year-old knows how to find open spaces and when to use them properly. Solely from a team standpoint, Albrighton can support Leicester’s strikers better than Mahrez, who, however, offers a threat to every defence in the league, which makes him valuable to this team in his own way. Particularly if Vardy is asked to frequently drift to the right side, Mahrez can pick up layoff passes after moving diagonally towards the middle.

But other than that, he forces one-on-ones which does not fit to Leicester’s philosophy that well, yet he can be effective due to his technical ability and his vision for open pockets he can rush into. The Algerian international has improved in terms of end product, but remains an unknown factor if Leicester’s form declines one day.

Data via WhoScored. As always, credit goes to Ted Knutson for establishing this sort of diagram.

Up front, Okazaki has secured his spot next to Vardy, after a close battle with Leonardo Ulloa in the first half of the season. Once a clinical poacher at Mainz, the Japanese forward now interacts with Vardy with altruistic motives. In an offense with two strikers, he has the higher defensive work rate of the two.

Vardy has become a superstar in England thanks to his clean finishing and fast-paced counter-attacking style. A short and lightweight striker, Vardy outpaces the vast majority of Premier League defenders with ease, which is important to Ranieri’s pivotal strategy.

Strategic characteristics

Speaking of which, before Ranieri was able to introduce the finer points of his tactical system he had to have a basic idea, a fundament on which he could build the house. To put it simply, the idea is solely about making transitions, from the principles of counter-attacks to the shifts between single phases of pressing.

This is the concept, and it leads to their using a form of counter-dynamism, which means they react on the rhythm instead of setting the pace of a match, capitalising on the opposite force that is generated by quick transition plays.

I once read a comment on FourFourTwo where someone compared Leicester’s tactics to guerrilla warfare versus traditional armies. It is quite a stretch, but the more I think about it, the more a like the comparison. Leicester enjoy the chaos and benefit from the inflexibility of many opponents.

In a rather static environment, they don’t feel comfortable. If opponents don’t do them a favour in trying to determine the course of a match while in reality allowing Leicester to exploit openings, it has to be at least a chaotic match.

Contextually, they find ways to implant a certain impetus into the game, enabling the encounter with another team to move in the direction they want. Knowing they thrive in chaos, it can even be a goal to cause turmoil and destroy structures that otherwise could lead to a more conventional trial of strength which doesn’t usually favour Leicester.

The Foxes aren’t usually the superior side on many occasions. However, given the confidence and self-understanding they have developed, they believe in their ability to overcome obstacles, to beat a team that is more talented on paper, and to follow the plan laid out by Signore Ranieri.

And after all, the recent success has given them the confidence to even act like an experienced top-tier team, when, for instance, they drag the ball upfield or play slow one-on-ones to run down the clock in order to secure a lead. Leicester is new to the party, but that doesn’t mean they don’t learn quickly, while maintaining their special style of play.

Sacchi-esque defensive approach

As someone who started his coaching career in Italy in the mid-1980s, Arrigo Sacchi inevitably influenced Ranieri’s way of thinking of and looking at football. But not only did Sacchi affect him on a meta level, certain facets of Sacchi’s tactics find expression in Ranieri’s approach in practice today.

A clear-cut 4-4-2 with emphasis on spatial compactness is textbook Sacchi. Sports Illustrated‘s Liviu Bird pointed out the similarities in a piece in December.

“Sacchi wanted a maximum of 25 yards between his defenders and forwards and a high line that would compress the playable area of the pitch to his team’s advantage. Out of possession, the current Leicester displays similar tendencies, leaving little space for opponents to play centrally.” (Liviu Bird)

In the first phase of pressing, both forwards move laterally a lot, switching between the opposing players they are asked to man-mark in what is zone-orientated man coverage. The midfield line, meanwhile, moves in regards to the ball position and always keeps the initial shape. Only one of the wingers pushes a few yards forward if the opposing team move the ball to his side. The ball-near winger could pressure the ball-carrier on the wing by running towards him, although a strictly man-orientated approach doesn’t appear to be part of Ranieri’s plan.

Leicester’s general pressing structure, including their scheme of zones.

Rather, he wants his advanced winger to keep a connection to the centre, while the other line of four – most of the time it is the back line – should not be wider than the penalty area. The idea of narrowing at least one line or both lines at best resembles Sacchi’s concept of compactness.

This is a sketch from Sacchi showing his pressing idea for his 1994 Italy national team.

Leicester’s narrow defence today

It is obvious that Ranieri divides the pitch into three vertical zones, as his team should only occupy two of them at any moment. Therefore, Leicester’s strategist puts no emphasis on a half-space-dominated concept of space. His zone-orientated man-marking scheme paired with said focus on vertical compactness lead to spatial control in the middle of the park.

Leicester’s centre-midfielders cover opposing players as long as they are positioned near them. They follow opposite midfielders, who drop back to escape the tight zones, only to the own forward line and go back in position quickly after letting the opposing player leave the protected area.

This kind of control helps them intercept passes across the middle. First, tight man coverage closes down passing options. Second, the opponents’ natural reaction by leaving the centre leads to Leicester dominating the middle.

Man-orientated midfield

In the second phase of pressing, Leicester continue their ball-orientated shifting and zone-orientated man-marking, except for throw-ins where the far-side winger closes the distance to colleagues in midfield, so he could run into higher central zones in case Leicester win the ball.

After guiding the other team towards one flank, Vardy and Okazaki threaten the opponents’ backspace, being positioned on a diagonal line, with the centre-forward on the far side higher up the pitch. The ball-near forward uses backwards pressing to apply pressure from behind, or he waits in the half-space next to the ball-carrier to close down two or three short-pass options and block passing lanes towards the opponents’ backfield. What is more, the rather deep position allows said centre-forward to fill in the hole in midfield if one of the centre-midfielders chases an opponent down goalwards.

As for Leicester’s full-backs, they are usually positioned centrally and leave their position only occasionally, when moving towards the touchline after an opposing winger received the ball behind Leicester’s midfield line or the opposing team played a quick transition attack through the wing. If a full-back charges forward to pressure the ball-carrier, a 3-5-2 emerges for a moment – until the nearby midfielder drops into the full-back’s initial position.

Otherwise, both full-backs keep their positions near the centre-backs to narrow the gaps for through balls. It is also necessary to keep contact with Huth and Morgan, as both centre-backs shouldn’t leave the middle, because of their vulnerability in open spaces.

Once an opposing team are able to pull one of them out of the backline, Leicester are in major trouble.

Both centre-backs are physically impressive, yet lack speed and agility. That’s why Leicester’s back line cannot be too high in order to avoid too many long balls over the top and in behind the centre-backs.

All in all, Leicester’s defensive approach is not spectacular, though it offers so many little details and group tactical aspects that make it tough to get in behind the back line through the middle and create high quality goal scoring opportunities.

Arsenal were able to play through Leicester number six space, but couldn’t enter the penalty area that often. Tottenham completely failed to come through the middle. Graphics by Stats Zone.

Statsbomb‘s James Yorke recently mentioned on Twitter that Leicester’s opponents had an average shot conversion rate of 3.4 percent in the matches against the Foxes from this season’s midpoint onwards.

Pressing is the best playmaker

Their build-up play is as stale as their defensive system is solid. Consequently, pressing and counterpressing have to create goal scoring chances, more or less following Jürgen Klopp’s credo of counterpressing as the best playmaker.

Premier League teams are already primarily focused on wing attacks, so they lack the required structure to build up across the middle. It is, therefore, easy for Leicester to guide them to the wing. Due to the diagonal staggering, their forward line occasionally offers one side, only to isolate the opposition near the touchline.

“Different cultures, levels and leagues have different patterns. Some leagues vary a huge amount, others have teams playing in very similar systems. … Thus, when building the game model it’s important to reflect what this means tactically and what the strengths and weaknesses of the oppositional systems are.” (Spielverlagerung’s René Marić in his piece on ‘How to create a game model’)

Once the opponents are on the wing, it becomes hard to move the ball around Leicester’s block thanks to the centre-forwards’ backwards pressing. Midfielders are two against three quite often, yet squeezing the space provides spatial compactness, which, as explained, forces the opposing midfielders to move back. Thus, Leicester gain control over the centre.

Overall, the transition within the process of pressing is very smooth. It divides Leicester from the vast majority of Premier League teams. To achieve their aim of slowing down opposing attacks on the wing, as opponents move into dead ends, it is indispensable to transform the formation fluently.

Both strikers track the ball, while staying close to the opposing midfielders and making use of cover shadows. The one opposing midfielder who is man-marked by a Leicester midfielder drops back, which gives the Foxes’ midfield the opportunity to control the passing lanes through the centre. After the opposing team played the ball down the flank, Leicester close the space near the ball, while both centre-forwards position themselves intelligently, so they have access to several opponents in the backfield.

The ultimate goal is to set up counter-attacks. In accordance to their general strategy, Leicester appear to be sitting deep passively, but by employing little tricks they gain a huge advantage. As for many matches in this season, turnovers were inevitable.

Comparison of Leicester City’s shots from ‘fast’ and ‘deep’ attacks in 2014-2015 and 2015-2016. Points are coloured by their expected goal value (red = higher xG, lighter = lower xG). Diagram courtesy of Will Gürpınar-Morgan. Read his piece on Leicester here.

Leicester’s Busquets

After winning the ball, both full-backs usually stay deep for a moment, protecting the advancing team-mates and offering passing options in backfield. But ultimately all players, except for the two centre-backs, move upfield to preserve a certain degree of compactness. Drinkwater and especially Kanté are the pivotal points in both defensive and offensive transition.

Speaking of him, Kanté is the heart of the team. Once reduced to his fitness and sturdiness in defensive one-on-ones, now his importance, defensively and offensively, has become blatantly obvious. Of course, the French international doesn’t have the presence of a Sergio Busquets, but he is as essential for Leicester as Busquets is for his team. And, moreover, both share common strengths, although on different levels.

Kanté is mostly convenient to his team and doesn’t serve own purposes. In midfield, he has to protect the more attacking-minded Drinkwater, who sometimes tends to be overaggressive in offensive transition, which is, on the other side, a good aspect, considering Leicester’s reliance on quick attacks after gaining ball possession.

In addition, Kanté is crucial for their counterpressing efficiency, as he usually sits in the shadow of attacking players and lies in wait for vertical passes from the opposition while reading the eyes of a potential passer – similar to a linebacker or safety who reads the quarterback’s eyes.

Afterwards, the Frenchman pitches in the passing lane explosively. As far as counterpressing goes, Kanté, as well as Drinkwater to some extent, has the intuition for rather chaotic situations. If Leicester cannot simply regain ball possession with their pressing approach, a back-and-forth between them and the opponents can occur in the middle of the field, with many changes of possession.

In this context, both centre-midfielders are not only great at winning one-on-ones, but they also have the required spatial and positional awareness to sit back for a moment before rushing out of the backfield in order to surprise the opposing team. It looks like the other team could control the situation, but in fact Leicester’s midfielders just make a feint by pretending to start sitting deep in a waiting position.

Ranieri’s men blur the border between illusion and reality, competing with straightforward Premier League teams with an in-your-face-mentality and therefore with a tendency to walk right into traps without looking left and right.

Auxiliary movement by Kanté

Sans Kanté, the Foxes couldn’t work that effectively. The 25-year-old does all the little things right – like dropping a few yards back, after the ball moved to one of the wingers, to offer a passing option in backfield, avoiding the threat of an immediate loss of possession. As opposed to Drinkwater, Kanté often chooses the safe option at first glance, yet ultimately helps his team to maintain the ball-circulation or simply helps his team-mates to make the right decision.

Kanté is basically an assistant all over the pitch. He has a hand in all things that happen. To put it in a nutshell, Kanté is football.

Blind understanding

The publicly most discussed person is, however, Vardy. Even though from a pure tactical standpoint, it may seem to be unfair to put Vardy over Kanté, many of his performances and consequently many of his numbers are impressive.

Data via WhoScored.

Analyst Will Gürpınar-Morgan underlined in his recent piece, that Vardy is the most effective fast-attacking player over the past four Premier League seasons, with 0.15 fast-attacking expected goals per 90 minutes. In terms of counter-attacking goals, Vardy is second over the past four years with 0.12.

“Vardy’s overall open-play expected goals per 90 minutes stands at 0.26 by my numbers over the past two seasons, so over half of his xG per 90 comes from getting on the end of fast-attacking moves.” (Will Gürpınar-Morgan)

In this regard, many people wonder how Leicester are able to find the out-balls from a deep block, as most of their opening balls seem to accurately go to team-mates up the pitch. There has to be some sort of tactical trigger that gives them the advantage over the defending team.

Indeed, there is, yet it is not the moment of the interception or the turnover in general, but rather the moment prior to that already triggers certain mechanism thanks to the anticipation of the players upfront. Having already turned to make runs before the players at the back can send the ball into the wider areas before or behind the offside line, it shows the good reflexes Leicester’s attacking players, Mahrez and Vardy in particular, have.

Textbook Leicester

What is more, these frequent counter-attacks demonstrate a blind understanding between midfield and offense. In addition to Vardy, who always waits upfront, and Okazaki, his partner in crime, both wingers usually advance really quickly, so Leicester can overload the upper wing zone, that is the main area of a particular counterattack, with two or even three players. In contrast to both full-backs, Mahrez and Albrighton don’t hesitate when it comes to making quick runs to initiate these counter-attacks and therefore overwhelm the opposing team, whose defenders stand with their backs to their goal and have to start out of static positions.

Vardy, as the main target player, usually drifts outwardly to receive a long pass, but keeps an eye on the direct way towards the goal. He can rush towards the touchline, but tries to stay within the half-space. Particularly in situations when Vardy is on his own, it wouldn’t make sense to try to split the centre-backs when there is nobody he could play to. The route between the centre of the pitch and outside lane has become a Vardy trademark move.

Vardy’s usual routes

Vardy has been successful with this route repeatedly. Graphic by Stats Zone.

Okazaki or any other second striker serves as an elementary component in terms of how Leicester set up these Vardy shots. Plus, he can help Vardy out if Leicester’s top goal scorer cannot attempt a shot on his own. Okazaki either drops back to offer the midfielders a short passing outlet for a moment, or drifts towards the zone Vardy has entered to help his team-mate by setting up a short combination play, or he makes a diagonal run into the danger zone staying ready for any kind of cross-field pass.

Diagram courtesy of David Sumpter (Soccermatics).

Every move happens in the light of three elements Leicester’s players always keep in mind: the importance of pace and directness, plus the avoidance of pressure thanks to quick passes into open spaces. And their routine has led to an execution of their style on a consistent basis.

But that doesn’t necessarily mean the Foxes don’t have answers if they cannot execute their initial plan. Vardy and his colleagues from time to time can be great at improvising fast-attacking combination plays, without utilising any of the designed plays.

Nevertheless, they are more comfortable when following a predefined plan and Ranieri provides them with more than one. For instance, if Leicester aren’t able to accelerate from a deep position or by knocking the ball down an outside lane, a winger or full-back who hugs the touchline often receives the ball, while one of the centre-forwards charges upfield. Then a diagonal pass into the space next to the opposing backline or behind the nearby full-back sets another play in motion, as the defence has to react quickly, often giving up the backspace which then is open for Drinkwater or the second striker who doesn’t have to rush into the box in a predictable manner, even though these runs let the defenders’ eyes rivet on him.

Crossing routes, exploiting holes, coming at opponents full force

Despite both full-backs tending to stay deep in the first few moments after their team regain ball possession, their overlapping runs really help to give width in the final third and to expand the passing patterns. First, Fuchs and Simpson are deep to get involved in the ball circulation if necessary. Second, after advancing they then offer options at the halfway line. Third and last, they penetrate the high wing zones next to the opposing penalty are.

Full-backs who provide width combined with four attacking players who run diagonal routes to annihilate man-marking schemes – zone-orientated man-marking as preferred by many English teams – and overwhelm rigid formations, plus at least one on-rushing midfielder result in a dynamic structure which isn’t highly sophisticated, but largely effective, as the constant quality of their shots gives evidence. Only 23.96 percent of Leicester’s shots got blocked by opponents, far less than any of the other title contenders. Leicester are the fifth-best Premier League team in this category.

To point out one aspect that is not perfect as of now, Leicester are so focused on playing said diagonal balls into the designated landing zones that they quite often neglect an open inside lane. It has worked so well that they probably ignore alternatives.

Speaking of alternatives, crossed passes belong to their style, yet Leicester use these only when it is situationally required. Although long balls are crucial elements of their attacking style, goalkeeper punts aren’t utilised effectively. Typically, the ‘keeper knocks the ball over the heads of both centre-forwards, without them as well as the midfielders being positioned properly and therefore compactly enough to win rebounds or force duels.

Set-pieces can be of importance, though Leicester don’t rely on any specific tactics other than having two towers in Huth and Morgan who, of course, are always likely to score after crossed free-kicks or corners. Besides free-kicks, corners and conventional crosses, which can lead to goal scoring opportunities, Fuchs’ throw-ins have been a consciously used weapon so far, because his throws have almost the length and pace of crossed passes.

Knowing your limits

It remains questionable how long Leicester can perform with their unique style at the top. Because, on a downside, their build-up play is improvable, as they suffer from many losses of possession in static environments. With both full-backs being positioned deep and all attacking players normally charging forward in the initial build-up, there is a lack of connection between the first and the forward line. Only if opponents press with only one player upfront, one of Leicester’s centre-backs dares to move a couple of yards forward.

Build-up structure shows lack of connection between Leicester’s interior players.

No matter against whom they play, Leicester stick to their strategy of constant wing attacks. Graphic by Stats Zone.

But normally the success of their build-up play, when not having the opportunity to capitalise on transitional situations, relies on both centre-midfielders, who begin every spell of possession in the middle next to each other. From there they start moving vertically. Kanté often drops back to get in front of the opposing block, escaping the pressure to screen the field, though the possibility of build-up play via ground passes is reduced.

In fact, they deprive themselves of the possibility to add more variables to their attacking game, which isn’t shockingly surprising when speaking of a Premier League team. Even when considering their altered status, that doesn’t necessarily mean that Leicester are forced to be more creative when in possession of the ball. Since the beginning of the year, their average percentage of possession hasn’t increased significantly, as this is due to the characteristic of the league and due to Leicester’s ability to make matches chaotic.

“Over games 17 to 28 in the Premier League, their shots from possessions starting in their own half tumbled by 50%. Meanwhile, the expected goals from these possessions – a measure of how good their chances were – fell by 25%.” (Sean Ingle, Guardian.com)

Number of created chances declined after Matchday 17. Diagram by Squawka.

In recent weeks, Leicester’s matches gave the impression that opponents were more successful with pressing in midfield. However, while the total number of shots from counter-attacks fell, the quality of shots taken following counter-attacks rose.

The Foxes lay emphasis on long balls that can bypass a lot of players and bridge much space at once. Even though it hasn’t become easier to deploy these trademark balls, attacks that get through the press are still a dangerous threat to every defence.

“Currently, the Foxes have about the same expected goals total per match as Tottenham in a simple shots-based model. But they also take about a quarter fewer shots per match than Tottenham. And, as you’d expect, their expected goals per shot are about a third higher and also the highest in the league.” (Dan Altman)

Where shall they end up?

Almost everyone already expected a decline after Christmas – a regression toward the mean, if you will. Yet, Leicester proved forecasts wrong to the delight of Ranieri and his players. Most of them stayed healthy and the Italian didn’t change his winning system.

Plus, despite the mentioned decrease of Leicester counter-attacks, a partial unwillingness among the English clubs to come up with suitable strategies against Leicester has helped them to be the second-best team in the league since Christmas and the best team point-wise overall. To answer the question from the beginning, Leicester’s success is a consequence of own achievement and external failure.

At this point, there is no reason to think Leicester’s squad will be completely picked apart, because their owners, King Power, should be willing to fund huge wages. Nevertheless, the probability is high that Leicester will finally experience a breakdown next season.

The Foxes will not only go up against high-quality competition in the Champions League, but also compete with motivated teams who could enjoy the fresh air of new coaches (Pep Guardiola, José Mourinho) or the impact of coaches who finally settle down at their clubs (Jürgen Klopp). Hope gives Atlético Madrid who are a defensive-minded side as well and who have surpassed all expectations, although the Rojiblancos have had a more talented roster.

And even if Leicester disappear from the upper third of the Premier League quickly, their 2015-2016 campaign is one for the history books.

Note: It should be mentioned that current players of Leicester have been accused of the use of performance-enhancing drugs in a recent Sunday Times report. The paper said that a private doctor, Mark Bonar, claims to have prescribed banned PEDs to over 150 British athletes, including players of Leicester. The club denies the claims, and there is no independent evidence that any footballers have been treated by Bonar. You can find more about this topic here and here.

Chelsea hosted Manchester City in the 33^rd game week of the Premier League season. In previous seasons this fixture would has often had a major impact on the destination of the Premier League trophy with both sides occupying the highest positions in the table. This year however neither side are involved in the title race and the outcome was only significant for Manchester City in their attempts to fend off their neighbours and secure Champions League football for next season.

Starting Line-ups

Chelsea’s weak possession game

Chelsea displayed a heavily wing-oriented construction game for most of the match with most of their progress in possession being made via the flanks. This was in no small part due to the positioning of the central midfield players Mikel and Fabregas. On many occasions they demonstrated weak co-ordination in their movements at times both dropping into the defensive line in their attempts to assist the home side’s build-up. While this ensured they had enough players in the first line to outnumber City’s 2 man first line of defence, it meant that progressing past this line centrally was very difficult to achieve. On many occasions they were left with only Loftus-Cheek and Costa as central options to progress which City were easily able to mark. Furthermore the lack of support they would have upon receiving the ball would have become major issues and would likely have led to several turnovers of possession which added to the reluctance Chelsea displayed in passing into these areas.

7 out of Chelsea’s 10 outfield players are positioned outside City’s block

With little or no viable options to progress Fabregas and Mikel were often forced into using the full-backs in deep and wide positions during their build-up. This is an inherently unstable approach to building up due to the presence of the touchline and the subsequently heavily reduced rotational possibilities available. With literally half of the angles to move into cut off, a team or player become far more predictable and thus easier for the defending team to control and defend against.

These issues in their build-up translated naturally into offensive problems for the home side and they spent much of the first half trying to create chances from wide areas. Once they did make their progressions via the flank their lack of central presence meant they struggled to form connections to move the ball back into the middle. The connections they did establish to move away from wide areas were often created by playing backwards, at times to the defenders which did not trouble City and resulted in several long periods of build-up with little effect.

Furthermore their positioning often meant the only available options for the defenders upon providing connections from wide areas were to the opposite side which essentially only challenged City to shift from side to side which was not too difficult.

City often suffered from similar build-up issues with both Fernandinho and Toure acting in deep positions leading to quite a wing-oriented build-up phase. Where they differed, however, was how they created connections from the wide areas. On several occasions City managed to shift their attacks back into the centre, with players on the move providing connections their momentum often took them past direct opponents. Furthermore it was often midfield players or full-backs moving through midfield that created the connections giving them a quicker circulation speed than Chelsea.

Circulating possession directly through their opponents’ block gave City the potential to draw pressure from Chelsea and create space in ball-far areas. This showed one of the positives of players positioned in midfield giving connections as opposed to defenders.

When a team can move the ball from a wide area back into the middle directly through the opponents’ midfield most defensive teams will attempt to collapse on the ball in an attempt to prevent central penetration which is often the ultimate goal. If the team in possession can evade this incoming pressure they can access the space the opponents’ press creates through a simple switch. Circulating possession directly through an opponents’ midfield therefore gives the offensive side an opportunity to manipulate their opponents’ defence and create good offensive possibilities.

However if a team constantly rely on the defenders as an escape route from wide areas the process of building can become drawn out, repetitive and ineffective. It can be particularly ineffective due to the lack of reactions it evokes from oppositional defences. This is especially the case because several defensive teams are content to lack access instead aiming to prevent the ball penetrating their block, they will therefore view such passes as a success on their part.

Weak defensive systems

Chelsea’s defensive organisation was characterised by inadequate distances and therefore poor support in defensive actions. This was in no small part due to the man-oriented nature of their strategy. One characteristic of good defending is using the support of the team members to create a collective stability in defence which has a multiplying effect on the defensive abilities of the individuals involved. With a man-marking strategy however a team takes an individualistic approach whereby the focus on coverage of opponents often means the team relies heavily on the individual defensive abilities of the players.

The home side’s wide players in particular were noticeably assigned a man-marking role on the opposing full-backs. With both wingers at times moving wide and deep, Chelsea’s ability to defend the centre and half spaces in particular was practically compromised with a midfield line at times consisting of two players. Furthermore Fabregas and Loftus-Cheek were often positioned too narrowly and this weak spacing further reduced the size of the midfield that Chelsea could control.

It’s pretty difficult to defend the width of the half spaces with 2 players in the midfield line

While the responsibility to create access in the half spaces often fell to Chelsea’s full-backs, the away side’s wide players supported possession in fairly deep positions making Azpilicueta and Rahman wary of following them out. The result was a lack of access for prolonged periods and City could circulate possession in Chelsea’s half relatively unopposed. This also had an adverse effect on their ability to defend against City’s full-backs despite access to them being prioritised over a compact defensive shape. With simple ball circulation City could create 2v1 situations on the flanks from where City could simply commit their opponents and release Kolarov, Zabaleta or Navas down the flanks to create cut-back and crossing opportunities.

Pellegrini’s side’s structure was flawed due to their passivity in addition to sub-optimal distances between players with a noticeably poor level of horizontal compactness. In defensive phases City were often very passive and struggled to maintain a consistent line of defence from which they began to press Chelsea. With this lack of pressure they struggled to direct Chelsea’s build-up in the manner they desired, and if not for Chelsea’s poor positioning they would have experienced more issues.

This passivity was compounded by their poor horizontal compactness. Whilst a passive defence is not ideal if one wishes to force turnovers it is not an inherently weak defensive strategy in absolute terms. Its major strength however lays in its ability to restrict the quality and to an extent the quantity of chances an opponent can create.

If a team do not press to restrict options they must maintain good distances between players to exert control of their chosen areas otherwise their opponents will not only have space but easy possibilities to penetrate a team’s block. Optimal distances between players in all directions are therefore crucial in order to access the strengths of a passive system.

City were also quite poor in this regard with their block often very stretched horizontally opening up several vertical routes of progression for Chelsea, fortunately for City Hiddink’s side were often too poorly positioned to take advantage.

Transition Game

With a game lacking somewhat in tactical nous and both sides largely incapable of exerting a high level of control over proceedings their approach to transitions were vital in the outcome.

Chelsea’s aforementioned struggles in their positional structure had predictably adverse effects on their ability to defend City’s counter attacks.

In the above image their offensive positioning lacks staggering and proper spacing which will not only harm their ability to manipulate City and create chances but also their attempts to defend the counter.

With 6 attacking players practically all on the same horizontal line in offence and the rest of the outfield players around the halfway line Chelsea’s team is essentially split into two. Their lack of spacing negates counterpressing as a feasible strategy and the large disconnect between the sub-units of the team gives City room to create momentum and attack Chelsea’s back line directly at speed with no opponents to slow them down.

The non-existent staggering of attacking players and large disconnections between the sub-units of the team were a feature of Chelsea’s game with the same issues appearing on a number of occasions. Only a few last ditch tackles prevented City from taking advantage of these situations and building an imperious lead early on in the contest and it was of little surprise when City eventually took the lead on the counter attack.

While Chelsea’s inability to defend transitions gave City a relatively easy job when it came to counter attacks, they still executed them fairly impressively and they picked out vertical or diagonal runs precisely and directly behind the home defence with De Bruyne and Nasri both having clear chances as a result of these.

Manchester City’s approach to defensive transitions was, rather sensibly, heavily dependent on the situation. In situations where they had favourable numbers in the vicinity they would counterpress with the forward players particularly ball-oriented aiming to force an action. There were of course other cases where they were fairly weak around the ball and in these situations they attempted to drop collectively and regain their defensive positioning. At times this created some issues for the away side as they were too slow to recover their positions and lacked access to the ball to slow down Chelsea’s counter attacks.

City did improve in this respect after the interval and when they managed to force Chelsea into deep defensive positions they could easily regain possession, this was partly due to Chelsea lacking outlets to release them from their deep positions.

Another factor behind this was the fact that they already had the lead, this meant they had a reduced need to attack and create chances. They could be seen using defensive ball circulation and the positioning of a number of players was visibly aimed at providing stability upon turnovers. This allowed them to exert a greater level of control over proceedings which was an effective way of protecting their lead.

With a reduced need to attack Man City positioned themselves effectively to prevent counters and had greater control pic.twitter.com/oW0xwtmK5f

— Judah Davies (@1415football) April 17, 2016

Conclusion

Chelsea and Manchester City both displayed some tactical vulnerabilities that go some way to explaining their relatively modest positions in the league. Chelsea however were particularly poor, struggling to make their possession game efficient and lacking control of any defensive phases. City meanwhile were more impressive after the interval as they displayed greater control of the game and ran out convincing winners.

With nothing left to fight for Chelsea’s season has been all but finished for almost a month and their resolve to fight back after going behind could be questioned. Chelsea staff, players and fans could be forgiven for willing the season to end and looking forward to starting the new campaign under Antonio Conte.

Manchester City on the other hand ended a good week on a positive note after knocking out Paris-Saint Germain on Tuesday. They now have a Champions League semi-final against Zidane’s Real Madrid to look forward to and will be quietly optimistic of causing an upset. With Pep Guardiola soon to join Manchester City fans will be looking to the future with a renewed sense of hope after an indifferent league campaign.

Arsenal made history by becoming the most successful club in the oldest football competition on Earth. This was Arsenal’s 12th FA Cup final win and it was probably their easiest as they came up against an Aston Villa side who were outclassed in every area.

Arsene Wenger chose an asymmetric 4-2-3-1 formation with the biggest surprise probably being the selection of Theo Walcott as a lone forward. Fellow Englishman Danny Welbeck was injured and there were rumours that Giroud had some sort of allergy problem in midweek however I think Wenger would have chosen in-form Walcott regardless.

Sherwood played a formation that was somewhere in between a 4-3-2-1 and 4-3-3.

The base formations of the two sides.

Arsenal more direct than usual

Arsenal played 63 long passes in the match (14%) compared to just 24 long passes (3%) in their match earlier this month against Sunderland. They finished that match 0-0 with Giroud playing the whole match. Arsenal won the last game of the league season 4-1 vs West Brom with Walcott scoring a hat-trick and therefore Wenger chose Walcott to play in the final. When interviewed prior to the match, Sherwood seemed slightly surprised that Walcott was chosen to start as a lone striker and he set up his Villa side to press fairly high in the final third.

Aston Villa press high.

This high press worked very well at times in the first half. They performed more of an option-based press until they made sure they could press the man on the ball whilst maintaining sustainability in the rest of their press. The above is a perfect example of that. They targeted Mertesacker and Szczesny in particular as they are two players who can’t really pass a ball more than fifteen yards that would beat a press.

While it was good at times, the press was also sometimes detrimental to Villa and the double pivot of Coquelin and Cazorla were key to beating the press. Cazorla would sometimes drop deep to create superiority in these areas to help pass their way out the press, alternatively the ball would be played to him with his back to goal where he would use his technical superiority over Cleverley to beat him and then look to play it forward or wide. This high press completely played in to the Gunners’ hands when it was broken as they could move up the pitch quickly, suiting Walcott.

Arsenal played in a 4-4-1-1 shape in defence with Mesut Ozil as a no. 10. This is a defensive shape that is very useful in attacking transition and Arsenal utilised this, getting the ball to Ozil who would look to thread balls into the space behind the defence to Walcott. Ozil was key to Arsenal’s direct play.

Arsenal dominated early possession however and some of the negatives of Walcott’s selection were shown. He missed a couple of good chances from close range that a more orthodox centre-forward would probably put away. Also, a lot of Arsenal’s final third play was crossing-based. Walcott doesn’t really suit this type of play.

In response to this, Wenger switched Walcott and Sanchez about 35 minutes into the game. Just four minutes later Sanchez jumped brilliantly to win a header from a Monreal cross, Walcott ran into the area from deep and smashed it in to put Arsenal 1-0 up. Straight after the goal, Walcott went back up top.

Walcott became more and more of a threat as Arsenal kept scoring and Villa became more committed in attack.

Arsenal’s left-wing orientation

Most of Arsenal’s middle and final third play was oriented on a left-wing where Cazorla, Ozil, Sanchez and Monreal often found themselves in close proximity. With these four players up against N’Zogbia, Cleverley, Okore and Hutton there was only ever going to be one winner.

Arsenal’s heatmap showing their left-wing orientation.

Arsenal utilised this left-wing superiority either through switches from the right side to the left where they would have a overload or they would play straight through this left side of the field, overloading the wing and using quick combination to get behind the Villa defence in wide areas and put crosses into the area.

Arsenal overload the wing 4vs3. Ozil and Ramsey occupying Hutton and Okore in the halfspace also restrains them from closing down Monreal when he gets the ball behind Cleverley and looks to cross.

Aston Villa completely inept in all areas

In Defence

Aston Villa defended in a rigid 4-1-4-1 shape in the middle third. They were position orientated and their wide players showed no regard for onrushing Arsenal fullbacks, allowing balls to be played into these fullbacks behind the midfield four, allowing Arsenal to develop 2v1 wide overloads. Westwood often would get carried away with pressing and move into the line of four, leaving masses of space between the defensive and midfield line.

Aston Villa’s very  horizontally compact midfield in the defensive phase worked well at times in the first half however isn’t ideal against a team like Arsenal who are very good at quick passing combinations, beating men with dribbling and putting balls through an eye of a needle. Arsenal exploited it better in the second half, getting both fullbacks up high and switching between them, stretching Villa.

In Attack

Aston Villa were absolutely dreadful in attack. They didn’t have a single shot on target all match (two shots off target), they were harmless in attacking transition which is the main area you can hurt Arsenal, and their final third play was one-dimensional. Their whole attack was aimed at crosses towards Benteke. The crosses were always those horrible floaty, slow balls which Szczesny collected well if Benteke was up against Koscielny. Mertesacker dominated Benteke in the air not only in his own penalty area, but at the other end too, peeling off Benteke’s dreadful marking to make it 3-0 Arsenal twelve minutes after *that* Sanchez goal made it 2-0 to the Gunners.

When Villa played it wide and pulled Arsenal’s full-back out, Coquelin moved into the empty halfspace and made sure Villa couldn’t find any space on the inside.

Conclusion

Arsenal were deserving winners in the end and rounded off a fairly successful season for Arsenal in comparison to some of their recent campaigns. There was a lot of talk as soon as the final whistle was blown as to whether their performance showed  that they could challenge for the Premier League next season (a lot of said talk was by people that often complain about the cup’s decrease in significance) and personally, I think a comfortable win against a side that played as badly as Aston Villa did means absolutely nothing. They are still about £70m in the transfer market (or a new manager) away from winning the Premier League title.

The final day of the 2014-15 season saw Brendan Rodgers’ Liverpool side get thrashed 6-1 by a mediocre Stoke team. After challenging for the title in the previous season, the transfer of Luis Suarez and poor health of Daniel Sturridge created big issues and performance dropped off a cliff. Whilst Rodgers was previously able to rely on his talented personnel, he struggled to implement a consistent strategy from this point onwards. He was granted the start of the 2015-16 season to rectify the issues, but was unable to do so. He was sacked after a 1-1 draw with Everton in October. A few days later, Jurgen Klopp was hired.

Klopp has already made a number of changes to the systems utilised under Rodgers, and Liverpool have shown many promising signs despite clear tactical and personnel issues.

Pressing and counterpressing

One major tool used by Jurgen Klopp is the infamous counterpress: attempting to regain possession immediately after losing it. Whilst Rodgers’ Liverpool were a high pressing team at their peak in 2013-14, this often came in established possession rather than actively focusing on recovering the ball immediately. But during 2014-15, the team even began to lose their focus on pressing itself as Rodgers found himself stuck between philosophies.

Whilst the nuances of counterpressing can take many months to fully implement, Klopp was able to make immediate improvements.

Progression of Liverpool’s counterpress over the 2015-16 Premier League season

On Jurgen Klopp’s debut (game 9 of the season), Liverpool visited another team focused heavily on counterpressing, Mauricio Pochettino’s Tottenham. With less than a week of training, Klopp was already able to instill a few key principles of counterpressing into the team. Despite this, many of the suitable support structures were not in place to implement a successful post-counterpress transition (after only days of coaching, this is to be expected). This created a match with many individual duels and second balls, but little sustained possession or clean combination play.

The general aggression of the counterpress was vastly increased, but more importantly, the triggers for counterpressing were seemingly more clearly defined than under Rodgers. The main signal for triggering an ultra-aggressive counterpress was the opponent receiving the ball with his back to [Liverpool’s] goal. This is the most common trigger in general, because makes it more difficult for the receiving ball-player to view or access the game behind him. It reduces his passing options and makes it easier for the ball to be regained. If the ball is not won back quickly, then it forces the opponent into a backwards pass and gives the team additional time to re-structure.

Another core principle the players exhibited almost immediately was a more intense press in the wing area. This is simply because of the lack of connectivity to the other areas of the pitch.

Fewer areas of the pitch are immediately accessible from the wing (from TP’s Empoli team analysis)

The simplicity of these instructions made it easy for the team to co-ordinate the press after little training time together, but they were not yet able to assess the situation for themselves or alter the intensity of the press. This meant that even if the team had poor initial pressing access, the midfield would still press aggressively without closing passing lanes, allowing Tottenham an easy route out.

Liverpool on Klopp's debut: ultra-aggressive in flooding area around ball, but lacking structure for clean regain. pic.twitter.com/62HHcftKze

— Ed (@edAfootball) June 14, 2016

Klopp was quickly able to improve on these base rules. More complex principles were introduced, and the counterpress peaked around the turn of the year, despite an injury crisis. Perhaps the success would have been improved even further if the team did not (rightly or wrongly) prioritise their Europa League campaign over the Premier League.

An example of a common early pressing trap: allowing the ball to return to the halfspace after it previously reached the wing.

Around this time, the team began to introduce pressing and counterpressing traps based on the key taught principles. The most commonly used trap was to force the opposition into a wider area, and allow a single open passing lane into the halfspace. Based on the position of the ball, this player was forced to have an outwards-facing field of vision, and would be pressed heavily from all directions upon receiving the ball. Backwards pressing from the ball-side attacking midfielder played a key role in ensuring the opposition could not merely recycle possession.

The specifics of the trap itself varied depending on the system used and opposition faced. For example, a less aggressive version of the same press may be to force a ball backwards to a central defender. If co-ordinated previously, this allows the central midfielder to aggressively press the opposition receiver. With sufficiently altered movement to close potential passing lanes, this can force a long ball forward.

But the other key reason that Liverpool’s counterpress improved during the season was the preparation for the counterpress during the possession phase. As the year went on, many more of Liverpool’s attacks were forced to the wing.

Percentage of all potential counterpress opportunities in the opposition half that occurred on the wing

Whilst this can have disadvantages in attacking, it creates more stability if the ball is lost. With a strong central presence, it becomes much easier to defend transitions that start from the wing because of the reduced passing options the opposition immediately has.

This increase was largely due to two connected reasons. Firstly, the emphasis of Liverpool’s attacks has gradually moved wider: in the first half of the Premier League season, no team completed a lower percentage of their opposition half passes on the wing. This improved to 13th in the league for the second half of the season.

In facilitating this focus on wider possession, the team’s structure improved and began to focus more on utilising the halfspace as a means to attack rather than the centre itself. This was particularly the case in Klopp’s 4-3-2-1 shape, where both the attacking midfielders and outside central midfielders would spend much of their time in the halfspace (with license to drift wide depending on the movements and positioning of their teammates).

This increased focus on the halfspace had a big effect on attacking midfielders Firmino & Lallana, but neither were the very best contributor…

Individual counterpressing contributions, and effect on the team’s ability to regain possession quickly

Initially brought in as the ‘Welsh Xavi’, Allen has found himself without a defined role at post-Rodgers Liverpool. Injury troubles have contributed to a lack of consistent starts, but even when fit Allen has struggled to start games regularly. There are questions about his physicality (or lack thereof) and how this can be a detriment in Klopp’s system, where second ball duels in tight spaces form a key part of a midfielder’s role.

Despite this, his contributions to the counterpress when he does feature are unparalleled. In general pressing phases, his contribution to regaining possession is more indirect: closing passing lanes and adjusting to his teammates’ movements with intelligent decision making. Within the counterpress, his ability to regain the ball himself is magnified due to his impressive in-possession positioning. Particularly when the ball reaches the final third, it is rare that Allen is more than one pass away. This allows him to easily shift towards the opposition, or aggressively close the ball-player if the situation demands.

As the outer central midfielder in the 4-3-2-1, he was given license to make extreme vertical movements forward. In advanced positions, he provides good value in stabilising possession with good decision-making. If a quick combination play is available, then he facilitates this with quick feet, but also understands when the tempo needs to be reduced. This general game intelligence is perhaps one of the reasons he makes such an impact as a sub, and why his GoalImpact score is one of the highest in the Liverpool squad (2nd only to Jordan Henderson).

Increasing horizontal compactness and ball-orientation

Improved ball-oriented shifting was one of the key features that Klopp was able to implement into Liverpool’s press almost immediately. During Liverpool’s peak under Brendan Rodgers, there was often an aggressive initial press without suitable compactness and ball-orientation. This means if the opposition break the initial press with quick feet or a sharp pass, there is an immediate transition opportunity.

When the ball is in the centre, Klopp’s team will often disregard the wing and focus almost entirely on defending the halfspaces and centre. Whilst the centre is occupied, the team’s forward is tasked with closing inside passing lanes and forcing the opposition towards the unoccupied wings. The most common example comes when one opposition central defender has the ball – Liverpool’s forward disallows the pass to the other central defender whilst his teammates occupy the centre.

This was one of the primary strengths of the 4-3-2-1 shape that Klopp used many times throughout the season. Once the pass has been forced to the opposition full-back, Liverpool’s outside central midfielder can aggressively press whilst closing the inside passing lane. The ball-side attacking midfielder can then curve his movement to ensure the opposition cannot recycle possession through their central defenders.

Liverpool’s pressing shape in their 4-3-2-1, from RM’s analysis of Klopp’s Liverpool debut

The players developed more intelligence in adapting their pressing movements as the season developed. The win against eventual Premier League winners Leicester was particularly impressive due to Liverpool’s dominance of the transition phase (one of Leicester’s key strengths).

Because of the compactness of the two teams, much of Leicester’s transitions came from trying to stretch the pitch into the previously vacant wide areas. This limited the influence of Leicester’s central midfielders, and consistently forced build-up through the full-backs. If the ball was quickly regained, then the team could attempt a transition. For the opposition to stay suitably structured in the chaos of this transition moment requires huge levels of co-ordination. In many instances, it will create some large spaces (and many smaller spaces) that Liverpool can immediately exploit with quick vertical passing and sharp combination play.

Liverpool force build-up into wide areas, then attempt to quickly transition into the newly opened spaces. pic.twitter.com/3FYmwgZMxN

— Ed (@edAfootball) July 10, 2016

The role of the attacking midfielders (generally Lallana & Firmino in the 4-3-2-1) in these instances was particularly interesting. Many times, when Liverpool’s forward forced the ball wide, they would remain in an advanced position, ready to press the opposition ball-side central midfielder should the ball return into the centre of the pitch. This adds another dimension to the press that was sometimes vacant when the team pressed in a 4-2-3-1 shape.

Backwards pressing

The nature of their positioning generally meant that these players were pressing backwards, often outside the opponent’s immediate field of vision. Lallana in particular benefited most from an extended shift to the 4-3-2-1 during game 21 of the season. This improvement, and their role in particular, mainly came in the form of picking the pocket of the opponent with a tackle from behind. Firmino & Lallana had the highest percentage of their counterpressing recoveries come as tackles of all Liverpool players.

Aside from the player curving his movement to stay ‘out of view’ of the ball-player, these tackles often necessitate slightly different body positioning to an ordinary tackle. With the ball on the other side of the opponent, there is more need for use of the upper body to disrupt the balance of the opponent. This slight push can create a split-second of disorientation for the ball-player, particularly if he was unaware of the approaching presser.

Additionally, sometimes a small ‘hop’ immediately prior to making the tackle can give the tackler an advantage when tackling from behind. This small jump has the added benefit of avoid the shield that some players naturally use to protect the ball. When the opponent’s leg is extended, it clearly has to be at an angle because of the biomechanics of the hip joint. Making a slight hop over the leg (if it is extended in a shielding motion) allows less diversion of tackler’s movement, making it easier to reach the ball quickly.

Another vital advantage of this downwards force (after the peak of the natural trajectory of a jump) is that it creates enough force for a tackle and pass to be made in one motion. Instead of making an additional movement with his leg, the player can use the force generated from the jump to deflect the ball to a teammate.

For obvious reasons, this quickens the process and reduces the likelihood the tackler will immediately lose the ball again. When there is a suitable support structure around the ball, this can create dangerous transitions through the use of combination play and third man runs. Within the 4-3-2-1, the two attacking midfielders would ball-orient in an attempt to overload the nearby zone. When this is the case, the ‘third man’ can anticipate the regain of possession. This creates the opportunity for the player to ensure he is open for a pass from the recipient of the tackle-pass, allowing the ball to be quickly moved away.

An example of Liverpool's backwards pressing into immediate combination play. pic.twitter.com/afRRxxiMwe

— Ed (@edAfootball) July 10, 2016

Firmino & Lallana were the primary proponents of such techniques. Coutinho had more difficulty achieving this; despite curving his movement suitably, his tackling positioning was often poor. This makes the Liverpool press more one-dimensional, and is perhaps one key reason why the team were much less effective at regaining the ball with Coutinho on the pitch, despite the fact he had a similar number of direct regains from counterpressing (0.81 per 90 minutes) to Firmino (0.82) and Lallana (0.94).

Defensive transition issues

Focusing on counterpressing rather than dropping deep to regain structure is an inherently aggressive tactic. Klopp’s system is focused more on quickly closing the space around the ball with large numbers of players converging from all directions. The upside, as mentioned previously, is that this can allow the team to quickly regain possession and even start its own attacks.

The downside is that an aggressive counterpress from deep in midfield can allow the opposition more opportunity to transition if the initial press is beaten. This effect is magnified if the team prepares poorly for the counterpress when in-possession, and does not have good pressing access from all sides of the ball to immediately flood the new opposition ball-player.

Liverpool suffered from this very effect in the latter stages of the season, particularly when James Milner was utilised in a double pivot with Emre Can. Despite joining Liverpool largely to play in central midfield, Milner spent much of his time situated anywhere but central midfield in these moments.

Milner’s positioning moments before a deadly Dortmund transition leading to a goal

Not only does this poor structure make it more difficult to attack effectively, but it makes quickly regaining possession a near-impossible task. With such poor pressing access, Dortmund can easily escape.

Milner also exhibited one of the other key negative traits that caused issues for Liverpool midfielders: an over-reliance on situational man-marking. Despite largely using a zonal-based system, occasionally the central midfielders would push forward and aggressively pursue potential passing options. Because of their backwards-facing field of vision and tight pressure from behind, this makes a pass into those players less likely. But it also leaves a large open space behind.

This was exploited by the opposition on a number of occasions during the season, but chiefly by Dortmund and Henrikh Mkhitaryan. A 2v2 man-marking of the midfielders can leave space for the opposition #10 to drop into the space behind Liverpool’s midfield and receive the ball. This was particularly effective when the opposition were attempting to build from wide, and the full-back could play a diagonal ball into the halfspace behind Milner & Can. The ball-player is able to quickly accelerate into a 1v1 duel because he receives the ball on the half-turn. This forces the ball-side central defender into a difficult position, and in the case of Sakho & Lovren (with their naturally aggressive tendencies), will generally choose to confront the ball-player. For a successful confrontation, the central defender is forced to simultaneously attempt to close the passing lane and apply pressure to the ball-player. With sharp movements in front and behind of the defender and constantly shifting passing lanes – this makes it a very difficult situation to defend.

Build-up disconnects

The other key area the opposition were able exploit consistently in transition was behind Alberto Moreno. In general, Liverpool’s left side defense was much more porous than their right, and much of this was because of passes made behind Moreno. Whilst Nathaniel Clyne was generally more conservative in his movement, Moreno often pushed forward on the left.

Liverpool’s softer left side (graph from @SaturdayonCouch)

Sometimes this effect can also create more pressure for Liverpool’s midfielders. Because of the distance of the pass needed to reach Moreno, his direct opponent can comfortably leave more space to cover, as he will have more time to reach Moreno whilst the pass is in motion. This allows them to create a more horizontally compact midfield, and allows less space to receive the ball in midfield.

Moreno too high in build-up, allows opposition winger to simultaneously cover him + pressure Coutinho. Easy counter. pic.twitter.com/hMdbUjd0B9

— Ed (@edAfootball) July 2, 2016

Despite his good top speed, he can also find it difficult to turn quickly to ensure his direct opponent is not a threat in transition. This is due to his tendency to face towards the opposition goal whilst Liverpool has the ball, meaning he has to turn whilst his opponent faces the Liverpool goal. If possession is lost, he then has to turn before sprinting backwards, giving his opponent a head start. Even if he is facing inwards towards play from the left sideline, he still has to make a half-turn whereas his opponent can immediately move forward. When positioned on the same horizontal space on the pitch, this can make it difficult for Moreno to recover.

Once Moreno recovers, he is excellent at making tackles or recovering the ball whilst sprinting. It makes sense to utilise him in an advanced role, as this fits his skillset and the requirements of the team. But this can be fine-turned; simply by dropping slightly deeper in build-up, he could increase his influence and limit the opponent’s opportunity to transition behind him if the ball is lot.

Instead of pushing Moreno deeper in build-up though, this issue was ‘solved’ by shifting Sakho into a wider role in early build-up with a central midfielder often dropping between the two central defenders. Being situated in this wider position allowed Sakho to consistently find Moreno whilst still making his incisive laser passes into central areas. But the different midfield shape had a negative effect on Liverpool’s build-up generally – where once Emre Can would sit, now there was only space.

Of his two-man-midfield partners, neither are able to consistently add value to build-up play. Milner’s proclivity to move away from central areas means he can often only be accessed after a horizontal shift in play rather than from an immediate central pass. Whilst Jordan Henderson has improved his touch and passing ability, his off-ball movement in these phases can be negligible.

This dependence on Emre Can & Mamadou Sakho for ball progression is not sustainable for obvious reasons. This lack of midfield occupation merely gives the opposition more opportunity to counter, much like when Moreno is too advanced. Liverpool’s attacking midfielders will often attempt to fill this space by dropping deeper, and sometimes this creates some reasonably successful rotations. On the right-side Milner’s forward movements could be harnessed to disrupt opposition man-orientations with Lallana dropping into the vacant space, receiving the ball from Clyne in the halfspace. However, these simple movements cannot be relied upon to consistently progress play against strong opposition.

Offensive transitions and pass availability

With different personnel, Liverpool’s general attacking transition play varies wildly. Daniel Sturridge spent much of the season injured, but his return had a profound effect on Liverpool’s ability to consistently shift play forwards at speed. This was primarily down to his proclivity to drift ball-side (and particularly to the right) in transition. Whilst this is a strategically worse position for combination play and possession structure, it has some key advantages in transition for a player such as Sturridge.

With few opposition defenders back, drifting wide allows the opportunity for Sturridge to create a 1v1 in space. Once the ball is under control, an inward-facing field of vision gives view of the entire pitch. The lengthier nature of an ‘outlet’ pass in transition means there is also more time for the receiving player to alter his body positioning (and therefore his field of vision) whilst the pass is in motion than a standard, shorter pass.

Less capable dribblers have a tendency to remain facing their own goal when receiving the ball in the centre of the pitch. Indeed, Benteke will largely receive the ball facing his own goal regardless of his location on the pitch. As the most advanced player, it makes sense to do this – a backwards-facing field of vision allows him to view his teammates as they catch up with play. But it creates a blindspot where the opposition can press. Whilst Sturridge can move his field of vision towards the centre of the pitch as the pass is in motion, he is able to view more reference points and make a more informed decision of play. All Sturridge’s teammates can only move forwards on one side of him, whereas they could flood forwards on either side of Benteke. This can make it even harder for the player receiving centrally to assess the situation and make a quick decision, which is vital to successful transitions.

If teammates are not able to progress as quickly as play, Sturridge is capable of shielding the ball or utilising sharp dribbling movements to move beyond his opponent. This is again made easier by the 1v1 created as he drifts into a wider position. With the movement wide disrupting the opposition’s horizontal compactness in defense, even if a 1v1 is unsuccessful then onrushing teammates will have more room to operate if Sturridge can make a pass to them.

Sturridge is not the only Liverpool player with a multi-dimension skillset in offensive transitions. Divock Origi has vastly improved his timing of runs in behind, and his new-found strength makes it easier for him to keep Premier League central defenders from slowing him down in a tight tussle. Sadio Mane provides a huge transition threat, and had been invaluable in these situations at Southampton & Salzburg. Sturridge’s inclination to drift wide benefits Mane’s preference to move beyond the strikers (with a preference of starting on the left and moving inside).

Danny Ings missed much of the 2015/16 season with injury, but is one of the top transition forwards in the league. Much like Sturridge, he is capable of playing as the outlet or reacting to an initial break and offering immediate support, with a fast-paced movement into the centre.

Top 20 players in terms of fast-attacking expected goals per 90 minutes over the past four Premier League seasons. Minimum 2,700 minutes played. Three 2016/17 Liverpool players feature – here comes the speed. (Graph courtesy of @WillTGM)

Jurgen Klopp famously said that the counterpress is the best playmaker. Despite an improved counterpress, the quantity of Liverpool transitions from these situations has not dramatically increased. This is perhaps a downside of the ‘space-oriented’ counterpress that Klopp operates with – when the players do not fully understand the system, there tends to be an emphasis on aggression over structure. If the pressing movements are not staggered, then this leaves few potential passing options once possession is regained.

This clean regain of possession improved in general pressing, particularly with the blind-side tackling from Lallana & Firmino. But there are still improvements to be made. Feeding off passes from second balls and broken possessions was also one key reason Gotze found such success in Klopp’s system at Dortmund…

The Future: 4-4-2-0?

It is clear that many improvements have been made since Jurgen Klopp’s arrival on Merseyside. In terms of counterpressing and general pressing structures, this team is now totally different than the one that started the season under Brendan Rodgers. There seems to be more focus on adapting the system to individual challenges & fixtures, rather than completely ditching a style or system after a few bad results.

One such system that was only explored briefly throughout the season, was a 4-4-2/4-6-0 used against Aston Villa. This came immediately after the controversial Sunderland match (due to a fan walkout at ticket prices and Klopp missing the game due to illness) where Liverpool utilised a heavily rotating midfield to counter Sunderland’s emphasis on man-marking.

Situation from the Aston Villa match, and how Milner could have adapted his positioning to occupy the opposition central defender – perhaps with a more capable striker, even both central defenders could be occupied.

Having utilised a 4-3-2-1/4-3-3 system against Sunderland and in recent matches, it was suggested the same would be used. Against Aston Villa, though, Liverpool were able to utilise Roberto Firmino & Daniel Sturridge at the same time for the very first time that season (25 league games in). The natural movements of both players are to drift from a traditional centre forward position.

One such situation is both players drifting towards the ball-side halfspace. This allows for improved combination play in those wide areas that Liverpool began to focus on more, and an even more aggressive counterpress if the ball is lost. It can cause chaos against man- or zonal-focused systems, and produced Liverpool’s best performance of the season as they thrashed Villa 6-0. Against a man-oriented system, the fluidity of movement creates a natural difficult challenge for defenders to constantly react to. Against systems with stricter zonal marking, it presents an opportunity to overload the zone and utilise combination play in a tight area.

But this wide movement of the strikers must be compensated with movement from other players. This is something assistant manager Peter Krawietz had talked about previously when asked about the use of a ‘false nine’ (quote translated from his interview with SPOX in 2012):

“It is possible that in case you break through on the wing, the centre is under-manned. This was observable in the Champions League semi-final between Barcelona and Chelsea. The Blues blocked the centre with eight or nine guys, and Barca could only break through the wings. But then in the middle, not enough happened. The advantage: you can turn it around.

It is possible to occupy the centre flexibly and run into it with different players with high tempo movement, which deprives the oppositional centre backs of access. When the ball arrives, you can occupy the relevant spaces with many players, creating an ‘ambush’. That is clearly the positive aspect of this arrangement.”

In the match against Aston Villa, James Milner was often the player tasked with occupying the opposition central defenders when Sturridge & Firmino both shifted away from that area. Lallana has been used in a similar way on occasions throughout the year, but it may also present some of the key reasoning for the signing of Sadio Mane, who operated in a similar way during his time at Southampton.

Liverpool's "4-4-2" against Villa. No occupation of oppo CBs until Milner makes diagonal run. But lacks pace. Mane? pic.twitter.com/W9VZw3KPhc

— Ed (@edAfootball) July 2, 2016

He has the added advantage of lightning top speed, but Mane’s agility and acceleration is particularly outstanding. This means he can quickly adapt and adjust his movement to play, beating his direct opponent to the ball. As well as making him adept at occupying opposition central defenders, it also ensures he is a consistent threat in counterpressing situations. Mane’s manager in Salzburg, Roger Schmidt, famously utilised an alarm clock in training that went off five seconds after conceding possession if the ball was not yet regained.

Mane’s time at Salzburg was spent mainly as an indented winger on the left of Schmidt’s flexible 4-4-2/4-2-2-2 system. Being able to adapt to the movement of his teammates was another key strength developed during this time. With such outstanding pace, it was often expected that Mane would focus only on making movements behind, but after a shift in play he provided a valuable passing option for combination play after indenting infield. Particularly when the strikers remain in their traditional advanced position, Mane is capable of combining with teammates in the ’10 space’ for spectacular results.

Variable movement in Red Bull Salzburg’s 4-4-2: Mane often played a key role in combining play in the ten space, but also able to adapt to backwards movement from striker to make movement in behind defense himself.

These variable movements are a major strength of another rumoured Liverpool target: Mario Gotze. Despite the obvious differences in play-style and effect on the team, this key feature makes them both suitable as indented ‘wingers’ in a 4-2-2-2 system. There could still be a place for Gotze (or a similar player), who would have a massively positive impact on the team’s ability to re-structure in attacking organisation.

In this way, Gotze presents a different profile to Liverpool incumbent Philippe Coutinho. The Brazilian provides valuable progression in early build-up phases, where he can dribble or make quick combination plays in the halfspace. But in attacking organisation, he finds it difficult to make consistently helpful movements, particularly with his back to goal. Gotze differs from this, whilst also being just as useful in early build-up due to his similarly high press resistance. He can make intelligent movements out of cover shadows, and more effectively adjust to his teammates and the opposition. This becomes particularly useful during a sideways shift in possession (such as the scene illustrated above) or when adjusting quickly to a new in-game situation.

Firmino & Sturridge only started four more games together throughout the rest of the season, and Mario Gotze seems more likely to return to Dortmund. But the deadly potential of these personnel combinations suggest Liverpool may not be far away from something great. Particularly down the right side, where Sturridge naturally prefers to drift towards anyway, a number of dangerous combinations could be created.

Conclusion

With the arrival of managerial megastars Guardiola, Mourinho and Conte, the top of the Premier League may look very different next season. Leicester will hope to continue their outstanding form that led them to a Premier League title, and Arsenal & Tottenham will both provide serious challenges to the top four.

Liverpool will have to improve to even be in contention. This improvement has been occurring consistently since Klopp’s arrival, and the addition of players over the Summer will provide valuable reinforcement. Klopp and his staff seem to have concocted a more suitable fitness regime for Daniel Sturridge, who has spent most of 2016 available. Many players with long-term injuries will also return to full fitness over the Summer and bolster the squad.

After a disappointing loss in the Europa League final to Sevilla, Liverpool find themselves without European football for next year. This will significantly reduce the long-term fitness load on the players during the latter stages of the season. Of the other top Premier League teams, only Chelsea have a similar advantage.

If the team can continue their progress and further advance their approach to fitness without the valuable winter break, then there is no reason Liverpool cannot take a major step next year.

Big thanks again go to those who were happy to share data or other information for this article, be sure to make use of the links throughout this piece to access their respective Twitter accounts. Also thanks to @MC_of_A and @GoalImpact for providing additional data.

After a disappointing end to the season, the future looks bright for Manchester City with the introduction of Josep Guardiola as manager. Following great success in Spain and Germany, Pep now looks to try his hand in the Premier League in what is an eagerly anticipated tenure. The ex-Bayern coach has already had some impact on his side, with the astute signing of Ilkay Gündogan adding much needed playmaking to the 8 position whilst their work on the training ground has already begun to show.

Whilst the manager has been doubted by taking over ‘easy’ jobs in the super-teams of Bayern and Barcelona, Pep will have no such luck in Manchester as the team he has inherited showed key tactical flaws under Pellegrini. The Catalan coach has a big challenge in getting the team up to his standards and in this article, I’ll be looking at the tasks facing him and how he has already begun to amend the system.

Disconnected spacing

As noted well on Spielverlagerung, positional play is perhaps the number one factor in the success and beautiful football of a typical Guardiola team. Both his Barcelona and Bayern sides were trained to be positionally intelligent and would consistently occupy the correct spaces on the pitch at all times, in turn allowing them to move the ball quickly and emphasise the abilities of players such as Messi and Müller. His sides practice on a marked pitch which consists of 4 vertical lines which separates the pitch into 5 vertical corridors of space as he teaches them to position themselves upon the lines marked below.

The marked pitch which Pep coaches his team’s positional play on.

This grid acts as a guideline for his players’ positioning and they are taught to orient themselves on this grid in different ways depending on the ball position. The position of the ball is a primary reference point whilst the grid itself gives them a reference point on how to position themselves according to the different situations. If followed correctly, these guidelines can help a team achieve a strong level of spacing with appropriate distances between players conducive to near-optimal ball circulation.

If not following a scheme, it is possible that a team’s structuring can become harmful to their possession game. A good example is the free-form nature of Arsenal, where the players’ poor understanding of how to create appropriate attacking shapes reduces their ability to move the ball with fluidity and penetration. Often relying on the individual quality of players such as Özil and Ramsey, their poor spacing is one of the greatest limiting factors on their play with the ball. Obviously it’s possible to have a good structure without a set scheme but in City’s case, a positional guideline might be just what is needed for them to get the most out of the likes of Agüero and Silva.

Given that spacing is a key element of Pep’s ideology, it will be interesting to see how he approaches a Manchester City side who struggle to create appropriate shapes as a team. Players rarely achieve many of the intentions of positional play as they fail to occupy and support the key spaces around the ball-carrier, nor shift accordingly when re-adjustment to the ball position is required.

It’s extremely difficult to progress the ball with no player connecting the attack vertically.

This is highly problematic in nearly all phases of their possession. During the build-up there are only few midfielders who actively look to make themselves progressive passing options whilst the likes of Yaya Touré and Fernando are particularly passive. Neither consistently take up positions which can help their team in moving the ball forwards and the build-up stagnates rather regularly. Without a means of moving the ball past the oppositional press, they also become quite susceptible to the pressure which can in turn cause some dangerous situations for the Manchester team.

These moments are common throughout City’s matches and it significantly stunts their attempts at passing the ball out of the back. Without players in these key central areas, they reduce their ability to move the ball forward and invite the opposition to put them under pressure whilst they’re in a weak position. If there aren’t any midfielders or forwards in important positions, then the risk to consider when pressing is much less as the consequences are smaller in the chance that the pressing is bypassed.

Four players within touching-distance and just one in the midfield block.

Maps from @11tegen11.

City’s incapacity to space themselves correctly has often led to an inability to penetrate the attacking midfield area, or ’10 space’. When trying to circulate the ball through the midfield, they often have an insufficient amount of players behind the opposition midfield as many are more inclined to occupy inoffensive positions in deeper spaces. With few players to move the ball forwards into, their ability to penetrate lines of defenders is significantly reduced which leads to a slow and ‘U’-shaped ball circulation which is easily defended against. In the same play as the graphic below, they demonstrated the limiting power a weak positional structure has within the final third.

With literally no players occupying the central column of space, it is nearly impossible for City to fashion out a chance of any quality. There are no players to pass to in dangerous positions and the side are forced to pass the ball backwards. The strange 4-chain in the deepest line is completely unnecessary too, as it simply means that there are less players further upfield to occupy more progressive positions. Although Leicester’s counter-attacks are very dangerous, having 4 players in the deepest line is inappropriate for the situation, when the occupation of the midfield spaces is so insufficient.

Weak spacing in the final third means little way to penetrate the 10 space.

City’s inability to occupy the key areas of the pitch and distance themselves appropriately restricts them from achieving an important facet of juego de posicion – positional superiority. By occupying different lines on the pitch and staggering effectively, a team can create space and passing lanes within the opponent’s defensive block. Yet just as in the examples provided above, City are unable to create such gaps or lanes and there is no pressure on the defensive stability of the opposition.

For an in-depth look into Guardiola’s juego de posición playing style, read AO’s detailed analysis of the philosophy.

Defensive transition

Another one of City’s tactical issues on the pitch is their reaction to losing possession of the ball. Not only is there a distinct lack of pressure once a turnover is made, but open gaps are plentiful in the midfield which allowed teams such as Leicester to cut through them last season. This issue predominantly stems from their weak spacing when in possession. If the players are disconnected and distributed poorly when they have the ball, then the same factors are going to impact their attempts at counterpressing. Should they make a turnover with few players nearby, it becomes rather difficult to enforce a sufficient level of pressure and the opposition can counter-attack with relative ease.

It becomes difficult to form a strong counterpress from a weak positional structure.

With a poor attacking shape, City are now exposed on the break.

If there aren’t many players in spaces around the ball, then there won’t be any defensive presence if the opposition regain it. Another thing to consider is the actual positions of the players; if they’re grouped together with too-short distances then it’s likely that other spaces will be uncovered. In the case that the opposition defender intercepts the ball, there will be open spaces to move the ball into and away from pressure of any counterpressing forwards. Because of City’s weak positional game with the ball, their transition into defence is very weak and they cannot effectively counterpress nor can they recover well due to the open gaps left in the midfield.

A clear example of this is to the left. City have tried to attack but their weak shape was a contributing factor as they lost the ball in a turnover. With Arsenal now on the counter, City’s control of the midfield is poor with open gaps through the centre – the large distances between the players means that the highlighted CM has too much space to cover and is easily beaten.

Having a strong structural position around the ball is highly advantageous during the moments after a turnover, as Elche B manager Óscar Cano states:

“Provoke the proximity of the maximum number of opposition players around the ball. Recuperate the ball imminently when lost in spaces where we are united.”

Another key factor in this tactical deficiency lies within the players. In moments where City turn the ball over there is a lethargic nature about the reactions of some players and they’re slow to either press or make a recovery run. This obviously makes transitioning into defence much more prone to counter-attacks with there commonly being an under-manned counterpress or an absence of recovery runs being made. Without the midfielders getting back into a stronger defensive position, the spaces open at the start of the break take a long time to close thus giving the opposition a greater opportunity to establish a dangerous attack. Considering that this issue was more prevalent towards the end of the season and is somewhat a question of effort, it could well largely be a motivational problem which can commonly be corrected with the introduction of a new manager and backroom staff.

There is little doubt that Pep will improve the defensive transitioning at the Etihad and this can largely be done indirectly. By improving the spacing through the above-mentioned adaptions, Guardiola will give his team a much stronger starting position from which to counterpress. With a better connected shape with stronger numbers around the ball, City will theoretically be able to quickly apply pressure with numerous players and from various angles in close vicinity to the opposition ball-carrier.

The ex-Bayern boss is also famed for his short passing approach; something which can be another influential feature for the defensive transition. Because the passes are generally short, there are often players close by in case the ball gets intercepted. Following turnovers, they are close enough to the ball to enforce a counterpress to try and stunt their counter if not ideally regain control over the ball. As the late Johan Cruyff said on Pep’s Barcelona side:

“Do you know how Barcelona win the ball back so quickly? It’s because they don’t have to run back more than 10 metres as they never pass the ball more than 10 metres.”

– Johan Cruyff

Although counterpressing is conceptually consistent as the act of pressing the opposition upon losing possession of the ball (i.e. pressing the counter), there are multiple ways of doing so. As for the type of counterpressing we can expect to see next year at City, the Catalan coach implemented one based around the passing lanes in his native country. Upon losing possession of the ball, the players will prime themselves to anticipate the first pass by the opposition and look to intercept it in the passing lanes.

Guardiola’s passing-lane oriented counterpressing at Barcelona.

To read more about the concept of counterpressing, find RM’s excellent tactical theory article.

Uncompact pressing

City also have some fairly clear issues when pressing in non-transitional moments too. They often find it difficult to effectively close down opponents and are particularly open when they do so, with sizeable distances between players. It is rare to see the midfield push up sufficiently behind the two forwards and the spaces in which a defensive or attacking midfielder would be can become exposed. Despite being aggressive and on the ‘front foot’ in defence, City don’t seem to prioritise covering the key spaces in the centre of the pitch.

Compactness in pressing is an issue shared by many in the Premier League.

Their midfield is particularly open during these moments with the two 8s having large amounts of space to individually cover whilst the likes of Touré simply aren’t dynamic enough in defence to do so. The defensive line is rarely high enough to close the space behind the midfield whilst the midfield themselves struggle to reach positions where they could effectively support the front two.

This is a common problem shared by numerous teams in the Premier League. Although this area is due to improve with the introduction of managers such as Klopp, Conte and Guardiola himself, many teams are still unable to maintain compactness in defence. Such characteristics are key factors in what makes the league be considered as one of the entertaining in the world – open matches with strong individual attackers.

It’s been a thorn in Manchester City’s side for years, being particularly problematic when they come to face the best in Europe in their failed Champions League runs. Coming up against teams such as Barcelona who can create better co-ordinated attacks as a group, City are given less lee-way in their disconnected defence. Because they face Premier League teams where the majority of which struggle to formulate cohesive attacks as a group, compactness isn’t as much of an issue as it would be in the Bundesliga or La Liga.

Due to this open shape, City can often struggle to form effective pressure on the opposing team. The large gaps available to the opposition offer a way out of any tricky situations which makes defensive access difficult to create. If you pair this with the at-times passive defending of the front two, then City’s defensive structure is rather unstable and lacks security in the centre. Without pressure on the opposition’s first line, they have more time and space to pick out a pass into the open defensive block.

When the forwards do look to apply pressure, it can be quite difficult to make it a threat to the opponent’s build-up. Not only is there extra space for the opposition to evade the pressure into, but there is a distinct lack of support from the midfield four. Although the ball-near winger will push up to (individually) press wide situations, they chain of four is commonly disconnected from the front two. This uncompact shape makes it difficult for inter-player support in the pressing which results in quite an individualistic defensive effort.

In such scenes it’s difficult for the central midfielders to properly support the forwards.

The most common example is perhaps found between the central midfielders and the strikers. Because of Touré and Fernandinho’s deep positioning, they are often disconnected from their teammates higher up. Because of this, there are spaces in between which can be capitalised on by the opposition. If Agüero, for example, is beaten then you’re unlikely to see a City midfielder closely behind him to cover; instead, they are positioned deeper and the uncoordinated press is broken and exposed with ease.

Direct play is easier to make against an uncompact press.

By pressing with an open and stretched shape, one allows the opposition to benefit more from a direct passing game. Long balls are commonly used as a means to counter a pressing defensive system as it acts as a means to bypass the pressure higher up. By having an uncompact midfield, the players higher in attack have more space in which they can receive the ball, whilst the forwards are more able to lay-off any long passes to continue to the attack.

As you can see on the right, City have looked to close down WBA in build-up with Agüero the closest person to McAuley in possession. Whilst the front four are in advanced positions high up the pitch, the two central midfielders are much deeper and thus a significant opens up in the centre. The long ball is played into Rondón who is able to make an unchallenged lay-off into said gap as WBA continue their attack forward.

The above-mentioned disconnect is also evident in this play, with neither central midfielder in any position to support the press. As a result, the closing down was ineffective and although WBA opted for the direct option, McAuley could’ve easily played the ball on the ground into the vacated space highlighted.

Attacks without dynamic

Upon moving the ball into the opposition half, a team would ideally be moving within their shape to open up spaces within the midfield to make the next progression. Yet City, holding numerous attacking talents, are instead distinctly static off of the ball with a clear lack of supporting runs being made from the midfield players. In an almost lethargic manner, players such as Yaya Toure and Fernando operate in very small spaces and rarely break sweat in trying to offer connections to the ball. Although their attack can have a somewhat free-form nature, the level of dynamism in the shape is definitely sub-par.

This plays straight into the hands of the numerous man-marking Premier League defences. When the opposition players are static and without movement, it instantly becomes much easier to cover them through man-marking. Not only do City miss out an opportunity to destabilise and disorient their opposition through off-the-ball movement but individually they become easier to defend against. Without the movement of teammates, City show evident struggles in the task of opening space in midfield with players unwilling to move in order to create the gaps which are so key in generating dangerous attacks.

Without a sufficient level of supporting movements in the midfield, City’s attacks can soon become isolated within the play. As the ball-carrier struggles to find nearby players moving into helping positions, he can be isolated fairly easily and the capacity for them to work in a team is restricted. This is particularly the case in wide areas, where not only does the ball-carrier have less space, but his teammates aren’t willing to shift quickly to support him through the necessary connections.

The movement of the deeper midfielders is one of the bigger factors in this lack of dynamic and all but Fernandinho are to blame at least to some extent. Whilst the likes of Toure are rather lethargic, Fernandinho offers an individual dynamism which can be quite useful when moving the ball in midfield. The versatile midfielder covers a relatively large amount of space, allowing him to be present in the circulation which he does so with clever short passes within the midfield gaps. At times he is the only one offering connections to under-pressure teammates whilst Fernando is in contrast much less ball-oriented in his positioning on the pitch. Although his presence is important to City, he obviously can’t fulfil the role of 3 players at the same time (after all, he’s no Luka Modric) and his team are still lacking in this department.

Aguero has possession on the right touchline, yet none of his teammates adjust their positioning to support.

The responsibility of creating this pace and dynamic in the attack is often dropped on one player – David Silva. With the rest of the team in stagnation, the diminutive interior often takes it upon himself to accelerate the attack as he comes to receive the ball and proceeds to carry it into more prosperous situations. Obviously, a reliance on one player is far from ideal and although many Premier League defences are bettered by this strategy, it’s less sustainable against stronger opposition.

Looking past this lone player, City can sometimes prosper through the dynamic between small pairings of players, such as the Silva – Zabaleta tandem on the right of the pitch. The 4-4-2 shape under Pellegrini allowed for a number of small partnerships to form which gave City some threat in the final third through the synergy between these pairings. However the fact that these were restricted to just 2 or at-times 3 players meant that any attacking strategy based around these few attackers was of limited potential.

Without the aforementioned penetration, City’s ‘U-shaped’ circulation is a factor in this problem too. The ball’s side-to-side movement is very rarely met by the appropriate adjustments in positioning off of the ball. For example, if the ball moves from the centre to the right-wing, then it is almost-necessary for the midfielders to create passing options around the right half-space. Yet many of the players are reluctant to do so and stay centrally instead, offering no connection or support to the ball which has just entered a strategically-weak position.

When taking this into consideration, it comes as little surprise that Manchester City possess one of the slowest attacks in the league. They gain space at a very slow rate as they progress up the pitch with little intensity and despite receiving a fraction of the criticism, are comparable to their Manchester neighbours. With the players taking their time in moving off of the ball and supporting the ball-carrier, it not only takes time to formulate an attack but also progress it through the lines of opposition defence.

This issue is something which Pep will need to address early and has already began doing so. The excellent signing of Ilkay Gündogan introduces another dynamic player to the squad and is one who carries the ball well with high game intelligence. With spacing being such an important facet of Guardiola’s playing philosophy, improving their movements off of the ball will be high on his list of priorities. Gündogan represents many things which players such as Yaya Toure are not and through both training and squad re-structuring, City will be soon on the path to improvement.

Within the above-mentioned juego de posicion, various supporting movements are trained in order to create strong support in the ball-local spaces whilst crucially maintaining positional balance and stability. There were many examples of this during his time at Bayern Munich. If a winger such as Kinglsey Coman receives the ball on the touchline and looks to move inside, Phillip Lahm will balance this movement by moving from the interior line to the touchline and effectively rotate with his teammate. In order to provide from balance and security to this movement, a central midfielder may shift simultaneously to occupy the spaces behind the two wide players.

These supporting movements are executed to enable the team to maintain positional balance whilst constantly adjusting to sustain support to the ball-carrier and the spaces around him. If they aren’t made, then the side would quickly lose key support to the ball and circulation may be less effective and stable. In the first example, Lahm maintains the balance by re-occupying the touchline whilst potentially creating space for Coman inside or even offer for an overlapping run. The central midfielder increases the security of the possession by taking up the space behind them which can be useful for counterpressing situations and if it becomes necessary to ‘reset’ the play.

Improving their attacking in the final third will be a major key if Pep wants this team to become as potent as what he created at Bayern. City have some talented individuals such as David Silva and Sergio Agüero but in recent years they have struggled to work well as a collective. The lack of supporting off-the-ball movements highlights an attack which is quite individualistic at times with players struggling to incorporate teammates into the play.

Despite their clear structural issues, this aspect is often overlooked as they’re able to attack frequently due to the individual quality of their players. Especially in the Premier League, they can rely on individuals such as Silva, de Bruyne and Agüero to create chances despite not effectively coordinating attacks as a team. However, because of the lack of connections between players, it still acts as a limiting factor in the potential of such forwards and a positional structure more conducive to team-play would provide a better platform for these players to perform to their abilities.

This is a stark contrast to the football we saw at Bayern with many players working together to create dangerous situations within the final third. Players would stay connected for the duration of the play by moving well and positioning themselves effectively without the ball which allowed them to participate in combinations when they try to break through the defence. Another means of generating superiority is through overloads (named numerical superiority) where the attacking team positions more players than their opponents in a particular space – in doing so, they create free players who can be uncovered in space to accelerate the attack forwards. This tactic represents a truly collectivist playing style where teammates work together to create a promising situation as a group, A goal which Pep will aim for his City team to achieve.

“Everyone is allowed to move into the box, but none are allowed to stand in it.”
– Pep Guardiola

In order to demonstrate their lack of dynamism, I went over the Real Madrid semi-finals and clipped their possessions where little movement off of the ball was to be seen.

A quick fix?

Whilst Manchester City’s problems are rather deep-rooted in their play both in and out of possession, we may see a rather fast turnaround in performances this season. We saw an incredibly quick improvement in Dortmund after Thomas Tuchel took over from Jürgen Klopp on the back of a terrible final season for the now-Liverpool manager. It was known that Tuchel had met Guardiola on a number of occasions during his sabbatical and when he arrived at the Westfalenstadion, the coach implemented a playing style which closely resembled Juego de Posición.

A scene from Tuchel’s first Bundesliga match in charge of Dortmund.

As I documented in my Hinrunde analysis, Dortmund’s excellent performances saw a rapid return to one of the best clubs in the world. The now-more possession-based footballing style had Tuchel get the best out of world class players such as Henrikh Mkhitaryan, Mats Hummels and the man which Pep now has at City, Ilkay Gundogan. From their 4-o win over Gladbach on the opening matchday, Dortmund’s spacing was at a very high standard and with it, other aspects such as their ball circulation and counterpressing improved dramatically too.

It is highly possible that the guidelines for positioning and other rules which come with this playing philosophy allow players to understand the system better. If a player knows there are 2-3 positions he should be taking up when the ball is in x area, then it’s possible that he can understand his role faster as opposed to a style which demands a less-rigid interpretation on the pitch.

Dortmund made an excellent start under Tuchel.

However, Guardiola’s playing philosophy differs from Tuchel’s in some ways. With the Man City boss, the guidelines for positioning are more explicit and rigid whilst the circulation of the ball is more patterned and structured than what we saw over the past season in Dortmund. Because of this, we may see a different speed of adaption from the City players. On one hand, the more explicit playing style may allow the players to execute it sooner on the pitch, yet due to the more regulations in the playing style, it could take longer for the likes of Sterling and Silva to learn the ropes of Guardiola’s footballing style.

Another factor is the quality of players. Whilst Dortmund possessed many intelligent players such as Weigl, Kagawa, Schmelzer, Hummels and not least Mkhitaryan, City don’t possess a similar level of squad. Although the likes of De Bruyne and Silva have impressive tactical intelligence, the same cannot be said for players such as Fernando, whilst Raheem Sterling is lacking in this area too. At Dortmund, Tuchel had players such as the team-tactical genius Mkhitaryan who learned the system immediately and Pep may not have the same luck in Manchester.

Early showings in training

Although we have only been fortunate to see glimpses of City in pre-season, there have been many promising signs to be found on the training pitch.

A basic rondo seen in a training session at the new ‘Etihad Campus’.

No-one will have been surprised to see nearly every exercise involves a football to some extent, the warm-ups feature basic manouevres in passing and very rarely can you see work without the ball. Every aspect is football-specific and more specifically focused on improving technical capacities and manipulation of the ball – something obviously central to Guardiola’s footballing ideology. It didn’t take long for rondos to make an appearance either, with some basic variations being used to help the players adapt to the new playing style.

Rondos are an incredibly useful tool to have in training as they are a rather holistic exercise which trains a number of key footballing aspects, especially for the simplicity of the drill. It’s clear to see their use in helping players improve in their combinative ability and capacity to pass cleanly in pressured situations. Moving past that however, it’s an important practice to develop things such as body shape in receiving passes, the use of different parts of the foot in controlling and passing the ball as well as passing through defenders and making the most out of numerical superiority. The defensive side of rondos is quite commonly overlooked, as it helps the defenders improving their pressing mechanisms and anticipatory capacity as they try to overcome the clear numerical disadvantage.

Guardiola has had the ‘keepers acting in the rondos – every player needs to be technically proficient.

It seems like Guardiola took little time to begin to address the issue of spacing in possession, with his first training session showing him directing players’ positioning during build-up. From what the club’s YouTube channel allowed us to see, Pep designed a match-like scenario where they focused on the structure of the team when playing out from the back. In an obviously laid-back session, one team would build-up possession from the goalkeeper, often passing in clear patterns through the players and upon reaching the half-way line, would pass it to the opposing ‘keeper and the sides swapped roles. The defenders split in deep positions whilst a pivot would drop between and the player’s positioning off of the ball took the main focus of the session. Pep would sometimes specify the focus and force the teams to build-up through exact areas on the pitch, as h In other areas, it seemed there was a focus on ball-oriented shifts which had the purpose of re-adjusting and maintaining support in areas around the ball despite longer passes being made.

A simple 6v6+3 exercise was part of a session in Säbener Straße.

There have been signs of further work on this area in a short clip of another exercise. In a fairly small square area, a (possibly) 7v7+2 game was played where the focus was on maintaining possession and using the joker players to create connections and overloads to keep control over the ball.  Another session shows a similar 6v6+3 practice with the same principles as the former, later on in the session – this was elaborated into a small match spanning the length of one half of the pitch. The emphasis remained on active positioning off of the ball and the players maintained a fairly good level of connections as fast combination plays ensued as a result.

It has been interesting to see Guardiola give quite explicit instructions to his team during training, especially when they’re learning the basic positioning in match situations. The coach clearly states the positions which he wants them to be in, instead of allowing them to find their own solutions.

The most likely explanation for this is to do with time. Pep himself stated that he doesn’t have a lot of time due to the nature and short-sightedness of the league so he needs his team to understand his ideologies quickly. Through telling them exactly which positions they should take up, Guardiola can quickly establish an understanding with his players and as a result, they can move to understand other concepts. If he were to use a more implicit approach, then it may take longer for the players to grasp a basic understanding of this principle as the players have to find the solutions themselves.

Translation onto the pitch

With all the work put into their positional game on the training pitch, it’s clear that Pep has already made his mark on the team and they’ve showed exactly that in friendly matches. In their first match at the Allianz Arena, City showed many signs of a typical Guardiola-team with many changes clear from the system which Pellegrini departed with.

Some of the ‘trademark’ principles of a Guardiola side were on display as they incorporated the goalkeeper in build-up, focused on spacing themselves across the width and depth of the pitch and perhaps most importantly, looked to use possession as a tool. Whilst they were competed quite closely for possession of the ball, Guardiola’s team were able to both maintain and utilise possession better than we have seen in

You could see this micro-structure when City were practicing their build-up at the Etihad Complex.

During their build-up of possession, both centre-backs dropped to either side of the goalkeeper whilst Fernando and Fernandinho would drop into receiving positions too. The full-backs would occupy slightly higher positions and triangular structures were thus created within the half-space and wings. Such patterns trace back to the work on the training ground which I previously referenced as they practiced their build-up structure on the very first day – the centre-backs stayed wide of the ‘keeper, the full-backs moved higher whilst the central midfielders offered on the edge of the penalty area.

They passed the ball more efficiently and had a clear direction in their circulation. Often inviting Bayern further up the pitch during the City build-up, they had the intention of passing the ball into any space created from their press. Such a concept is a typical feature of both Bayern and Barça under Pep and is an aspect of Juego de Posicion.

“Move the opponent, not the ball. Invite the opponent to press. You have the ball on one side, to finish on the other.”

– Pep Guardiola

By inviting the opposition to press, it often forces them to vacate space in other areas which can then be used to progress the ball upfield by the team in possession. A large aspect of Guardiola’s playing philosophy is centred around creating a free man within the opposition block and drawing them out helps his team achieve this. It’s also one of the reasons why he demands such ball-playing capabilities from his deeper players – they need to be comfortable against pressure from the opposition forwards.

Less positive things could be said about their build-up in the match against Borussia Dortmund. Tuchel’s side pressed aggressively throughout the game and City rarely looked comfortable on the ball as they made many turnovers within their own third. The level of support in connections from midfield was commonly insufficient and Caballero’s inability to pass accurately had him resorting to aimless long balls.

A moment from the 40th minute.

Whilst their possession game did show clear improvements and distinct traits of a Guardiola side, they still showed the remnants of last year’s side, which is entirely understandable of course. While evidently improved, their spacing was rather inconsistent and the lower-level of synergy common in pre-season (and under a new coach) was unmistakeable as the distances between players wasn’t always conducive to effective ball circulation.

City’s inability to maintain a sufficient level of occupation over the attacking midfield spaces was once again on display as their positional structure in the final third at times resembled a clear ‘U’. However whilst it was a big problem in these isolated moments, it was much less a recurring issue throughout the 90 minutes. The midfield and forwards were able to more persistently take up positions within the Bayern defence and although the staggering of the players was sub-optimal, it’s a definite improvement from what we would have seen a few months prior.

Although the structure isn’t ideal for strong attacks, it’s an improvement from last year.

Improvements have been made from a defensive perspective, too. Guardiola’s new side are making a shift into a more zonally-marking system as the players maintain their defensive structure better out of possession. Although individually, some players such as Fernando are still showing a tendency to follow their man off of the ball, City’s new zonal-focus sees them maintain a higher level of compactness and stability.

Against Borussia Dortmund, the pressing of City looked strong as they were able to stop the opposition from consistently constructing possession with short passes. Although a quickly-deteriorating pitch supported their cause considerably, Pep’s team were able to put the ball under pressure well and force more direct passes from Dortmund.

They were much more man-oriented in their attempts to press and when closing down Dortmund would largely man-mark in the BVB third. Defending in the 3-4-2-1 shape which Pep had chosen for the match, Zinchenko joined Iheanacho on the first line whilst Fabian Delph dropped into the midfield to create more of a 3-5-2 structure. This allowed City to match up man-for-man against Dortmund who were playing in a more orthodox 4-3-3 structure. City often lost their shape throughout the game due to the reactionary nature of their man-marking approach, but were able to effectively apply pressure for large periods of the match. It’s little secret that Dortmund are particularly susceptible when trying to build-up against such pressure and, especially without the structure-creating and pressing-resistant presence of Julian Weigl, their Manchester opposition posed a distinct challenge.

City’s man-oriented pressing against Dortmund.

New Signings

Manchester City have been one of the biggest players in the summer transfer window, making a number of high-profile signings in order to strengthen midfield and wing positions.

The biggest move of their window was the introduction of Ilkay Gündogan from Borussia Dortmund. Enjoying one of his best seasons ever, and certainly his best performances since the 2012/2013 season, the midfield benefited massively from the system introduced by Thomas Tuchel. Playing on the right side of the pivot in a 4-2-3-1, Gündogan was a crucial component of the system acting as an important playmaking influence in all areas of the pitch. The Turk-German is of great technical ability and one of the best in his position at carrying the ball forward through the centre of the pitch.

In his position alongside Julian Weigl, Gündogan has a dribbling ability which few players have in this area of the pitch, allowing him to create space individually and avoid the pressing efforts of those who attempt to challenge him. His other great quality is his excellent capacity to circulate the ball and create chances for teammates. The 20-some million pound signing is capable of a wide array of passes, ranging from short interplay passes to far-reaching long balls with a particularly impressive chip over the top of the defence, as seen below.

Everyone should stop watching the draw and just appreciate Ilkay Gundogan #BVB pic.twitter.com/gQ9XDldF4D

— Tom Payne (@TomPayneftbl) December 14, 2015

Fitting into Guardiola’s system at Manchester City, one can be fairly sure of seeing him largely in the 8 position in Pep’s preferred 4-3-3 formation. It wouldn’t be surprising to see a fast transition into Guardiola’s system considering his excellence under Tuchel in his last year at Dortmund. As I’ve already noted in this article, the two share very similar playing styles and principles meaning Gündogan will be already at least somewhat accustomed to such a game model and adjustment will be less drastic than the teammates he is joining.

The second import from Germany comes in the form of young winger Leroy Sané. Signing from Dortmund rivals Schalke, the winger is thought to be one of the biggest prospects out of Germany football and for good reason. Playing largely on the right flank, Sané has a distinct inclination to come inside where he can use his dominant left foot (which possesses a rather threatening long shot) to greater effect and play with teammates or threaten with direct runs.

His pace is a major tool in his array of skills and if necessary he can rely on this to beat his man either on or off of the ball. His playing style is far from a typical winger however and he also has a strong capacity to combine well with teammates either opting for simple 1-2s in wide areas or, towards the centre, more complex combinations. Coming inside onto his left foot, Sané shows quite a high attacking intelligence and is able to find free teammates with short passes or find runners with diagonal through-balls from the right half-space.

Sané’s output isn’t limited to the offence either, as he can protect his full-back fairly well out of possession. Using his pace to cover a fairly large amount of space and can be a threat in backwards-pressing when the situation arrises. He will be challenged quite closely for a starting role on the wings, coming into a squad already possessing Sterling, Navas, Nolito and potentially De Bruyne, Silva, Zinchenko and Nasri. However it would be no surprise to see him quickly establish himself as the top winger against his competition, with the potential to be a valuable member of Guardiola’s City.

Considering the ageing squad profile of Manchester City, the signing of Nolito came as somewhat of a surprise. Aged 29, he joins the likes of David Silva, Samir Nasri and Jesus Navas who are at the latter end, or past, the natural peak for their position. On this basis, it seems quite a short-sighted signing from Manchester City, especially considering it was confirmed before the transfers of Sané (20) and Zinchenko (19). The one redeeming factor however, is that the forward has a fairly low mileage in terms of matches throughout his career, having (according to TransferMarkt) only played 228 professional games. Compare this to the much higher mileage of Jesus Navas (over double at 538 matches) and the difference is striking, suggesting that Nolito could be closer to his peak and more useful over the next few years.

Despite his low mileage, the signing of Nolito is still highly questionable. The winger is much more of a typical winger/inside forward in comparison to Sané which a much less dynamic playing style. His team-tactical intelligence is rather dubious and he struggles to make effective attacks between teammates with a poor capacity to make clean combinations. The £15m signing from Celta Vigo seems to have quite poor decision making on the ball, with a poor understanding of when to release the pass, especially in deeper situations where he simply looks out-of-place.

More promising is the cheap signing of Oleksandr Zinchenko who arrived for just £1.7m from FC Ufa of Russia. The young midfielder played mostly on the right side of his old club’s midfield but is more-than capable in an attacking midfield position, as he showed in City’s friendly with Borussia Dortmund. More of a team-player than Nolito, the Ukranian 19-year-old’s playing style is somewhat focused around short passing combinations with teammates and bringing others into play.

With the depth which City possess in the attacking-midfield positions, it’s unlikely that we will see a lot of Zinchenko this season as he may be a 3rd back-up for large periods of the season. However it seems an intelligent signing considering his age and price tag, whilst his playing style could suit Pep’s football quite well.

The latest major signing from Manchester City has been the Brazilian Gabriel Jesus from Palmeiras. At a striking £27m transfer fee, the 19-year-old is much of a high-profile transfer than that of Zinchenko yet he will remain at his Brazilian side until December though you’ll see him before then for Brazil’s olympic squad. Adding even more competition to the winger positions, Gabriel has the capacity to play more centrally too but we’re more likely to see him act in wider positions unless Pep has a secret plan for the young forward. In his most recent matches for Palmeiras, he’s acted as a lone striker in a 4-2-3-1 or 4-1-4-1 which suggests a capacity to act as back-up to the striker position at City.

Missing Pieces

Whilst Guardiola has already improved his new side to some extent in his first few weeks at the club, it wouldn’t be surprising to see him look towards the transfer market to finalise his squad. Ilkay Gündogan could prove to be one of the best players in the Premier League but an additional reinforcement in midfield may be necessary at the pivot spot.

Considering both Guardiola’s playing style and the squad at his disposal, Pep could benefit massively from a more team-tactically intelligent defensive midfielder who could be an important linking factor in the system. In Catalonia, the coach had arguably the best defensive midfielder of all time at his disposal whilst in Munich he had Xabi Alonso – who made a good contribution despite having some problems with his positioning. At Manchester City, Pep currently will have to choose from the likes of Fernando, Toure and Fernandinho (outside of new signings) for this defensive midfield position and only the latter suits his needs at this spot (and in that case it is still not a good fit).

The Manchester club were linked with Julian Weigl earlier in the summer and the extremely intelligent Dortmund pivot would’ve been ideal to co-ordinate City’s build-up and ball circulation under Pep. In a somewhat similar system at Dortmund, the defensive midfielder constantly creates triangles and connections within the structure and connects the build-up to the midfield and attack. Leandro Paredes was another touted earlier in the season and the Roma 10-turned-pivot would be another well-suited for Pep’s idea of playing football. Unfortunately for the City manager however, Spalletti seems to have big plans for the midfielder after his return from Empoli where he made his mark as one of the best young players in Italy.

With the possibility of David Silva and Kevin De Bruyne occupying the 8 positions in a 4-3-3, both Gundogan and Fernandinho come available for the defensive midfield position. Pep has already stated his appreciation for Fernandinho’s versatility, saying he could play in all 10 positions (though this is to be taken lightly) whilst Gündogan could be potentially capable of fulfilling this role too. Accompanying Julian Weigl in the deep midfield spaces last year, he played an important role during Dortmund’s build-up so it’s plausible to see him in a deeper role in Manchester.

Another area in which we may see a purchase is in the goalkeeper position. Whilst Pep has both Joe Hart and Willy Caballero already, he may be on the look at for another goalkeeper – one with greater ability to pass the ball and help contribute to the side’s build-up. Neither Hart nor Caballero have the greatest of playmaking capacities and this could be somewhat harmful to their ability to make short build-up through the thirds. The Argentine ‘keeper started in the friendly against Bayern and his inability to play with the ball at his feet was evident. On a number of occasions, their opposition could easily force him into a difficult pass and they commonly regained possession from doing so.

Whilst they have signed Geronimo Rulli, he will spend the coming season back on loan at Sociedad which leaves the goalkeeper spot for the first year still in question. Although both goalkeepers have taken part in the rondos and will have trained their technical abilities more intensely under Guardiola, there is a question around whether they are up to the level which Guardiola demands. With that being said, Victor Valdes had reluctancies upon the coach’s promotion to the Barcelona first team and we all know how that worked out.

Conclusion

Particularly towards the end of last season, Manchester City’s tactical deficiencies were clear to see on the pitch as Pellegrini leaves Pep with quite a difficult situation in many ways. All three of the primary issues I stated above are things which play major roles in Guardiola’s playing philosophy and the manager will undoubtedly be looking to correct them with haste. Although Pep is one of the elite managers in the world, he may not achieve the high-quality performance he demands from his team straight away as a stark turnaround in numerous tactical aspects is required.

Either way, the introduction of Guardiola at the Etihad is highly-anticipated and we will undoubtedly be following the coach closely as he makes his first steps into management on English soil.

Pep Guardiola finally completed his first match in the Premier League, with a narrow win over David Moyes’ Sunderland team. The managerial merry-go-round was struck into full swing when Sam Allardyce replaced Roy Hodgson as England manager, leaving David Moyes to take up the vacant Sunderland managerial role. With only a few weeks of pre-season preparation, expectations were not high against the favourites for the title.

Lineups

The teamsheet is never as expected with Guardiola as manager, and he did not disappoint with his selection on debut. Perhaps the most surprising move was the introduction of Willy Caballero in goal, instead of England & City regular Joe Hart. There was also no place for a number of City’s other big earners; Yaya Toure, Elaquim Mangala, Samir Nasri and Wilfried Bony were all left outside of the matchday squad.

David Silva was moved into a slightly deeper midfield role, and Aleksandr Kolarov continued his central defensive role from pre-season. New signing John Stones completed the backline.

Sunderland opted for a more conservative selection of personnel with John O’Shea deployed in central midfield alongside Jack Rodwell. Youngster Lynden Gooch was given his first Premier League start, and new signing Donald Love made his Sunderland debut at right-back.

One of the most obvious tactical features utilised by Guardiola was the full-backs drifting towards the halfspace during build-up and attacking organisation.

A tangent: on irregularity

There is something to be said for irregularity. Part of the reason an unusual approach like this can be successful even without perfect implementation is a lack of familiarity from the opponent. An opposition winger spends his whole career understanding when and how to approach a wider full-back depending on a number of different reference points (such as the location of his teammates). When his man moves inside, it removes this automation and creates uncertainty – the defensive responsibility of individual players is now less certain.

Particularly in the Premier League, where tactical adaptability (on a team and individual level) is less prevalent than in La Liga or the Bundesliga, slightly unusual build-up shapes have often proved successful. Brendan Rodgers & Roberto Martinez both found success with back three systems, but an inability to fine-tune these systems meant they were less successful after a period of 10-15 games. Pep Guardiola has proven his ability to understand the intricacies of a system and evaluate the problems within it. He will have no such problems.

‘False’ full-backs in build-up

Both Gael Clichy & Bacary Sagna were more narrow than traditional full-backs, much to the amazement of the English commentary team. This was used by Guardiola many times at Bayern Munich, particularly in the latter stages of his reign in Germany, with Rafinha in particular being given increasingly complex tactical instructions.

Primarily because of the positioning & dynamic movement of David Silva, City’s left-side connections were far superior and they were therefore more easily able to progress the ball on this side.

During the first phase of build-up, the full-backs would drift narrow once the ball-side central defender collected possession from the goalkeeper. In the early moments of the game, this disrupted Sunderland’s defense because of their proclivity to man-orient. The ‘false’ full-back was followed by the Sunderland winger, and the vacated space was filled by either the City central midfielder or winger.

This was much more successful on the left side, for a couple of reasons.

Firstly, Gael Clichy’s ability to control the ball and quickly turn is superior to that of Bacary Sagna. He has improved quickness & agility over his countryman, and can pass the ball from both feet. This allows him to be less predictable when receiving the ball with back to goal, whereas Sagna would regularly turn towards his right foot.

More important though was the differing approaches of David Silva & Kevin de Bruyne, and particularly how they adapted to the positioning of the full-back on their side. Silva often moved into the vacated space out wide when Clichy moved inside. Because of Silva’s natural gravity, and Sunderland’s proclivity to man-mark, this generally forced Jack Rodwell to follow him away from the central areas. The space was then opened for Nolito to make a sharp movement inside, receiving the ball in a good position to immediately attack the goal.

On the other side, de Bruyne never made such a movement. The means of progessing play on the right was solely reliant on Raheem Sterling dropping deeper on the right-touchline. Because both players were facing backwards towards their own goal, the responsibility to adjust to his teammate rests with the central midfielder. Silva successfully used the positioning of Clichy to govern his own movement, but de Bruyne seemed unwilling or unable to make similar adjustments based on Sagna’s location. In many cases, John Stones’s options were limited as de Bruyne and Sagna would occupy the same passing lane.

The main difference between City’s build-up on the sides: not only does the left-sided CB have more immediate passing options, but so does anyone that receives the ball.

Of course, a similar effect could have been created if Kevin de Bruyne drifted slightly wider. This was just more organically created when the central midfielder moved deep + wide, as the forward could then make a direct movement towards goal in a more dangerous area.

Even when the left-side did not make this particular movement pattern, though, Silva was more subtle in altering his positioning to ensure his passing lane was not blocked by Clichy. Kolarov was able to make some nice laser passes directly into Silva in advanced areas because of this.

Provoking the press, but inability to adjust

Whilst Stones’ passing influence was somewhat negated by the structure around him, he was still able to influence the game with sharp on-ball movements forward after a quick circulation in possession. Fabio Borini was often doing two players’ worth of pressing whilst Jermain Defoe stayed central, and this meant he could be fairly easily bypassed by a quick sideways pass. Stones & Kolarov both dribbled with the ball when the space was available after Borini had been forced into pressing on the other side of the pitch.

Whilst the quick circulation in possession allowed the centre back to be the free-man in build-up, this effect was nullified by poor spacing from City. Sagna & Clichy seemed unaware of how to adjust their positioning, and this often led to overcrowding.

Unlike David Alaba’s role at Bayern Munich, the full-backs were generally limited to the first phase of build-up, or picking up second balls. Once play moved into the final third, they merely operated as an outball to recycle possession. This allowed City to retain possession well, but did not facilitate chance creation. Much of City’s ability to break through came from combination play down the left between Silva & Nolito. On the right, de Bruyne was again disconnected from play and Sterling was often tasked with beating his full-back in a 1v1 duel. Later in the game, de Bruyne began to make moves towards the left to create overloads in that area, and create more space for Sterling by dragging his marker away.

… and in defensive transition

One of the most common transition routes in English football is the lofted pass between the central defender and advanced full-back. Jamie Vardy has made a career out of getting on the end of these passes and isolating a central defender in a wide 1v1. With a full-back positioned in a more central area, this is much more difficult to accomplish.

The full-backs positioning in the halfspace gives better access for pressuring the initial passer, but also reduces the potential passing lanes the ball-player can utilise. If the pass is successful and the striker receives the ball in the wide area, the ‘false’ full-back can more easily drop into the defensive line than if he were positioned wide initially.

Single pass counter-attacks are therefore much more difficult to achieve, and the opposition are usually required increased attacking presence to make an impact in transition.

Conclusion

There is much to work on for Pep Guardiola and Manchester City, but they showed that this will not be a boring season. The team already put in a good performance, but was lacking the familiarity and understanding to consistently penetrate in the final third.

Arsenal hosted Liverpool in their opening Premier League game of the 2016/17 campaign on Sunday afternoon. With fans frustrated with a lack of signings and worried by the transfer activity and managerial acquisitions of their rivals, a win was vital for Arsenal to keep the fans onside.

Liverpool were beginning their second campaign under Jurgen Klopp and after a promising start fans were expectant of a good start to set the tone for a strong campaign. The increased time Klopp has had to work with the players in addition to new signings and no European competition has served to heighten expectation at Anfield.

Building Issues

The starting line-ups

Much of the first half was characterised by both teams’ struggles in their build-up phases. This led to a transition-focused game whereby the team on the ball was more vulnerable to conceding a chance due to the likely impending loss of possession.

For the home side the major issue was a typically poor support from the midfielders in this phase of the game. When looking to start attacks Arsenal’s defenders often found themselves in far closer proximity to Liverpool’s forwards than their own team-mates. Arsenal’s midfielders often lacked either the positioning to find the spaces away from Liverpool’s press or the ability to receive the ball, maintain it under pressure and find routes to advance.

The result was predictable, Arsenal were easily forced into a wing-oriented construction game. From here they were easily isolated and forced into long balls down the flanks or turning over possession more directly. On the occasions where the midfielders did move to escape the situational man-orientations of Liverpool’s midfielders the rest of the team did not react or adjust their positioning. This meant that they were still largely disconnected and despite the midfielders being on the ball retained no progressive means of advancing.

If this was a plan to evade Liverpool’s strong midfield compactness it was a poorly executed one as once the ball went wide the midfielders lacked sufficient ball-orientation. This meant Arsenal’s full-backs were often left without viable passing options. The midfielders did not offer a route back into the centre or give the ball carrier time and space by attracting the attention of their opponents.

Can be quite difficult to progress in a shape like this

There were one or two occasions where Arsenal moved forwards from the flanks with good passing combinations and generally stabilised their wide build-up through better connections. This was often due to the presence of Ramsey dropping from his attacking midfield spot towards these areas and offering an option to the ball carrier. These were too far and few between however and Arsenal’s build-up therefore lacked efficacy.

Credit must go to Liverpool who directed Arsenal’s build-up well with their strong positioning and pressing mechanisms. One of these was their high central control, in their narrow 4-3-3 defensive shape they had good access to the centre and half spaces and crucially retained the ability to press Arsenal’s midfielders both from the forward and midfield lines. By the nature of their positioning Liverpool could easily outnumber Arsenal’s midfielders in the centre of the pitch. Furthermore the lack of needle playing ability from the likes of Elneny and Coquelin meant these situations would be highly favourable for the away side.

In conjunction with their strong positioning Liverpool’s forwards directed Arsenal’s build-up well with a strong usage of curved runs and cover shadows. Although they were mostly passive against Arsenal’s back line, on the occasions they did press they took up positions to prevent passes in central areas through their cover shadows. This could be seen when Firmino would start between Arsenal’s defenders and press the ball carrying centre back to prevent the switch to the other.

Klopp’s side suffered from similar issues, namely the inability to progress their build-up via the midfielders. Against Arsenal’s man-oriented pressing Liverpool struggled to build-up effectively. These man-orientations were particularly active in midfield and were effective at forcing Liverpool to search for alternative routes of progression. Arsenal’s man-oriented pressing was generally quite stable, not because of any strong mechanisms but due to Liverpool’s inability to manipulate and bypass them.

A static attack is strategically the best match for a man-oriented defence, given that it does not challenge the mobility of thedefenders and the speed at which they have to re-organise themselves to re-align against their opponents. It was no surprise therefore that Liverpool struggled to use their midfielders in build-up with their generally static nature making life easy for the likes of Ramsey, Coquelin and Elneny. There were one or two instances where Henderson rotated with one of the 8s leading to a quick and effective central build-up but this sort of rotation was far too rare.

Although it may seem counter-intuitive, the pairing of man and ball-orientation on some level is quite common. Essentially it means that man-orientations are more active on the near side whilst the ball-far players shift across and attempt to maintain some level of compactness. The ball-far players may still man-mark but it would generally be against a more central opponent, for example a right winger marking an opposing left central midfielder. With Arsenal’s man-orientations being more focused on the near side diagonal passing could have been another potential tool for Liverpool to bypass Arsenal’s pressing.

There were a number of instances where Liverpool’s ball-far 8 was free to receive passes as Arsenal’s ball-far winger took their time to shift across. However liverpool’s defenders were either lacking the confidence or the vision to play those passes.

Furthermore with Mignolet’s general incompetence in this phase of the game they lacked the ability to use him as an immediatefree man in these situations which could have been another method to disrupt their man-oriented opponents.

Generally Liverpool lacked the collective press resistance to build attacks consistently against Arsenal’s pressing. Theoretically they could also have made better use of Lallana’s individual press resistance with his agility, close control and ability to use both feet he can be quite difficult to press. He certainly possesses the required qualities to be of greater assistance in this phase than he was.

Redundant Overloads

Overloads in specific areas of the pitch are an increasingly common offensive tool. They can enhance the ability for forwards to combine quickly and can assist with significantly altering the defensive shape of an opponent. However several overloads are made redundant by the offensive team themselves due to a lack of sufficient organisation within the area.

Arsenal, with their free form offensive nature. are a prime example of this. With the players being given no guidelines for a structured attack Arsenal players can be seen acting wholly out of their own will in offensive situations. While this can at times create great combinations, the lack of structure often harms the ability for their players to use their talents. It is also no surprise therefore that their attacks are inconsistent and reliant on moments, not only from game to game but from minute to minute.

The above image is an example of one of their typical redundant overloads. Elneny has the ball in this situation and technically Arsenal should benefit from a 5v4 advantage in the immediate vicinity. However the presence of Bellerin in front of him effectively does half of the defending for Liverpool as it removes three passing options effectively rendering those players redundant and practically changing the situation into a 2v4 underload. This lack of offensive organisation crippled Arsenal’s attack not only for much of this game but for the best part of the last few years.

Storm after the calm

In the exchanges immediately after the interval Liverpool took control of the game, with a number of mechanisms they gained and began to dominate territory as they had done towards the end of the first half.

One of these mechanisms was simply to engage their opponents higher up and press earlier in Arsenal’s build-up and force long balls or regain possession quicker. When they did have possession Liverpool were a bit more patient with their circulation allowing them to spend more time in higher zones but crucially they maintained the high ball-orientation the forwards displayed in the first half.

This gave Liverpool the potential for quick combinations to increase the pace of attack in the final 3rd. Furthermore it assisted their ability to prevent counters, with Arsenal finding space much harder to come by with Liverpool occupying the areas around the ball.

When Liverpool had the ball in higher areas it was not difficult to maintain it due to the passivity of Arsenal’s defence. With Arsenal lacking sufficient intensity against the ball they were vulnerable to the sort of lengthy passing sequences that Liverpool put together on a number of occasions. With more time being spent in attack and the likes of Firmino, Coutinho, Lallana, and the outstanding Mane given a platform to combine Liverpool were always going to be dangerous. Furthermore the support from the likes of Wijnaldum and Lallana enhanced the use of 3rd man runs to create scoring opportunities.

Immediately after half time #LFC gained territory and combined dangerously in front of a passive Arsenal defence. pic.twitter.com/TgiBAYWNAX

— Judah Davies (@1415football) August 15, 2016

The video above demonstrates the dangerous combinations and passing sequences Liverpool put together that saw them take a 3-1 lead before Mane’s excellent goal.

Natural Territory Swing

Through a combination of Arsenal’s increased desperation and Liverpool’s caution, Arsenal dominated possession for the minutes immediately after as Liverpool sought to close out the game.They fell back into a 4-1-4-1 mid-block earlier than previously and were again somewhat passive against Arsenal’s first line. With decent covering from Liverpool’s midfield line and a lack of presence from Arsenal, Wenger’s men found access to the centre difficult to come by. Their attacks therefore consisted largely of direct balls to the flanks and crosses from weak positions.

Towards the end it became a lot more balanced and Liverpool even began to saw more of the ball by maintaining the ball in higher areas. Whilst they could press Liverpool rather effectively in the opponents’ half, Arsenal lacked a cohesive pressing structure in their own half. Despite being a goal behind Arsenal were still fairly passive when defending in their own half, on the occasions they did attempt to press the efforts were rather individual and improvised and thus easy to play around. Liverpool used this weakness to maintain possession in higher areas and wind down the clock.

Conclusion

After a largely disjointed first half from both sides Liverpool dominated the game for the 20 minutes after half time and last 10 minutes of the game. This was enough for them to gain a commanding lead and then close it out. In the spell after half time they demonstrated their high offensive potential and their progress in Klopp’s second season will be keenly followed as the Liverpool faithful dream of the title.

Arsenal however showed several of the same weaknesses that have plagued their game for the best part of the last few years. It is of course only the first game of the season and it is important to note the significant absentees in Koscielny, Giroud and Mertesacker whilst Cazorla came off the bench. However it is the underlying strategic frailties that Arsenal fans should be most concerned about. It goes without saying that significant improvement will need to be shown if Arsenal are to maintain their perennial top 4 spot.

After a weekend of many Premier League debuts, Antonio Conte’s first match in English football was reserved for Monday night, as Chelsea hosted West Ham who started with Dimitri Payet on the bench.

Chelsea’s wing-focused attacks

With the ball, Conte’s side showed the same focus on attacking through the wide spaces which had been one of the biggest changes seen in the pre-season matches. When in sustained possession, they would patiently move the ball from side to side, looking to penetrate the wing-spaces with vertical passes and wouldn’t often attempt to progress through the centre.

Tailored towards this wing-focused passing was Chelsea’s positional structure. From a base formation of something between a 4-2-3-1 and a 4-3-3, both wide players would stay fairly close to their touchlines whilst Oscar had a tendency to drop into the right half-space. This formed some clear partnerships through the lateral areas of the pitch, with a triangle of Ivanovic, Willian and Oscar combining down the right and a more linear Hazard – Azpilicueta duo forming on the opposite side. In deeper positions, neither Matic nor Kanté looked to consistently take up positions higher in the midfield and a ‘U’ shape began to form.

Chelsea’s positional structure in possession.

As a result of this wing-oriented positional structure, Chelsea didn’t often look to occupy spaces higher up in the midfield. Their ball circulation was largely horizontal (until the more progressive-ball movement in the wider areas) and without attempting to move the ball upwards through the centre, there wasn’t a great need for the attacking midfield areas to be taken up.

Their spacing in possession was effective for the most part simply because it suited their attacking strategy of penetrating and combining down the flanks. Although it limited their variability to some degree, the open 10 space wasn’t very restrictive and their increased number of players down the flanks made for some threatening attacks.

In order to bridge these attacks, short passes along the deeper chain involving Kanté and Matic (as well as the deeper-moving Oscar) was an often-used means of moving the ball from one flank to the other. Although not necessarily ideal, it was a simple and easy means of re-circulating the ball back inside. The lack of pressure from West Ham’s more passive mid-block made for little challenge during these moments and Chelsea were fairly comfortable.

Aside from these shorter-passing switches, Chelsea also made quite a high number of long direct switches from flank to flank. When in more advanced positions where moving the ball back to switch through the midfield was not ideal, the wide players would look to hit direct passes to their teammates on the opposing touchline.

Strategic Asymmetry

Due to the slightly differing micro-structures and player profiles found on the flanks, Chelsea’s attacking strategy had some asymmetry between the two sides of the pitch.

Down the right side, the profiles of Oscar, Willian and Ivanovic made for more combinative plays with Willian in particular a key figure in bringing his teammates into action. The trio often made small triangles between each other and a number of fast passing exchanges were made through this to break open West Ham’s defence. It was a small 1-2 between Ivanovic and Oscar which led to the former’s chance in the 12 minute, as his low shot to the right corner was saved well by Adrian.

Aside from these small combinations, Chelsea quite commonly made crosses from deep positions in an attempt to create chances for Costa in the middle. However this tactic wasn’t very effective, with the angle and pace of the cross making it a generally difficult way of making clean goalscoring chances. From such an angle, it’s difficult for the crosser to deliver the ball to the strikers where they can run onto the ball due to the amount of curl necessary.

On the opposite side of the pitch, we saw some rather contrasting dynamics between Hazard and Azpilicueta. For a start, the fact that there wasn’t always a 3rd player joining the attacks meant that combinations were harder to form and would be more linear. Their inability to create triangles made combinations more difficult to form and thus it wasn’t a big part of their attacking tactics. In addition to this, Hazard is more of an individualistic player when compared to Oscar and Willian, preferring to make his aggressive slaloming runs at the opposition defence.

Hazard’s 12 dribbles, notice the diagonal focus from the wing through the half-space, directly to goal.

As a result, Chelsea’s attacking play down the left was much more based around individual actions. There was a greater priority on giving Hazard the ball to his feet, where he could turn and dribbling diagonally through the left half-space between small gaps of West Ham midfielders and defenders. With his direct opponent being an unnatural full-back in Michail Antonio, Hazard enjoyed some success going forward in a performance more reminiscent of his football before last year.

The starting lineups

Lacking chance creation

Despite having a clear plan and executing it fairly well during the match, it must be said that Chelsea struggled to create much against West Ham’s defence. Aside from the penalty, they generated 0.8 (of Caley’s model) expected goals throughout the game which is perhaps slightly sub-par for a team of Chelsea’s quality.

Aside from individual issues, West Ham defended fairly well. They used a compact 4-1-4-1 defensive block which saw 10 men behind the ball when defending their own half. They blocked the majority of Chelsea’s crosses well and used the low-block to good effect for the most part.

Chelsea had some issues of their own too. The wide-nature of the attacks made it difficult at times to create good chances, as they were trying to create from positions further away from the goal as well as in a lesser amount of space compared to more central positions. The deep crossing from the right flank came to little fruition whilst the left side was somewhat reliant on Hazard.

Pre-Season difference

There was a slight difference between what we saw Chelsea’s attacking game in pre-season and how they faired in their first Premier League outing. Although the flanks were also their focal point in the friendlies, their attacking was much more patterned and pre-planned with some clear movement schemes to be seen. Upon a vertical pass into the ball-near forward, it was common to see the winger making an inside movement around the front of the forward where he could receive the ball and drive it forwards. It was a frequently-used pattern which was obviously one practiced in training.

A common movement pattern seen in pre-season. Thanks to JD for the .gif.

However in their Premier League opener, we saw no such patterned attacking. Instead, Chelsea’s movements were more variable and improvised depending on reference points such as the positioning of teammates. This may have been due to the lack of a second striker, meaning the initial ball into the forward was difficult to establish due to Oscar’s deeper positioning. Another explanation could be that Conte did not feel such patterns were being executed at a level sufficient for competitive football yet, meaning it could be something we see further down the line.

Instead, more basic patterns were used such as overlaps by Ivanovic whilst Willian moved inside. Such movements were fairly effective in momentarily creating space for the free man where they could play crosses into the box.

Chelsea null West Ham’s direct game

Neither team approached their defensive game with a great intensity, preferring to sit in deeper mid-low blocks and not challenge the opposition within their own third.

In Chelsea’s case, they used a defence which could shift between a 4-5-1 and a 4-4-2/1-1 depending on the orientation of Oscar at the time. They kept a generally low defensive line which suited the nature of Terry and Cahill in the centre-back pairing and generally looked to defend their own half throughout the game. During West Ham’s build-up, they would adopt a slightly more advanced position in order to force their long balls from deeper positions, meaning that Carroll would be further away from Chelsea’s box and thus less of a threat. Most of the time, this could be done by just Oscar and Costa.

Their compactness was improved from last season, though not at ideal levels (yet). Vertically there was little space between the midfield and defence, which helped in their attempts at defending West Ham’s direct possession game quite well. However, due to the wider orientation of the wingers, their horizontal compactness was lacking at times within the final third. Thankfully for them, West Ham’s attacking was unable to expose these gaps, especially for the first 67 minutes when they were without the talismanic Dimitri Payet.

Creating just 0.4 expected goals throughout the 90 minutes, West Ham didn’t carry much of a threat in attack. Evidently missing the man who carried them at times last year, their game was predictable and rather linear as seemingly their only plan at times involved long balls to Andy Carroll. Whilst Chelsea defended fairly well, West Ham weren’t exactly causing them any trouble. They generated effectively no chances until the introduction of Payet in the second half, after which they made 5 shots compared to the previous 2.

West Ham struggled to create before Payet’s introduction in the 67th.

Strong rhythm shift at 1-1

After West Ham’s James Collins’ equalised the score, Conte reacted by making three substitutions in the attacking areas. Willian and Hazard made way for Pedro and Moses whilst most importantly, Michy Batshuayi was introduced for Oscar, meaning Chelsea switched to a 4-4-2.

Their attacking rhythm increased immediately with a much more direct ball circulation being made as Chelsea looked to reclaim the lead. A greater emphasis was placed on getting the ball into the box, with more aggressive attacking from the wingers and a much greater number of long balls being made into the two strikers. Now paired by new signing Batshuayi, Costa and Chelsea had a much better chance of winning first and second balls when going immediately direct to the attack. This is exactly what happened for the winner, as the Belgian striker won the first ball and was able to knock it down to Costa, who pushed the challenging Collins away and made an excellent finish to Adrian’s bottom right corner.

Conclusion

Although Chelsea only just managed to clinch victory in their season opener, there were a number of promising signs in Conte’s Premier League debut. The coherent attacking strategy worked well, despite ultimately not creating a great quantity of chances. The wing focus saw Hazard put in a performance closer to what we know he’s capable of, whilst the (albeit simple) in-game management of Conte led to Chelsea reclaiming the lead late on and ending with all three points.

West Ham showed their reliance on Dimitri Payet throughout the match and the attacking strategy around Andy Carroll was largely ineffective. However the reaction upon the French winger’s entrance was a promising sight and he’ll undoubtedly be their central figure for another season despite the signings of Andre Ayew and Jonathan Calleri.

Southampton travelled to Manchester as they faced Mourinho’s United in the second game of the new Premier League season. Despite being given a considerable share of the possession, they were unable to create against a resolute and compact home defence.

The starting formations.

The match was largely anticipated as the return of Paul Pogba, who made his first appearance at Old Trafford since leaving for Juventus, becoming one of the world’s best midfielders, then re-signing in England for a record-breaking €105m. Yet despite a strong performance, the French star wasn’t the key figure as Zlatan Ibrahimovic converted two goals to see his side ease past Southampton.

Control through a stable defence

Out of possession, Rooney joined Ibrahimovic in the first line of players and the United team created a 4-4-2. In this shape, they sat in a mid-block which focused on controlling the rhythm of the game and maintaining stability within the defensive shape itself. Mourinho’s side were generally happy for Southampton to see the majority of the possession. Ibrahimovic had a couple of impressive moments when engaging the ball-carrier with backwards pressing but for the large majority, Southampton built possession against a passive defensive block.

The compactness of the home side was one of their more impressive qualities, with short distances being maintained between the chains of United’s defensive shape. The width of the block was fairly narrow as they prioritised the centre whilst, especially within their own half, there was little distance between Rooney and the defensive line. Although not at Marcelino or Schmidt levels of compactness, it was sufficient in enabling United to control the midfield against Southampton and likely many other Premier League teams in the future.

United’s compactness wasn’t ground-breaking, but sufficient in restricting Southampton’s possession.

By having a strong coverage of the space in the middle, United were thus able to control the game despite not having possession of the ball. They were able to minimise any threat which Southampton’s attacking game posed, and often restricted Puel’s side from attacking in their ideal manner. Southampton’s preferred attack locations were reflected by the narrowness of the attacking trio and United’s defensive line were similarly tight in reaction.

Important to this level of compactness was United’s defensive orientation. The home side defended with a clear zonal-coverage, as the banks of four shifted from side to side and maintained well-connected. After a much more man-oriented defensive approach under van Gaal, Mourinho has begun to instil a more zonally-based defence at United, as he revealed in a pre-season interview –

“We’re trying to switch to zonal marking and that’s difficult after two years of man-to-man. We play zonal (…) that way we stay compact.”

– Jose Mourinho, pre-season

By maintaining a zonal coverage and not using the opposition as the primary reference point, United’s shape was less perturbed by any movement from Southampton. The spaces between the lines remained largely closed shut as Mourinho’s team could focus on keeping short distances between teammates over covering their opponents.

The above-mentioned transition is certainly not going to be instantaneous, and we did see some man-oriented movements in the midfield throughout the game. Particularly done by both Fellaini and Pogba, they would follow their man loosely without straying too far out of position, meaning that stability and compactness wasn’t lost. The purpose of these movements was simply to maintain defensive access and further block any Southampton passes into their teammates in the centre of midfield.

United’s compactness became greater around their own penalty area.

As United retreated closer to their own penalty area, the distances between players shortened and they were able to crowd out the centre of the pitch. They made it extremely difficult for Southampton to break through the middle of their narrow attacking shape and instead forced them to play towards the flanks more. This strategy didn’t suit their positional structure very well and Southampton’s attack was less of a danger as a result.

Southampton’s narrow attacking game

Playing in a narrow 4-1-2-1-2 formation, Southampton’s attacking structure was quite heavily focused on the centre of the pitch as they generally left the open wings to the marauding Targett and Cedric. After Romeu’s early injury, Pierre-Emile Højbjerg moved to the 6 position and dictated the ball circulation as Southampton took a rather patient approach to the game. Davis and Clasie acted as fairly orthodox 8s whilst Dusan Tadic played closer to the two strikers in a position higher than what you’d usually see from an attacking midfielder.

Despite the front three being positioned closely together, Southampton were often unable to attack through them. Undoubtedly a portion of the credit has to be given to the compact defending from the home team, whose controlled defensive performance worked well to minimise Southampton’s threat. In the above-mentioned zonal scheme, United defended the centre effectively and against an attack which employed a similarly-focused structure, they stopped the away side from attacking in their preferred manner.

However, the away side caused their own problems and one of the biggest issues could be seen in the spacing of the front three. Although they were close enough together to interact, the connections were not always strong enough for these interactions to be successful or effective. The links between the front three were often flat, and not conducive to progressive ball circulation and combinations. All three had a degree of freedom in their positioning, but the triangles created between the three were quite weak. It was rare that all three links were strong simultaneously and although they were connected, they weren’t connected well.

With Southampton unable to establish threatening attacks down the middle, we increasingly saw them look to the wider areas as the match progressed. The ball-near forward would commonly make lateral movements where they could engage in wider possessions. Nathan Redmond in particular moved towards the right touchline where he could participate in the wider attacks and at times offer for longer passes through the channel.

United struggle to create

For all of their defensive efforts, United were unable to replicate a similar level of performance in their attacking play. According to Michael Caley’s expected goals model, they created just 0.7 xG throughout the 90 minutes (excluding the penalty) and often relied on the individual quality of their players to create in the final third.

There didn’t seem to be a great emphasis on structured attacking from the home team. United’s forwards, and Rooney in particular, were given a degree of positional freedom as Mourinho gave a responsibility to his players when it came to creating suitable attacking structures. Although this made for an inconsistent and unclean structure for large periods, it allowed the individual stars of United’s attack to combine at times to create some promising situations.

From his attacking midfield slot, Rooney could be seen engaging in possession in most areas of the pitch. The England captain was generally present in attacks down both flanks through his ball-oriented horizontal movement, whilst on a few occasions he could be seen dropping towards the centre-backs during build-up. Because of this positional freedom, he was able to have a presence in most attacks and use his tactical intelligence to complement United’s efforts whether it be through the left half-space or down the right touchline.

Without a structure tailored to collective-driven attacks, United had to fall back on their enormous individual quality at times. Whilst the shape made it difficult to combine in groups, the quality of the players made this possible. With players such as Rooney, Ibrahimovic and Pogba, the Manchester side could make some threat despite not showing great cohesion in a system which is very much in a developmental stage. Individual actions were an important factor of United’s attacking. Pogba drove the ball forward as he does so well, whilst Ibrahimovic had multiple good moments, not least his excellent header to open the match.

Against Southampton’s somewhat narrow defence, it seemed that Mourinho wanted his side to target the wider areas of the pitch in their attacking strategy. Pogba would commonly make movements towards the left touchline whilst Rooney’s free role saw him appear down either wing, such as when he made the cross for the Ibrahimovic opener from the right flank.

With Mata moving inside, space was given for Valencia to isolate Targett.

Whilst there was very much an overloading nature to United’s left-sided attacks, the dynamics down the right were much different. As he does so often, Mata had a role of coming inside through the right half-space, abandoning the flank to participate in more central attacks. In doing so, he provided the entirety of the flank for Antonio Valencia to use when going forward.

This small movement scheme was done fairly often with the intention of creating isolation situations with Valencia pitted up against Matthew Targett. During such moments, the Ecuadorian wing-back could create a superiority of quality over his defender. Generally trying to emphasise his pace and dribbling, Valencia was able to get past the young full-back on a couple of occasions yet hindered by a poor delivery into the box. However, he was able to provide the pre-assist for the opener by playing a ball down the touchline to an on-rushing Rooney.

Conclusion

As the game progressed and eventually became 2-0, United were increasingly defensive-minded in their approach. The wingers were more ready to drop closer to their full-back when in a low-block whilst the attacking strategy became slightly more conservative. More players were left in deeper positions in order to limit Southampton’s transitions although the likes of Pogba still made his aggressive forward runs.

Whilst all eyes were on Pogba, it was Ibrahimovic who stole the show in an otherwise uneventful match. From early in the game, United controlled the game through their defensive performance and, although they didn’t create many chances in attack, they could rely on individual quality to bring about a 2-0 win.

From the perspective of Southampton, there were some positives to take despite the loss. After moving to the pivot position, Höjbjerg looked more-than competent in the role at the deepest point of the Saints’ diamond. He displayed an intelligent positional game whilst he was adept in supporting their deeper ball circulation. Although they failed to establish central attacks through their front three, they will come up against many defensively-weaker sides in the season to come.

In perhaps their best performance to date under Pep, Manchester City looked excellent against an albeit weak West Ham United. From the first minute, they controlled the game with a strong display in possession matched by intelligent pressing both in and out of transitional moments.

The two starting shapes.

Once again, they lined up in a 4-3-3 formation with Fernandinho taking on the lone pivot behind de Bruyne and Silva. Aleksandr Kolarov was absent from the starting lineup as Otamendi sided John Stones in the centre-back pairing. Slaven Bilic sprung a tactical surprise of his own as West Ham operated in a 5-4-1 formation as they looked to concede possession and sit deep in a defensive-minded approach to the game.

City Dominate

The tactical highlight of the game was City’s football when in possession. Particularly in the first half, they opened up their opponents on a consistent and frequent basis. Silva and de Bruyne constantly threatened in pockets of space between the lines, whilst Sterling was a particular danger down the right wing, where he benefited significantly from more isolation situations in a performance which saw him net twice and receive the man of the match award.

City’s dynamic back three made for a strong build-up.

They took a progressive and rather aggressive approach to their build-up play. Both Stones and Otamendi were free to move forwards (whilst the other would cover) and Fernandinho showed his footballing-intelligence in his balancing movements between the two of them. The advancing of the centre-back only added to the overloads in midfield and with Fletcher rather outnumbered, they could progress the ball with ease for significant periods of the game. Because of this, City were able to maintain a strong tempo and rhythm to their ball-circulation, applying a constant wave of pressure on West Ham’s midfield.

The dynamic nature of City’s back 2-1 resulted in a flexible shape which saw many permutations as City were bring the ball out of defence. Rotations of positions were executed well, with Fernandinho timing his complementary movements to best aid the actions of Stones and Otamendi. Such as in the example to the left, they were able to use this flexibility and dynamic to open spaces for eachother in the first line, giving the ball-carrier a better opportunity to penetrate the midfield which they did so frequently throughout the first half.

It was a small 1-2 with situational-midfielder John Stones which gave the space for David Silva to begin his run through the West Ham midfielder in the build-up to Sterling’s opener.

Although much has been said of City’s ‘false full-backs’ around the beginning of the season, both Clichy and Zabaleta acted in a more ‘orthodox’ manner against West Ham. They acted largely in their respective half-spaces and although both showed a capacity to come inside when the situation deemed necessary, it was much less extreme in comparison to previous matches. They did, however, maintain quite a deep position whilst their wingers were occupying the touchlines and stretching West Ham’s defence.

The inside movement of the full-backs was often used to creater better isolation moments.

When they did move inside, it was generally in order to create isolation situations for the wingers. By moving towards the centre of the pitch, they attracted the West Ham winger to follow suit which opened up the diagonal passing lane to the ball-near winger. It also dragged the winger away from his full-back, meaning that he would have less protection when faced with the trickery of Nolito or Sterling, the latter especially.

The ‘rejuvenation’ of Raheem Sterling is in a significant way a result of the better football which City are playing. The ability of a winger is largely dependent on the situations which his team creates for him. If the ball circulation is slow and lacks dynamism, then the winger is likely to receive the ball in situations where the defensive is already settled and his opponent is receiving good support from his teammates. With City now playing a faster brand of football, Sterling is receiving the ball more quickly and in situations where the defensive is still shifting to his side. Against a less stable defensive line, Sterling can threaten more with his dribbles and his performances so far into the season reflect this clearly.

City’s 2-3-4-1 shape.

With an aggressive and direct possession game, Pep’s team were able to exert a clear level of control for the majority of the 90 minutes. Their spacing in what was a rough 2-3-4-1 structure gave them a strong occupation of the spaces across the pitch, with the ‘3’ and central pairing of the ‘4’ (highlighted) able to control the space as well as the ball through an intelligent positional game.

The structure of the team had 4/5 vertical and many horizontal lines of players, resulting in an excellent level of natural staggering in the shape. By having players staggered across the structure, City increase their capacity to find gaps within the opponent’s block, due to the varying ‘heights’ of the players. For example, if the ball is down the left of the shape, then City have Otamendi, Clichy, Silva, Nolito and then potentially both Fernandinho and Aguero all on different lines. Because of West Ham’s defensive shape of just 3 lines, they are immediately at a disadvantage because it becomes difficult to cover the players occupying different lines simultaneously.

Aside from the positional superiority which they established, the spacing of the team had some other benefits. Firstly, the level of diagonal connections between the players supported their ball circulation significantly. Not only did it support the dynamics of the interplay with more diagonal passing being possible, but it allowed for triangles to more naturally develop, helping them combine with speed and fluidity.

Important to their control of the game was their reaction to losing the ball. Their counterpressing had a great intensity in regaining control over the possession, with Fernandinho being particularly effective in anticipating the loose balls. The deeper positioning of the full-backs made for an important presence in counterpressing between the half-spaces and the trio were able to stop many counter-attacks from formulating. Not only could they advance to apply pressure on any loose clearances from the opposition, but they could help deter any opportunities where the Hammers were able to get to the ball first, providing a greater security in the middle of the pitch.

City’s deeper structure aided their ability to counterpress after losing the ball.

Through an effective counterpress, City were able to sustain the heavy pressure on West Ham’s defence which was set from the beginning of the game. They stopped the visitors from establishing any real attacks and Bilic’s team spent long spells stuck within their own half. They controlled the spaces in front of West Ham’s midfield and were in good positions to intercept and free balls if an attack broke down.

As I detailed in my preview to Pep’s reign at City, a strong positional structure in possession is key for the moments after turnovers. Good distances when in possession of the ball translates directly to having strong connections in the often unstable moments following a break down. By having a good structure, a team is able to press relevant and many areas of the pitch, whilst having an important capacity to support teammates through the links they formed in the previous spell on the ball.

West Ham’s defensive issues

In an attempt to dull a City attack with a much depleted squad, Slaven Bilic took to a 5-man defensive line away at the Etihad. Recent England-call-up Michail Antonio and Arthur Masuaku acted as wing-backs on the right and left respectively, whilst the three centre-backs consisted of Ogbonna, Reid and Collins. In this shape, the visitors took on a mid-low defensive block, resting their hopes on City being unable to break through the proverbial bus.

The back-5 was likely chosen as a way to give more security in the defensive line against the best striker in the league. The additional centre-back would hypothetically also offer greater support to the full-backs, though we didn’t necessarily see this as Sterling and Nolito both prospered. Although a fine plan in theory, their execution of the defensive strategy left much to be desired.

The Hammers’ biggest flaw was their passivity in the midfield. The visitor’s often struggled to create and then maintain defensive access to the City ball-carrier, with their midfield in particular unable to enforce sufficient pressure. Obviously they weren’t intending to press high up into City’s build-up, but the midfield pressure, generally done for stability and to stop the man in possession from having the opportunity to find his next pass, was lacking.

Aside from their inability to effectively press the opposition’s possession, West Ham were also noticeably uncompact. Despite having a fairly tight midfield four, they frequently let up gaps between the lines of midfield and defence, which Silva and de Bruyne were happy to take advantage of. The extra centre-back came at the expense of an extra man in midfield and Bilic’s side were somewhat susceptible to overloads behind Kouyate and Noble. City’s staggering was able to create free men in gaps within the West Ham block, which wasn’t compact enough to deal with their fast interplay through the midfield. Against most sides in the league, their defensive performance would’ve likely been sufficient and the East London team won’t face another opposition with as strong of a possession game this year.

West Ham were noticeably uncompact, and City’s midfielders occupied the gaps well.

The issues of their uncompact defending were evident in the opener. Once Silva had managed to shake away the backwards-pressing of Valencia, he was completely free between the lines of midfield and defence. From this position, he had comfortably enough time and space to execute the through-ball to Nolito who dragged it back for Sterling to finish.

WHU's uncompact midfield meant that once Silva had beaten Valencia, he had acres of space to pick the right pass. pic.twitter.com/nmvfyW5fhs

— Tom Payne (@TomPayneftbl) August 30, 2016

Whilst West Ham were distinctly poor for large periods, City’s performance shouldn’t be completely overlooked. Their extremely depleted squad rarely looked up to the challenge of Pep’s City, yet their weak showing was in some way down to the strong play of the home side. Through exerting such a level of control, City stopped their opposition from developing any rhythm in their attacks and they failed to have a meaningful share of possession during considerable periods.

Second Half Developments

After the interval, City weren’t as in-control as they had been throughout the first 45 minutes. They were unable to progress the ball centrally as often as in the first half, with a slightly weaker positional structure to do so. The Silva – de Bruyne pairing wasn’t as connected to their deeper teammates in a number of possessions and instead, City had to look towards the wings instead. Their weaker build-up became problematic at times, making slower ball circulation which invited pressure and saw some misplaced passes being made.

Bilic immediately looked to secure the right side of his team, bringing Sam Byram in place of Tore and the ex-Leeds full-back moved to the right of the defensive line whilst Antonio moved into the midfield. Although they were still uncompact for periods of the second half, their midfield pressure improved somewhat and they were able to win the ball more in the midfield third. Especially after their first goal, they tried to press higher in City’s build-up and did so to some effectiveness. The co-ordination of their pressing wasn’t excellent, but it served to disrupt and challenge the home side’s construction.

From an attacking perspective, they were able to make some cause for concern in their direct game and crossing. With City exerting less control, the visitors had more clear opportunities to form established attacks and when they did so, they looked towards the flank where they would deliver crosses into the tall Fletcher. The tall striker received better support from his wide-men in comparison to the first half, and the distances between him and the midfield were much more manageable. Their better play in possession allowed them to find him more accurately as City’s pressing declined somewhat, and during the period of the rhythm shift, were able to cause much more threat than they had done in the first 45.

Naturally, the final 20 minutes saw a more open game as West Ham looked to find their second goal and their equaliser. A more chaotic match with more moments of transition, City were able to create a number of dangerous situations attacking after a turnover from the opponents. Although they had the ball on numerous occasions in front of the Hammers’ defence, they were unable to convert a series of chances to make a slightly nervous end to the match. These nerves were eventually quelled however after an intelligent piece of creativity in the box by Sterling made the scoreline 3-1 in the 1st minute of injury time.

Conclusion

Man City made an outstanding performance in the first half and showed many promising signs of what’s to come under Guardiola’s tenure. They repeatedly opened up the 10 space behind West Ham’s midfield with Silva and Sterling in particular having excellent matches. Although West Ham failed to put up a great challenge, it doesn’t completely take away from the performance of the home team. However, the anticipation surrounding their derby on the 10th of September is even greater now as both teams will look to maintain their 100% record under new managers.

Manchester United hosted their local rivals Manchester City in the 172nd edition of the Manchester derby. Although the fixture is always eagerly anticipated, the additions of Mourinho and Guardiola to their respective teams created a unique level of tension and excitement.

For much of the first half City were almost completely in control of proceedings and there were several reasons behind their superiority.

City’s stable build-up & use of Bravo

The starting line-ups

One of the main reasons for City’s dominance was down to their ability to build-up in a stable fashion from deep areas. They demonstrated strong collective press resistance and their use of Bravo was a major factor behind this.

In deep build-up situations the use of Bravo as an additional defender allowed them to create an instant free man against United’s man-orientations. By doing this they were able to draw United’s forwards into pressing him in turn creating a free man in the defence or midfield line. This often allowed them to escape the first line of United’s pressing but there was a deeper and more subtle aspect that allowed them to do this.

When United’s forwards left their direct opponent to press Bravo they would often do so from an angle that allowed them to cover passes into said opponent whilst creating access to Bravo. In reaction to this City used blind side movement to escape the cover shadow of United’s presser in front. With this movement they could create passing options from situations where United appeared to have good access.

Furthermore this blind side movement was effective due to the positioning of the players ahead. Knowing that they were in control of the positioning of United’s midfield pair, Silva and De Bruyne used their positioning well to manipulate United’s pressing structure.

When they were able to use their blind side movement to create passing options in the first line Silva and De Bruyne would occupy higher positions which removed Pogba and Fellaini’s capacity to support the press. With weak support from behind United’s forwards were easily taken out of the game and City enjoyed large space behind United’s front line.

Bravo as a free man and Fernandinho’s blind side movement.

However when United appeared to have good coverage of the passing options in the first two lines Silva would often drop and the reaction of Fellaini would have big implications for the actions of City’s ball carrier.

If Silva was followed into deep positions City could play longer towards the forwards to target a defence exposed without the support of the midfield line. This would give the forwards the chance to attack the back line directly if they could control the destiny of the second balls.

Alternately if he was not followed Silva would be able to act as a free man and allow City to break past United’s pressing structure.

Another area of their build-up that Bravo had a strong influence on was in connecting their possession from wide areas back into the centre. When City appeared to be trapped on the wings without viable passing options they used Bravo as a route to switch the ball back to the opposite half space.

In order to maintain coverage of the nearby passing options; United in particular the front two, had to shift over to the ball. In these situations City used Bravo to switch the ball to a centre back in the opposite half space. Due to the long distances they had to make up United could not create access against these half space switches and the recipient could drive forwards aggressively into midfield. This would have a similar effect as the use of Bravo. United’s midfielders were put in situations where they were required to create access to the ball in front of them but also maintain coverage of their direct opponents behind them. At times they did neither and in moving forwards to press they only opened large spaces for their direct opponent to receive passes behind them.

City’s rotating back 3

In order to make these switches and connect their possession from wide areas back into the half spaces, Fernandinho and the centre backs demonstrated strong staggering. In these situations where the ball was seemingly trapped on the flanks Fernandinho often moved higher into midfield. This was done to drag Rooney forwards with him and reduce United’s presence in the front line which would in turn give the centre backs more time and space on the ball.

However this movement was at times done by the centre backs. In some situations the ball-near centre back would pass out to the full back and move forwards, if Ibrahimovic chose to follow then the pass back into Bravo was open. If he did not follow then City would be able to connect their play back into the centre through the ball-near centre back.

Issues in breaking through

Despite their dominance Manchester City were not able to break through United’s defence regularly and were not able to create several chances. Part of the reason for this was their intentions, they made rather sporadic attempts to break through and seemed to be quite focused on building stability with their possession.

Furthermore they often lacked depth particularly when Iheanacho dropped deeper. Although his position was usually taken up by Silva, his skill set did not facilitate creating a threat in behind.

Furthermore the timing of the reactions from Nolito and Sterling was sub optimal. At times they reacted by moving higher, more central and at times making runs in behind but these were often made too early or not at all.

United’s pressing issues

Despite the strength and press resistance showed there were some clear issues in United’s pressing that made City’s life easier.

Firstly they lacked a certain intensity in their actions and it was at times too easy for City to break past them with individual dribbles. This lack of intensity transferred to shifting moments where they were often too slow to prevent City escaping their pressing by switching to the far side.

Mourinho’s men also experienced issues in pressing particularly on their right side. When City were building in the left half space Mkhitaryan was visibly unsure whether to close down aggressively due to the risk of leaving Valencia against Kolarov and Nolito. He therefore chose to approach gradually whilst attempting to cover the pass into Kolarov. However Otamendi used his time on the ball to drive forwards with the ball where Nolito could move infield and receive passes, De Bruyne could move off Fellaini’s blind side or Silva could be accessed.

Another issues was due to the man-oriented nature of their defending. Whilst their man-orientations allowed them to press every pass, the individualistic nature prevented them from making cohesive and collective attempts to press the ball.

United’s offensive struggles

When United recovered the ball in deep areas their man-oriented nature meant they lacked separation from their opponents to make passes and avoid City’s counter pressing. Thus they were easily forced into hasty clearances.

In other situations where they recovered the ball in midfield areas they were unable to combine out of pressure with City’s focus on guarding passing lanes before moving into them leading to a number of interceptions.

In non-transitional phases they were often reluctant to build-up from deep areas, perhaps wary of City’s pressing. On the occasions that they tried to the poor support from the midfield meant they were easily forced into a more direct passing game.

Towards the end of the first half they built a foothold in the game and took advantage of the lowered height and intensity of City’s pressing. An error from Stones and Bravo allowed them to claw one back and set up an interesting 2nd half.

2nd half

United’s changes

Immediately after half time Mourinho brought on Rashford and Herrera for Lingard and Mkhitaryan as United switched to something of a 4-3-3. With Herrera now behind them, Pogba and Fellaini in particular could move high and use their height as targets for long balls.

Their final 3rd dynamic was very wing-oriented as they aimed to take advantage of their height advantage with crosses. While United’s right side was rather predictable with Rooney and Valencia aiming to cross whenever they had the chance, the direct dribbling of Rashford on the left was more problematic.

The direct approach did generate quite a few shots meaning City had more goal kick situations where United could force them to play longer with their man-oriented approach. Due to the rules of a goal kick Bravo could not be used as a free man and the coverage of all passes in the first line meant they were forced into longer kicks from these situations.

Generally United’s direct approach failed to create quality chances and this was partly due to a smart change from Guardiola.

Pep reacts

After around 7 minutes of the second half when United’s approach was evident Guardiola brought on Fernando to the 6 position with Fernandinho acting as an 8 and De Bruyne moving up front.

In addition to the increased height Fernando brought he often dropped into the defensive line to protect against both long balls and crosses and City defended in a 5-4-1. With three centre backs they had more security against flick ons and the full backs could press more aggressively in wide areas to prevent crosses. This would assist in reducing the frequency and quality of crosses.

With their opponents becoming increasingly desperate City had a number of transition situations which they split between winding down the clock with possession or going directly for goal. Their profligacy prevented them from adding to their lead and making the last few minutes more comfortable.

Conclusion

8 wins from 17 games and still just the 3 defeats is now the record as Guardiola kept up his dominance in meetings with Jose Mourinho. Although there is a long season ahead, victory at Old Trafford without Aguero and Gundogan should give City’s fans confidence. Klopp’s Liverpool and Conte’s Chelsea will likely be tougher opponents from a strategic perspective and it will be interesting to see how City deal with those opponents.

As for United, Mourinho’s strategy will be strong enough to beat most opponents in the league. However their attempts to press City were not intense or co-ordinated enough and this will need to be improved for their February clash at the Etihad.

Guardiola’s City travelled to Wales in their 10th game of the season as they looked to make it a perfect 10 wins from 10 at the start of the season. After their previous league game Guardiola credited Bournemouth as the Premier League side who had caused them the most trouble with their use of the ball and Swansea could be expected to pose a similar threat. Swansea meanwhile were aiming to avoid back to back league losses and a 5 game winless streak as they aimed to ease their relegation fears.

City’s 3-3-3-1 and asymmetric wing staggering

Being the first game where Silva, Gundogan and De Bruyne were all announced in the same starting team; all eyes were on how Pep would integrate them given that the system he had used thus far only had room for two 8s. From the start of the game this was done through an asymmetric 3-3-3-1 shape. In deep build-up they would create a back 3 with Kolarov dropping into the defensive line as a left centre back whilst Stones and Otamendi shifted across. Sagna the other nominal full-back had a far more “orthodox” role, as he moved higher onto the second line and was very much wing-oriented in his positioning.

Given that one of Pep’s main positional rules is that the winger and full-back should not occupy the same vertical line; this had implications on the roles of Sterling and De Bruyne. With Kolarov playing deep and a bit more narrow Sterling remained on the left flank in a similar role to much of the season so far as they aimed to create the best conditions for him to take on full-backs. His positioning remained rather flexible as he reacted to the movements of his team mates, and there were some occasions where Kolarov or Silva moved out to the flanks and Sterling was free to move into the left half space. However on the right flank Sagna’s width-orientation meant De Bruyne was free to roam more centrally and add to City’s presence behind Swansea’s midfield line. From this position he often made late diagonal runs out towards the right flank in the final third to receive through balls and create crossing opportunities.

City’s initial structure

This asymmetry allowed City to use De Bruyne and Sterling in roles that suited their skill set without compromising the wing staggering that is key to Guardiola’s approach. There are several reasons behind Guardiola’s use of staggering in wide areas far too many to list here but two important reasons are to avoid building in deep and wide areas and to create a stable passing dynamic.

The starting line-ups

By removing his full-backs from the “usual” positions they may take up in build-up situations Pep implicitly forces his teams to access the midfield quicker. With no option for the centre backs to pass across to from the half spaces, the midfielders and forwards must move properly to create the necessary separation from their markers to facilitate progression or the build-up will have to restart. This removes the tendency for teams to use full-backs in deep positions from where teams often press more aggressively due to the instability of the location, and without very strong connections it becomes very difficult to retain the ball in these areas.

When teams have wingers and full-backs on the same vertical line it often leads to vertical passes from the full-back to the winger which heavily decreases the potential for the winger to progress from there. Vertical passes are often met with high resistance and situational man-orientations as the defenders aim to prevent their opponents from turning towards goal. These types of passes often mean the winger receives the ball with a defender immediately behind them and are often forced to pass the ball back. However Guardiola aims to use diagonal passes towards his wingers that allow them to receive the ball with a forward facing field of vision to take on the full-back directly and this wing staggering is crucial to this.

With these strong dynamics City were able to access dangerous spaces quite consistently at times this was done by pushing the opponents back and using the laser passing qualities of Stones, Kolarov and Otamendi. On other occasions this was done by bypassing Swansea’s press and using the transition-like characteristics to advance towards goal. However their final passing was uncharacteristically poor with poor decision making at times mixed with poor execution and this prevented them from taking advantage of these situations.

Swansea’s build-up mechanism

At times Man City had some issues with controlling Swansea’s build-up and this was partly due to Swansea using City’s defensive movements against them. With an overload in the first line against Aguero Swansea had a basis to circulate the ball across and with a situational use of their full-backs in deeper areas they maintained this overload even when City committed a midfielder forwards for access. Usually this is not particularly advantageous and can lead to a stale circulation game, however Swansea used it to their favour intelligently on a number of occasions.

By retaining the ability to circulate the ball across their back line Swansea could force City’s defensive lines to shift across and with quick passes agains the grain of City’s movement they could access the space behind City’s midfield line. This was due to a natural time span in City’s movements whereby the previously pressing midfielder is in a high position and the currently pressing midfielder is moving up meaning there are short periods where their control is sub optimal. (At times done through chipped passes to Llorente.)

On a number of occasions this extended naturally into 3rd man combinations to beat City’s defensive line as a City centre back would often step forward to win the ball and stop the opponent turning towards goal. When Llorente managed to receive the ball and hold off his opponent he could set it back and Swansea could use this movement to their favour and play through the gap left to Routledge in a third man combination.

Swansea’s GK press and transition game

Towards the end of the first half and for much of the second half Swansea were able to turn the contest into something of a transition game, and the end to end nature made the game quite chaotic. There were many reasons behind this one of them being some poor decision making from City in build-up which led to quite a lot of ball recoveries in midfield for Swansea. Another reason however was how Swansea were able to destabilise City’s build-up with the way they pressed Bravo.

Bravo is quite clearly right footed and tends to avoid using his left foot. Therefore by pressing Bravo from his right side Swansea could force him into uncomfortable situations and eventually force more direct balls from the goalkeeper. In order to do this Swansea often maintained a high block but allowed the first pass out from Bravo to a centre back and would press Bravo on the return pass whilst covering the passing option to the right. This also limited the range of angles Bravo could access which gave the rest of the Swansea team a simpler orientation as they knew where the ball would be heading and could close City on their left side.

With City now exerting less control over proceedings their chances were now predominantly through counter attacks after winning the ball in midfield. With the game at level scores City had to use these opportunities to go directly for goal as they sought to re-take the lead. However their execution of final passes or finishes was still lacking and this meant they continued to play in a transition based manner without real control of the game or of the scoreline.

City’s structure shift

After half time Guardiola adapted the roles of his players and in turn the positional structure. Kolarov remained deeper on the left than Sagna on the right but he was now acting a bit higher and wider. Stones and Otamendi thus shifted over and occupied positions as centre backs would in a back four. Fernandinho was also acting deeper usually taking a position as a lone pivot but at times dropping into the defensive line. De Bruyne was now positioned more centrally as a nominal 8 and he had the licence to come deeper and support build-up or move beyond Swansea’s midfield line. Silva was now positioned on the left wing but had a far less linear role than Sterling and often added to City’s presence in midfield whilst Sterling took up a similar role to De Bruyne’s in the first half. Aguero’s role did not change much apart from a bigger focus on balancing Silva’s movement which often meant moving diagonally towards the left flank.

This structural shift had little impact at the start of the second half as City were still forced into a transitional game but around the hour mark they began to exert more control again. This was potentially due to decreasing energy levels from their opponents as well as an increased focus on controlling the game rhythm with less frequent and direct attempts on goal being made. It was in this period that City regained their lead with a controversial penalty.

As Swansea began chasing the game with increased desperation City were presented with more opportunities to extend their lead on the counter attack and they did so with Sterling securing yet another win for Guardiola’s side.

Conclusion

Although City managed to make it a perfect 10 wins from their opening 10 games of the season there were some issues in this game that Pep will want to iron out. Particularly the instability that crept into their game and the poor execution in the final third. However this could be simply be the result of fatigue and at this moment City look imperious with their ability to win even on an off day being an important asset.

Defeat in this game means opening day victory has been met with a 5 game winless streak for Swansea. However they were arguably City’s toughest opponents thus far and if Guidolin can continue to adapt their mechanisms for opponents as well as today they will surely be on their way up the table soon.

After Brendan Rodgers’ Celtic challenged City with their pressing game in the midweek draw, Pochettino’s Spurs took full advantage and clinical first-half finishing saw them administer the first defeat of Pep Guardiola’s City reign.

the starting formations

Both managers made interesting changes to their line-ups.

For the home team, we saw Christian Eriksen in an unusually deep position alongside Victor Wanyama. £30m (thirty million pounds) signing  Moussa Sissoko played on the right side of the midfield, and would move towards the centre whilst Lamela was more of a traditional winger. The selection of Son Heung-Min as the striker would prove to be an excellent choice, as the South Korean led his team both in the pressing and in the quick attacking.

Without De Bruyne, Guardiola had to make changes of his own. Fernando came into the midfield after the Belgian’s injury, whilst Jesus Navas started too. Through the change of players, City resembled more of a 4-2-3-1 as opposed to the 4-1-4-1 we’ve seen them so far, Fernandinho played closer to Fernando whilst Silva acted between the lines higher up.

Spurs’ Pressing

By far the biggest talking point in the battle between Pochettino and Guardiola, was the former’s pressing approach to the game. One of the more notable ‘disciples’ of Bielsa, Pochettino has instilled an aggressive defensive approach at White Hart Lane as he had once done at St. Mary’s and at Espanyol before then. Capable of a press which has caused many opponents issues in the past, the young team were a prime candidate to be Pep’s biggest challenge yet, and they clearly were.

In typical ‘Bielsista’ fashion, Spurs were once again man-oriented in their pressing of City’s first phase. The two highest players, Alli and Son, would often split onto either centre-back and Christian Eriksen would move up to cover Fernando in the defensive midfield position. From this starting shape, the forwards would then use their cover shadow to block passes whilst pressing Bravo, with the intention of forcing an error from the goalkeeper.

Behind them the wide midfielders, Sissoko and Lamela, would support the press. The ball-near winger would often cover the full-back with the possibility of moving higher to increase the pressure whilst the ball-far winger came inside into a central City player. Although this strategy left Wanyama with a large amount of space to cover, he did so fairly well and made the tackle to win possession before Kolarov’s early own-goal. At times he was aided by the ball-far winger, or even the full-back who would sometimes come inside to help win balls. Sissoko was particularly able to shift inside to support due to the inside nature of Kolarov, who played as a ‘false’ full-back once again.

Spurs’ general pressing shape.

As is normal with a man-to-man approach, Spurs’ structure varied between plays. It was reactive to the shape of City which mean that Alli could sometimes drop into midfield for example, but the 4-1-2-1-2 shape was apparent.

Almost every turnover was matched by an intense counterpress from the home team. Even if the distances were too far to make an ideal counterpress, they would rush forward in a man-oriented manner and challenge Manchester City through the intensity of their movements. The intentions of Spurs’ approach in transition was to make the start to every oppositional possession as chaotic and unclean as possible.

Spurs counterpressed high up the pitch.

The host’s pressure was effective in disrupting City’s build-up and the entire possession game as a whole. Pep’s team were forced into a number of long balls and possession was lost frequently without an attack formulating. Although City have obviously made some great performances in the start to the season, but their possession game is still very much in early development. Their understanding of Guardiola’s system is improving with every day, but the players are still learning as they would be under most coaches, thus it was little surprise to see the second-best pressing team in the league cause them issues. This is especially the case when Fernando and Navas started – two players who haven’t had a lot of playing time in Guardiola’s first three months.

After taking the lead, the pressing subsided to some extent. It’s most likely that this was a result of a lead to protect, and for energy conservation as the intensity of the movements dropped.

City’s Issues in Possession

Against Tottenham’s pressure, City showed some clear issues in their possession game.

During build-up, they would often go directly to the strikers. In some cases, this was even when Spurs’ pressure wasn’t causing any danger, which suggests that a part of Guardiola’s plan was to bypass the pressing through a direct play, as he had done on occasion at Bayern. However, this time it wasn’t as successful. Agüero was obviously the main target for these long balls, who is much less capable of attacking in this manner in comparison to Lewandowski, and neither Navas nor Sterling got into positions close by for the purpose of supporting on the second balls.

With this direct play, there was less of an emphasis on a well-connected structure in the first phase.

After around the opening 25 minutes, City benefited from some attacks down the left side of the pitch. Sterling was moving inside whilst Silva would shift across to interact with Fernandinho, and the trio (as well as other teammates situationally) were able to make some combinations against Spurs’ strong midfield pressing. In addition, Silva was able to find gaps of space against the pressing which was at times uncompact due to the man-orientations. The inside movements of Navas and Sterling allowed City to overload Wanyama, which would result in one of the players (preferably not Navas) becoming free.

Inside movement from Navas made Silva free in the 27th minute.

In other cases, the centre-backs could help break Spurs’ man-oriented approach through individual dribbling. Obviously a high-risk approach, due to the dangerous position of losing the ball, both Stones and Otamendi could look to move past their presser to help move the ball forward. Due to the nature of Spurs’ man-to-man approach, every player was quite focused on covering their own man. That meant that if a player is beaten, then there is little cover to pick up the now-free man. If someone does move out to cover the ball-carrier, then it could easily result in a free player being available elsewhere, and it could continue so forth.

Despite improving, City were still unable to register big chances against Hugo Lloris. In some situations, an individual would be wasteful and take a low-percentage shot, when a pass would’ve created a more threatening moment. In others, the attacks simply broke down on the 3rd or 4th pass of a combination with the two centre-backs defending particularly well. When they found space between the lines, Jesus Navas was a common recipient of the pass.

The Spaniard is far from Kevin De Bruyne, and he was unable to convert these moments into strong attacks. Upon receiving the ball, he often missed a good passing opportunity to further continue the possession and instead looked to carry the ball, which was often met by good pressure from Spurs. This slowed down the attack in most occurrences, and it allowed Tottenham to recover and close out the previously-available space.

However, through these openings, City forced Tottenham into a deeper block. They shifted their focus to more of a midfield press and the centre-backs were then under less pressure during build-up. This benefited Guardiola’s team, who were then able to start attacks from higher up the pitch, giving them a better opportunity to penetrate the midfield through overloads, as both the wingers and full-backs came inside at times.

After half-time, Ilkay Gündogan was introduced as Guardiola probably looked to build-up on their improvements in midfield. The former BVB playmaker is an excellent box-to-box player whose ball-carrying skills and pressing-resistance could’ve been especially important against the man-to-man pressure of Spurs. It would hypothetically allow him to break the press through beating his man in a 1v1 as I mentioned with the centre-backs above.

Yet he had quite a poor game, and made three turnovers within the first few minutes of his introduction. The weighting of his passes were particularly disappointing, with a number being either under or over-hit.

A more Equal Game than Suggested

Pochettino’s team were the better of the two, and were on-top for larger periods of the game, yet the game was more balanced than many made it out to be. By both Michael Caley and 11Tegen11’s expected goals model suggested a fairly close game, with Spurs still edging it of course. Especially as the second half progressed, City were able to create a couple of good chances through Agüero and Iheanacho but they simply couldn’t convert these opportunities past Lloris.

Caley’s plot of the match.

11Tegen11’s plot.

For periods, City pressed in Tottenham’s third just as well as the hosts had done to them. Their zonal block gave them good stability although they struggled at times to deal with the vertical combinations which Pochettino’s side used to advance the ball and maintain the high tempo of the game.

Still, this isn’t to take anything away from Spurs, whose pressing game has been the first to nullify an on-fire City attack. Their pressing both high up as well as in their own half worked to disrupt and weaken City’s possession game which is still in development under Guardiola. Heung-Min Son was particularly good for the hosts. He held the ball up well, and brought other attackers into play whilst his movement into the channels (particularly to the right of Otamendi) was useful for creating space and advancing the ball directly too. The visitors clearly lacked Kevin De Bruyne to penetrate the midfield lines whilst the omission of both Gündogan and Sané from the starting eleven was questionable.

It will be interesting to see if teams follow the approach of Spurs when facing City after the international break. There are few teams in the league capable of pressing with such intensity and control as Pochettino’s side, and an uncoordinated attempt will certainly play into the hands of Pep.

Klopp’s Liverpool hosted Mourinho’s United at Anfield on Monday night in the highest profile Premier league clash of the weekend. With their blistering, free scoring form Liverpool headed into the game as heavy favourites against a labouring United side. However the fans and media alike were all too aware of Mourinho’s propensity to upset the odds to write off the Red devils.

Man Utd’s pressing

One of the biggest issues Mourinho’s Man Utd have encountered thus far has been their passive defensive style. With a lack of pressing and intensity United have struggled to force turnovers against several opponents. Furthermore their counter attacking game has not been strong enough to provide a threat when they eventually do win the ball. This combination has lead to a number of sterile halves where they have been unable to sustain a profitable offensive rhythm.

It was therefore a slight surprise to see United pressing Liverpool quite high for much of the first half. In these high block phases Pogba would join Ibrahimovic in the first line as United pressed in a 4-4-2 shape. Pobga and Ibrahimovic shared pressing and covering responsibilities depending on the ball’s side. The ball-near forward would press the centre back whilst the ball-far would situationally mark Liverpool’s deepest midfielder.

Behind the forwards Herrera and Fellaini acted in quite a man-oriented fashion, often following their direct opponents; Coutinho and Can respectively. There were two main things that instigated periods of tight man-oriented coverage.

The first was when they were on the ball side, this common mechanism sought to deny Liverpool easy progression on the near side and to encourage them to switch the ball again. The second was when their direct opponents dropped towards the ball. These dropping movements meant the likes of Coutinho and Can would be facing their own goal and United’s man-orientations aimed to prevent them turning towards goal.

With this man-oriented coverage United were able to force a number of turnovers in midfield and generally prevented Liverpool from building stability through their possession game.

However there were some imperfections in United’s pressing. Firstly the ball-oriented shifting in the first line was only done at medium intensity. With Henderson’s dropping movements Liverpool were  easily able to create space for a centre back to advance with the ball, and it took United relatively long periods to create access after these switches.

Furthermore once Liverpool had beaten United’s first line they would drop behind the ball with Pogba operating just above the midfield line creating a 1-1 structure with Ibrahimovic ahead of him. These one forward block phases predictably gave United a worse ability to control Liverpool’s build-up.

Ibrahimovic remained high and stayed between the ball and the ball-far centre back to keep Liverpool’s play on the same side and limit the space the midfielders had to cover. However this meant the ball-carrier was not under pressure meaning they could drive forwards to create overloads in the midfield area.

Liverpool’s build-up & dismarking methods

Initially United’s pressing led to some inaccurate passing and Liverpool seemingly struggled to deal with the accumulating effects of United’s pressure. With the man-oriented nature of their opponents Liverpool found most of their passes being played under pressure and this increased the probability of mistakes.

However as the game progressed Klopp’s men were able to use their build-up to find a route into the game. With Henderson’s joining the first line Liverpool could create a 3v2 and they frequently used half space switches between their centre backs to create opportunities to access the midfield area. As they were met with high resistance in the midfield Liverpool’s next task was to create the separation (dismarking) from United’s midfielders to progress the ball and they used a number of methods.

One method Liverpool used to create a free man was the midfielders dropping into deep positions. With the 8s dropping deep in the half spaces they sought to receive the ball from the defenders free from the attention of United’s midfielders. Whilst they were able to do so on a number of occasions, the positions they were now receiving the ball in meant the connections to the forwards were weak.

In addition to these movements Liverpool at times used positional rotations, by rotating positions they could theoretically take advantage of the time frames it would take United to re-organise their coverage. However the most effective method they used was Firming’s dropping movements. Creating an overload is, for obvious reasons, an effective way to create a free man. By using one of the forwards in midfield spaces Liverpool were able to overload the midfield as United’s defenders were reluctant to follow Firmino that far.

On several occasions he was able to receive the ball directly from Lovren or Matip and could lay the ball off to escape the inevitable pressure. However his utility was not diminished when he could not receive the ball as his presence often attracted a United midfielder meaning one of Coutinho or Can were free.

Example of Firmino dropping to help Liverpool access the midfield.

United avoid the press

Mourinho’s side essentially refused to build attacks from deep areas as they aimed to remove Liverpool’s pressing as a factor in the game. As such the likes of Pogba, Ibrahimovic and Fellaini were key in creating targets for long balls and allowing United to start attacks from Liverpool’s half.

The starting line-ups

Once they managed to consolidate possession in Liverpool’s half they used combinations on the wings for three main outcomes. One was to combine and attempt to break through Liverpool’s defence on the ball-near side to reach the byline and set up a crossing opportunity. Alternately these combinations would draw Liverpool over to the ball side meaning they could switch the ball to create an isolation on the far side from where Young or Rashford could be in good positions to cross into the box.

Lastly if these combinations failed the proximity to the touchline meant throw ins or other dead balls could result which had the effect of preventing counters but also possibly giving United opportunities to launch balls into the box. All these were clearly geared towards emphasising United’s height advantage as a means of creating scoring opportunities. However they were not largely successful with their inherent caution meaning they often lacked the presence to make such crosses effective.

Liverpool’s 2nd half improvement

Despite a similarly chaotic start, Liverpool dominated much of the 2nd half. Initially some of Liverpool’s sustained periods of possession in United’s half came as a result of winning the 2nd balls after playing long from goal kicks. With these periods becoming more frequent Liverpool were able to force United into progressively deeper positions meaning building attacks from deep became practically unopposed later in the game.

The task now facing the Anfield side was to break past United’s deep defensive structure.

United’s deep block behaviour

When forced into deeper positions United’s defensive structure was visibly similar to that used by Mourinho in so called “big games”. In typical Mourinho fashion the wingers were tasked with man-marking their respective full-backs which led to a number of different defensive line permutations between 5-4-1 and 6-3-1. Although there are a number of issues with defending in this manner it can be tough to break past the defensive line when it practically covers the entire width of the field.

The midfield 3 tried to maintain stable distances to each other but also aimed to keep the distance to their direct opponents as small as possible. The full-backs were also heavily man-oriented even following their opponents when it meant leaving the defensive line. Generally the defensive line tried to close any space behind the midfield dynamically which gave them a fairly high level of resistance.

Faced by a defence with a crowded last line and fairly strong cover from midfield, Klopp implemented a number of techniques to create openings and these were fairly effective. One of these methods was to push both full-backs high on the flanks forcing United into a 6-3-1 shape with Young and Rashford positioned along the defensive line. The effect on the game was two fold; Liverpool could now control United’s counter attacks very easily since the main outlets were in such deep positions and in close proximity to their opponents. Secondly there was now increased space to the side of United’s midfielders where the likes of Can, Lallana and Coutinho could operate.

From this 6-3-1 shape Blind and Valencia felt comfortable following Sturridge or Firmino into deep positions since the players around them provided a feeling of stability. Liverpool used these dropping movements from the forwards to open gaps in the half spaces and these were quickly filled with late runs from the midfield players.

Can’s late run takes advantage of the open half space caused by United’s man-oriented movements.

This scheme led to Can’s chance, perhaps Liverpool’s best chance of the night, and the away side had De Gea to thank for keeping it out. The addition of Lallana enhanced this movement pattern as he added not only his guile and press resistance but also his well timed runs beyond the front line.

Conclusion

In what was a game of very few chances and almost no clear chances Mourinho will be the more satisfied coach with a draw that prevents a direct rival gaining 3 points at home. However the extent of this satisfaction has been exaggerated in some quarters; the draw leaves United 5 points off the top of the table. Perhaps more worrying for United is the form of the likes of City, Arsenal, Liverpool and Tottenham who happen to currently make up the top four positions, and Chelsea their next opponents who lie just outside it.

As for Liverpool the result was disappointing but as goalkeeper Karius pointed out the manner of United’s performance at times is an indication of their great progress. With the form they have shown thus far Klopp’s side appear to be players in this title race and the Kop will be dreaming of ending their title drought come May.