David Moyes and his struggling Sunderland side hosted Arsenal in the early Saturday kick-off. Billy Jones returned to the starting XI in place of Javi Manquillo, with Adnan Januzaj kept on the bench. Despite returning to fitness, there was no starting place for Olivier Giroud as Wenger opted to stick with Alexis Sanchez as his centre forward.

Arsenal gain early control via the right side

Even in the early moments of the game, Arsenal had no trouble using the right-side to build-up. Re-circulating from left to right was particularly easy during semi-transition, because Duncan Watmore’s positioning during these moments was often deep and narrow. Perhaps to maintain compactness in the centre of the pitch or to drop in and mark an Arsenal midfielder after poor positioning from Sunderland’s midfield trio.

This narrowing from Watmore was important to ensure Arsenal were not able to simply bypass Defoe and move into midfield, but also created a large distance between he and Hector Bellerin. This consistently allowed Arsenal to quickly gain 10-20 yards whenever the Spaniard received the ball.

It is unlikely this was Sunderland’s planned pressing scheme, given Watmore’s strict man-marking of Bellerin during defensive organisation. It also seemed to reduce the impact of Pienaar in pressing phases, who seemed to screen similar angles to Watmore (although this may have been purposeful due to the South African’s declining physical ability).

The Sunderland response to Arsenal building down the right also seemed to lack co-ordination.

Standard pressing scheme from Sunderland. Defoe and Watmore attempt to stop easy central penetration, but this simply allows Bellerin to receive the ball in a huge amount of space.

In many cases, Pienaar was slow to recover in these situations. Primarily the full-back would look to engage Bellerin, but Rodwell would also shift across if necessary. When this happened, the rest of the Sunderland midfield did not pendulate with him, and a large pocket was created between them. This was particularly common if N’dong was occupied with a runner in transition, who he would choose to track instead of covering the vacant space.

As the half went on and Bellerin’s influence became more obvious, Watmore began staying wider. Obviously this reduced Bellerin’s impact, but also opened the centre. At this point Pienaar was often tasked with screening an Arsenal midfielder whilst also aggressively closing down Mustafi, who was the key man in horizontal re-circulation situations. Simple movements out of his cover shadow from Ozil made this very easy to bypass.

As Arsenal’s control grew, the need for them to progress from deep reduced as Sunderland reduced their pressing to their own third.

Simple movements disrupting man orientations

As with many Premier League teams, Sunderland’s defenders tend to follow opposition runners away from their zone. This was a common theme throughout the game, and Arsenal took advantage of this primarily using third-man runs and other diagonal movements.

With Alexis as the striker, the typical centre forward space was often vacated as he dropped deep into midfield to receive the ball. Sometimes he was followed by a Sunderland central defender, but occasionally not. If he was allowed to move back unattended, then the near-side Arsenal winger would make a diagonal movement into the vacated space.

This can provide a potential throughball route. Alternatively, if the winger is followed, it can disrupt the positioning of the near-side CB/FB and create a pocket of space for a teammate to move into. A diagonal run such as this can destroy a man-oriented defense, but can also be difficult for a zonal-focused defense to co-ordinate, particularly if the movement behind the defense is well timed.

During the first half though, the Arsenal play between the lines (when the lines actually existed) was poor. Many players on the same horizontal line restricted the passing options of the receiving player, and they relied on these co-ordinated, improvised movements rather than organised spacing.

Sunderland deepen and Arsenal dominate

At times in the first-half, Sunderland were able to create a nice structure for diagonal balls that allowed them to take advantage of chaotic second ball situations. This was even without a dominant aerial threat to win deliberate knock-downs. However, this seemed to lessen in the second half as Defoe became more and more isolated.

Whilst this disconnect was evident in Sunderland’s build-up, it also created problems in their low-block defense. With the flat five across midfield, Defoe was tasked with pressing both Arsenal central defenders with little help or pendulation from his midfielders. This meant an Arsenal defender (generally Mustafi) was able to easily progress 10-15 yards forward, disrupting the positioning of nearby Sunderland players. This also created more favourable passing angles for breaking through the midfield.

After Sunderland’s equaliser, Arsenal reacted well and continued to improve.

xG timeline

This dominance coincided with the arrival of Olivier Giroud from the bench, but the impact of Sunderland’s substitute should also not be understated. Once Januzaj came on, positioned on the right of Sunderland’s midfield, Arsenal were easily able to progress down that side.

This was partly due to the same issues Watmore had earlier on – a poor pressing structure forced Januzaj to push forward and inwards, but his disconnect with teammates allowed him to be easily bypassed. Khazri had been less enthusiastic about pressing or working hard, which meant those spaces weren’t so easily created. A deep-press is better than a disconnected one, particularly given Defoe had also given up offering any defensive resistance at this point.

In his deeper role on the left, Alexis could also position himself in line with the Sunderland midfield, using his superior turning speed to accelerate away whilst receiving on the halfturn. Januzaj’s advanced positioning allowed him to isolate in 1v1s if he was slowed down on the turn.

Conclusion

Sunderland’s forwards being so disconnected from their midfield in pressing phases meant the likes of Watmore were expected to cover huge spaces during Arsenal’s build-up. Obviously this was easily bypassed and merely resulted in unnecessary fatigue. Moyes and his team largely gave up on an aggressive press at half-time, and dropped deeper in an attempt to keep things tight at 0-0.

One of the key features of Arsenal’s attacking play is read-and-react movement based on teammates’ positioning, particularly when attacking a low block. This can cause major spacing issues for them if the opposition defense is organised and co-ordinated, which can also effect their transition defense. Sunderland’s defenders were instead easily manipulated and were often dragged away from their zones. With such co-ordination issues in their defense, it was only a matter of time before Arsenal were able to take advantage.

An open field, hundreds of one-on-ones and a few slapstick moments–that’s what the North London looked like on Sunday afternoon. As Arsenal’s level dropped in the second half, a 1-1 draw left head coach Arsène Wenger frustrated. Even though Tottenham have now gone seven games without a win in all competitions, picking up one point at the Emirates gives Mauricio Pochettino a desperately needed breather.

Line-ups

Before the first whistle, the Argentinian head coach already surprised with his line-up, bringing in Kevin Wimmer as an additional centre-back in order to field a 5-2-3. With Dele Alli not in the squad, striker Harry Kane was flanked by Heung-Min Son and Christian Eriksen. Moussa Dembélé and Victor Wanyama tried to control the middle of the park.

As for Arsenal, Granit Xhaka and Francis Coquelin played in central midfield. Other than that, there was no doubt who would wear the red and white jersey against their archrivals. Héctor Bellerín and Nacho Monreal bombed up and down the flanks, with left-winger Alex Iwobi mostly staying near the touchline as well, while Theo Walcott often supported Arsenal’s playmaker Mesut Özil and centre-forward Alexis Sánchez in the middle.

Tottenham defence in utter chaos

Pochettino’s decision to bank on a back five was gutsy and almost backfired. Early on, the three centre-backs basically didn’t know how to narrow the space and to prevent Sánchez’s runs behind the line. Plus, Wimmer and his colleagues nervously left their positions frequently, as they tried to shut down Arsenal’s build-up plays on the edge of the final third. It was a case of the right hand not knowing what the left hand’s doing.

That said, Tottenham found a way to control the early goings-on because Arsenal either couldn’t handle the opponent’s pressing or they were simply not creative enough to move the ball down the field without knocking it forward. Granted, Tottenham’s muddled back line could barely defend long balls without tripping or being caught napping by Arsenal’s attacking department.

“In the first half, we looked like we could score every time we crossed the halfway line.” (Wenger)

Only occasionally did Tottenham make use of a high press. Mostly, one player ran towards Petr Čech and put pressure on him, yet the coverage in midfield wasn’t tight at all. Wanyama and Dembélé struggled to get a hold of Özil and his colleagues. Arsenal, however, needed at least 20 minutes to figure out how they could effectively create triangles and expose Tottenham’s weakness on the wings.

After a while, it became apparent that Pochettino’s team weren’t able to close the space between the centre and the two full-backs. Both Kyle Walker and Danny Rose stayed wide and blocked the outside lane, but therefore left open the respective other side which gave Walcott and Iwobi openings to drift inward. With Dembélé and Wanyama being tied in the middle, the half-space was the place to be for Arsenal’s winger. And if either Rose or Walker followed the ball-carrier, one of the always alert full-backs popped up in the open space at the touchline.

Ball possession without any effect

Stats sheets showed at the end of the first half that the ball was in possession of Tottenham for 59 percent of the time–though mostly circulating through the deep zones. When trying to start an attacking play, Wimmer and left-sided centre-back Jan Vertonghen moved towards the left side, as Tottenham often intended to play down the left. Arsenal marked all three centre-backs closely and shut down Dembélé and Wanyama as well.

Only left-back Rose enjoyed some freedom because Bellerín couldn’t just walk him down and expose the wing. That’s why Tottenham was able to got Rose involved occasionally. Yet, Pochettino’s side couldn’t usually pass the opposing midfield line. When Rose kept a deep position on the left, he tied Walcott on the outside, while Coquelin marked Dembélé. Those situations gave Vertonghen some room to push through the half-space.

In the 5th minute of the match, Son fooled Bellerín when he feinted to pick up the ball, but instead let it roll through his legs and quickly turned around to run down the left. His cross-pass didn’t find a receiver, but a pattern how to create goal-scoring opportunities was shown. With Son usually hugging the touchline, Kane roaming around in front of Arsenal’s centre-backs and Tottenham focussing on attacks through the left side, Eriksen often drifted towards the middle, thus closing the gap between midfield and attack.

Arsenal exploit backspace

When the Gunners took command during a 25-minute spell late in the first half, Tottenham’s defensive problems helped Wenger’s team create several chances. Apart from aforementioned holes between midfield and full-backs, the back five and especially the execution of Pochettino’s idea of a system including a back five caused much trouble, when Arsenal marched through the wing zones.

All defender’s dropped into the box, while Dembélé and Wanyama were busy marking the onrushing centre-midfielders. It inevitably created space that was used by the likes of Özil and Walcott who normally didn’t push towards the offside line. In particular, Özil was lying in wait for a crossfield pass into the zone 14 several times. In the 31st minute, his shot from a position just outside the 18-yard box was fractionally wide.

Later, the German international curled over a free-kick that led to Wimmer heading into his own net. He was making his first appearance in the Premier League this season, brought in as part of the back five. The first half didn’t go well for the Austrian as he should have avoided the misplaced header that gave Arsenal the temporary lead.

Second half

During the first 45 minutes, Tottenham only showed glimpses of an effective build-up play. And almost always, Dembélé was involved showing his tremendous dribbling skills which should become valuable in the second half.

First, Pochettino made a slight adjustment at the beginning of the second frame. Dembélé’s switch to a more deep-lying position was a subtle yet important change. The connection between him, Wanyama and Eriksen noticeably improved. Meanwhile, Walker and Rose were asked to push forward more aggressively, taking the risk of exposing the flanks when losing the ball.

“In the last month we’ve had some small problems so we tried to find a better solution with our full-backs higher up the pitch.” (Pochettino)

Second, Dembélé, despite his deeper position, had the licence to roam forward. And it was his run drifting from right to left, passing Coquelin and then coming inside Monreal, that prompted Koscielny to make a dire challenge. The Frenchman tripped Dembélé, rather than touching the ball. Kane took advantage of the situation shooting the ball down the middle from the penalty spot.

Tottenham abandoned their strategy of letting the ball circulating slowly through the deeper zones, as their attacking plays looked more straightforward. Meanwhile, Arsenal managed to find advantageous positions on the wings, outnumbering Tottenham at first and then following up with aggressive diagonal passes into the half-spaces.

After Kane’s equaliser, both teams battled at high speed until the end, while forcing one-on-ones and exposing zones across the field. It was high-level entertainment that didn’t deliver much to write about. With end-to-end chances and last-moment tackles non-stop, both sides had the opportunity to collect three points but failed to do so.

Wenger brought on fresh legs following the hour mark. He moved Sánchez to the left, with Olivier Giroud serving as the sole centre-forward. Aaron Ramsey replaced Coquelin, with the Welshman frequently pushing forward helping out Xhaka who had a decent display offensively.

Conclusion

Pochettino’s decision to position Dembélé deeper in the second half, but allowing him to make quick runs forward paid off. Meanwhile, Arsenal weren’t able to maintain the degree of intensity and effectiveness they showed during the later stages of the first half. Without any significant tactical changes, the Gunners had to rely on their individual quality and hope to win a few important one-on-ones in order to get behind Tottenham’s back line. At the end, Wenger’s team didn’t score a second time, which means that Arsenal is still winless against Tottenham in the league during the Pochettino era.

Since Santi Cazorla suffered another Achilles injury in October, Arsenal have stuttered through a run of four draws (and three wins) in seven games. Much has already been written about how the Gunners struggle in possession but not as much attention has been paid to the struggle Arsène Wenger’s side have out of possession.

Like most sides who like to keep the ball, you can tell Arsenal are generally willing to press high and keep a high line. The problem is when they don’t know how to press efficiently and end up caught between two minds, allowing access to dangerous areas far too easily.

In two big matches over the course of the last week, Arsenal looked to press, struggled, and eventually fell into a deep shape without the necessary compactness and too many man-orientations. The attacking play fell flat on its face as the team couldn’t get out from such deep spaces and, against both Manchester United and Paris Saint-Germain, it became inevitable that Arsenal would concede the opening goal.

General pressing scheme

Issues in pressing

Particularly with Alexis Sánchez leading the line, Arsenal have been looking to press opposition sides higher up the pitch.

Using Theo Walcott, who is working much harder this season, from the right wing essentially gives Arsenal an asymmetrical shape and two strikers to start a press with. It was the same on Wednesday, when Özil, Alexis, and Giroud formed the first chain of pressing, focussing on the right side of the pitch. Unfortunately for Arsenal, Carl Jenkinson was not able to push forward and close the spaces Alexis left to the side of Aaron Ramsey, giving PSG an easy pass into Matuidi, who was leaving the wing to stand in the left halfspace and outnumber the Arsenal midfield.

In Wenger’s preferred lineup the pace of Walcott and Héctor Bellerín on the right means aggressive positions can be taken up but recovered when the press is beaten. Mesut Özil never seems to exert much energy but positions himself aggressively off the ball and Francis Coquelin, who has been playing as a ball winner from the 8 position rather than the base of the midfield, whirls around and hunts for possession whenever there is a loose pass.

The only big success came against Chelsea, when the press was triggered by poor, slow, sideways passing at the back between players who did not look comfortable on the ball. Other than that game, attempts to press generally end with Alexis Sánchez turning and facing his teammates in exasperation, beckoning them to join him before the opposition creates triangles in the vacated areas behind the first wave of pressing and combine to launch an attack.

Against PSG on Wednesday evening, it became clear that Arsenal intended to press in midfield at the very least but did not know how to.

More to the point, when certain players (Aaron Ramsey, Alexis Sánchez) hoped to engage with opposition players, they hesitated. This is probably because their teammates don’t tend to help them in the press, or appropriately position themselves to cut off passing options because they are man-orientated, rather than ball-orientated.

Passivity

That tentativeness regularly leads to Arsenal relaxing into a passive 4-4-2 shape out of possession, which exposes more issues. With little pressure on the ball and poor vertical and horizontal compactness, good teams can move the ball at ease, biding their time before probing one of the gaps Arsenal will inevitably leave exposed in midfield, defence, or both.

With Arsenal man-orientated, space is poorly managed. It becomes impossible for the two central midfielders to cover all the space that is asked of them to and the team struggles to securely keep possession as a defensive tactic (though that is another matter entirely). The shape of the entire team could do with some training ground work but even just an improvement in defence would have an enormous knock-on effect.

Take the build-up for PSG’s opener at the Emirates, where Thiago Motta had far too much time and space to pick a pass. Arsenal’s defence was so man-orientated that two defenders where each marking one man – Carl Jenkinson had followed Blaise Matuidi into what should be considered Shkodran Mustafi’s ‘zone’, Laurent Koscielny had tracked Edinson Cavani all the way out to the left-back position.

As shown in the graphic, a back four without such pronounced man-orientations and spacing issues would have covered the pitch better, as well as freeing Alexis Sánchez to put pressure on Motta in midfield without leaving the team exposed.

Alexis could easily press Motta, handily on his strong left foot, but is pre-occupied by the run of Maxwell. Too often in English football, wingers follow offensive full-backs and form a conditional back six, something Leicester avoided on their run to the title last season.

Just by slightly improving the defence, Arsenal’s midfield would have a much easier job, it would be easier to press in certain situations (from a mid/low block) and attacks could be launched much more simply, rather than having poor connections even when there is a turnover.

Teams should always seek to be compact and well-spaced but it is even more important without a good pressing game, any pressure on the ball, or paying attention to passing lanes.

Conclusion

A poor defensive shape means Arsenal are poorly positioned and easily pressed, rendering the side almost incapable of launching effective attacks once they have collapsed into their passive defensive shape.

As is so often the case in football, errors and goals are put down to individual errors. While Arsenal could certainly field a more cohesive midfield partnership than Coquelin-Ramsey, the midfield would work much better with more intelligent positioning from those around them.

In order to compete this season, Arsenal need to find a way to press or sit back out of possession without leaving themselves so vulnerable and relying solely on individual talent to make counter-attacking a viable threat.

Lewis Ambrose usually writes for Onefootball, watches too much of the Premier League and may be the biggest Mikel Arteta fan in the world. Follow him on Twitter @LGAmbrose

Guardiola’s Manchester City hosted Conte’s Chelsea in arguably the most eagerly anticipated Premier League clash of the season thus far. There were several reasons behind the excitement; with the coaches being two of the strongest tacticians in the league and the two sides being firmly in the title race. What followed was a high class, high intensity football game befitting of its expectations.

City’s 5-2-3 press

One of the biggest benefits Chelsea have enjoyed from their switch to 3-4-3 is a more stable and efficient build-up. This allows them to enter the final 3rd more consistently and in better positions creating a platform for the front 3 to combine. It followed, therefore, that one of the keys to the game for the home side would be to prevent Chelsea from building up in clean fashion. Guardiola’s plan to do so came in the form of an aggressively man-oriented press from a 5-2-3/5-2-2-1 base structure.

The base 5-2-3 shape gave Guardiola’s men a very clear reference point with each player having a clear assigned opponent. The front 3 gave City immediate access to prevent Chelsea progressing in the centre or half spaces. The two closest Chelsea centre backs to the ball would be subjected to the most tightest pressure from City’s closest two forwards. The role of Aguero in preventing passes to Luiz was particularly key since the Brazilian is often used as an escape route to to switch the ball across.

The danger with following Luiz deep is the increased space that movement could create in midfield, and Chelsea’s side backs are often able to use their midfield pair to switch the ball across when an opposition forward attempts to block Luiz. However, with their intensely man-oriented coverage City aimed to prevent Fabregas and Kante from turning out to make an effective switch.

City’s pressing was naturally mixed with an element of ball-orientation as the ball-far players would shift across to cover the centre, and accepting larger distances to their opponents in the process. Whilst City’s ball-near 6 would mark their opponent tightly, the ball-far one would sit deeper and allow the ball-far 10 to shuffle across and man-mark Chelsea’s other central midfielder. The same was evident in the defensive line where City’s ball-near wing-back and side back would aggressively man-mark whilst the remaining back 3 would cover deeper positions. This was vital for retaining an element of stability in the event of Chelsea beating the press.

This is why the ability to prevent switches in Chelsea’s build-up was so important. If switches were allowed; the long distances would mean time on the ball and City would be forced to retreat. Furthermore, keeping Chelsea’s play on one side would lead to more predictability and with their intense approach the Citizens would have more chance of winning possession.

There were a number of occasions where a couple of factors allowed Chelsea to escape City’s pressure and play to the far side. One such situation where this occurred was after turnovers. After losing the ball it inevitably took City players a certain time frame to organise their coverage. Chelsea were at times able to use this to their advantage and create small overloads near the ball to find a free man who could switch the ball away from the home side’s pressure.

However, the home side’s pressing was largely effective and generally prevented Chelsea from building consistent attacks from deep.

Guardiola targets wide areas

As part of their formation change; Chelsea have been defending in a 5-4-1 shape. One particular benefit the Londoners have encountered has been greater width in the last line of defence. This provides them with stability against wide attacks whilst allowing Pedro and Hazard to aid the compactness in midfield.

With Conte’s side operating in such a distinctive system; City’s adaptations to play against it were clear. City’s attacking game was based very much around wide areas as they targeted brief “2v1” situations. To facilitate this wide attacking strategy, City’s ball-near 10 was often positioned on the outside of Chelsea’s midfield four. The ball-far 10 would move and occupy a central position behind Chelsea’s midfield line. Along with Aguero, this was key in forcing the opposing midfield four to block the centre, in turn creating extra space out wide.

Another key was the positioning of the Sane and Navas, their presence was enough to occupy Chelsea’s wing-backs meaning City’s wide 10 could have time on the ball to cross. Alternately they could play Sane or Navas towards the byline if Chelsea’s wing-back pushed forward to close De Bruyne/Silva down.

These situations were often created after switches. With Hazard and Pedro playing narrow to cover the centre they often had large distances to make up after switches, this naturally meant City’s recipient enjoyed longer time on the ball. This was often utilised by a side back dribbling forwards or Gundogan moving wide to receive the ball on the left side.

When they created these 2v1 situations City often tried to enter the box with low and/or early crosses. These were often aimed towards diagonal runners towards the far-post. However it also created passing options back into central areas with the long shifts Chelsea’s midfield were forced into creating windows of opportunity to penetrate them.

2nd half

The starting line-ups.

With City taking the lead just before the interval the onus was on the away team to find an equaliser. The Mancunian side were therefore able to create a number of threatening opportunities on the break two of which fell to De Bruyne, both were somehow missed.

However there were a number of issues in City’s game that were becoming apparent. One of these was their declining intensity against the ball, allowing Chelsea to build attacks with more regularity. Another was their increasing vulnerability to counter attacks with their counterpressing becoming gradually worse and their presence in defence being inconsistent. These issues would eventually come back to haunt the home side.

From Chelsea’s point of view the introduction of Willian was vital. With the Brazilian winger replacing Pedro Chelsea benefitted from his superior speed and ability to cover large distances with his dribbling, this facilitated their threat from transitions.

Chelsea gain control

Chelsea were able to gain a greater foothold in the game through a number of natural causes resulting from the game state. Being a goal down Conte’s side naturally placed more emphasis on high pressing which they did with a similarly man-oriented coverage. This often worked to destabilise City and lead to quicker turnovers, although City did find some joy escaping this pressure with the wide movements from their central players.

In possession Chelsea benefitted somewhat from the Citizens’ declining intensity in pressing. However, a major improvement in Chelsea’s game was the movement of the forward players, this was vital in allowing Chelsea to progress. By dropping towards the ball they could create enough separation from their opponents to receive the ball, with the advantage of starting their movement earlier working in their favour.

At times the movement of Hazard/Pedro was key to creating openings in City’s rearguard. By moving wide or deep they could drag Otamendi or Kolarov out of position leaving large gaps for Costa to run through.

After equalising, with Fabregas taking advantage of the time he was given on the ball to play Costa in, Chelsea’s threat on the counter attack was set to become an even more prominent feature with City looking to restore their lead.

Chelsea triumph on the counter

Chelsea were now able to retreat into their 5-4-1 defensive block. However they still experienced some issues with City’s advancing side backs, wide midfielders and wing-backs creating 3v2 situations in the half spaces and wings. With these advantages City threatened to regain the lead as they were able to make dangerous entries into the box through the half spaces.

However their offensive shape gradually became looser which made them vulnerable to Chelsea’s counter attacks. An additional point is City’s sub-optimal reactions to losing the ball, they thus struggled to close Chelsea’s exit routes.

Chelsea’s counter attacks were put together in devastating fashion. The ability to beat opponents approaching from behind was vital and the speed of Hazard, Costa and Willian allowed them to take advantage of the space behind City’s defensive line.

City’s desperation was gradually increasing, this combined with Stones being replaced by Iheanacho meant it was little surprise when Chelsea took a 3-1 lead with a through ball from Alonso to Hazard essentially sealing the 3 points.

Conclusion

Conte’s side earned a crucial victory against arguably their main rivals for the title. Although they were somewhat fortunate to be only 1 goal behind their devastating counter attacks ensured they took full advantage. Chelsea have now come through a tough run of fixtures with 8 consecutive victories including wins over United, Spurs and Everton. Their form appears to be imperious and if they are to maintain this level Conte could well be celebrating a Premier League title in his debut season.

Guardiola’s side were somewhat unfortunate with a number of expected goals models indicating they had enough chances to be comfortably ahead by the time Chelsea equalised. The wide positioning of the likes of Silva, De Bruyne and Gundogan created some issues for Chelsea and they were able to create openings from this. Perhaps the bigger problem to come from this game is the suspensions Aguero and Fernandinho will face, missing the crucial fixture against Arsenal.

Pep Guardiola’s Manchester City hosted Arsenal in the Premier League’s 17th game week on Sunday evening. City came into the game with criticism surrounding the team with the performance in the defeat at Leicester in particular raising doubts amongst the media over Pep’s suitability to English football. Arsenal however had been in strong form and were eager to show the midweek defeat at Goodison Park was a mere blip and not the start of an annual meltdown.

Arsenal’s pressing scheme

As a lone forward Sanchez’s role in the away side’s pressing scheme was simply to direct the opposition’s build-up. To do this, Sanchez would press City’s ball carrying centre back in a direction whereby he could prevent circulation back across to where he came from. By keeping City’s play on the same side Arsenal would have a much greater chance of winning the ball through tackles/interceptions or forcing long balls and recovering the ball with their superior height in the defensive line.

For Sanchez’s efforts not to be wasted adequate support from the midfielders was key in denying the home side accessible routes to progress their build-up. This was largely done in man-oriented fashion with Ozil and Xhaka sticking tight to their assigned opponents.

For much of the opening exchanges this was very effective, with City largely unable to access the midfield the centre backs were frequently forced into long balls. This meant the home side struggled to build stability, with Arsenal able to force frequent turnovers, this made the game into more of an end-to-end contest than Pep would have liked.

City struggle to build

As mentioned earlier City’s inability to access midfield not only meant they lacked stability but also blunted their attack. With a well executed build-up being central to everything that happens afterwards in Pep’s game model, this was no surprise. The difficulty they experienced in accessing the midfield stemmed from issues at the base of their midfield.

In the early stages of the game; Toure and Fernando, the double pivot, were both positioned fairly high as they sought to give the centre backs space to dribble forwards and find routes to progress. However Sanchez’s speed meant it took fairly short periods to create access. This became a problem when combined with the weak spacing between Toure and Fernando which contributed to making Arsenal’s pressing more effective.

Toure and Fernando were often positioned on the same line, and were at times acting too close to one another which had a number of negative effects. By operating too close to one another they invited the pressure from Arsenal’s midfielders since they could both press and retain the support from one another. This was due to the short distances that City’s midfield had between themselves, thus they reduced one another’s space and time to receive the ball by attracting pressure.

Furthermore they either made low intensity or non-existent attempts to get free from their markers and this static nature played into the hands of the Gunners’ midfield.

City adapt midfield structure

Recognising the weakness of the current midfield dynamic Pep adapted the structure in midfield. One of the midfielders was now required to come deep and receive from the defenders, the other meanwhile would push onto the next line.

This led to City progressing into midfield more regularly by posing more questions to Arsenal’s pressing. The increased staggering in midfield meant Arsenal would have to press in a more unbalanced fashion if they wished to retain individual access, this could of course create other and potentially more dangerous issues.

With one of the midfielders acting deep, just above the two centre backs; City had a 3v2 advantage in the first line against Sanchez and Ozil. Although they possessed this overload previously, it was now more useful due to the shorter distance from the centre backs to the deepest midfielder. With the short passing distances the centre backs could use Toure/Fernando to play first time passes across to the other centre back despite being Ozil marking from behind. When the distance was longer, these passes were not viable since the time they would take to travel would give Ozil time to move forward and intercept whilst also allowing Sanchez to adjust his positioning.

With these switches they could eventually create space for one centre back to dribble forwards to progress or repeat the process until a suitable progression could be found. Another key to this was City’s strong presence behind Arsenal’s midfield line. With De Bruyne, Sterling and Silva operating in this space, they were able to influence Arsenal’s midfield four to remain in deep positions to cover. This reduced their capacity to contribute to the pressing attempts further ahead.

Arsenal deep in 4-4-1-1/4-5-1 block

With City now more frequently executing their build-up effectively Wenger’s men were gradually moved into deeper and deeper positions as City built stability in the game. With the front 2 now less able to prevent City building up Wenger instructed Ozil to move into a deeper position just ahead of the midfield four as he sought to further secure the centre of the pitch.

Of course this meant Sanchez operated as a lone forward and thus he was unable to control City’s build-up. The bigger problem however was that, even with his sporadic backwards pressing attempts, Pep’s side were establishing a circulation rhythm in front of Arsenal’s midfield. With little pressure on the ball in front of Arsenal’s midfield, City would be able to force the away side into several long shifts which would eventually lead to openings with the effects of fatigue.

For the time being, this tested Arsenal’s mid-block and more specifically its ability to protect the space immediately behind the midfield. In their attempts to do so, Arsenal operated in quite a position-oriented manner with quite strong levels of compactness. This meant City spent large periods circulating towards the flanks unable to create the situations to advance into the ten space. The Etihad outfit thus focused on overloading the areas around the flanks and attempting to break through towards the byline from there. If these initial attempts were not successful they could switch the ball across and isolate their wingers against Arsenal’s full-backs.

Arsenal’s deep 4-4-1-1 shape with little pressure on the ball in front.

City’s structure was thus adapted again in line with this increasing wing focus. While Clichy was initially operating wide with De Bruyne in the left half space, he would now operate more narrow with De Bruyne alternating with Silva in occupying the left flank.

City dominate 2nd half

At the start of the 2nd period yet another structural shift was evident from the home side; with Sane moving to the left wing, Sterling moving to the right and De Bruyne moving up front. This was arguably a better use of the attacking personnel with City now having players who thrive in isolation situations on either flank. This also lead to some interesting 4-2-4-0 like structures where Silva and De Bruyne occupied central spaces behind Arsenal’s midfield no players immediately occupying Arsenal’s last line.

There were, however, two main factors that led to City’s dominance after the interval…

Arsenal’s tiring midfield

The results of Arsenal’s inability to control City’s ball circulation was increasingly evident in the 2nd half where the midfield in particular appeared to be fatigued. As such the away side’s compactness greatly reduced in line with the decreasing intensity of their ball-oriented shifting.

Guardiola’s side were therefore able to make a number of entries into the box through the half spaces, simply by moving back infield from wide areas. This was effective with the London side unable to adjust their defensive shape quickly enough to cover the diagonal runs from the likes of Sane and De Bruyne.

Improved box cover and counterpressing

The 2nd aspect behind the home side’s dominance in the 2nd half was their excellent control of defensive transitions. This was achieved through their excellent box cover and intense counterpressing.

By retaining a strong presence around the edge of the box during counter attacks the Citizens were able to cover the exit routes for any potential counter attacks. This allowed them to either intercept any passes or swarm the receivers with a ball-oriented approach. This presence was often created through the inverted movements from the ball-far full-back and the deep midfield pair.

Another aspect within this transitional defending was the backwards pressing from the City players ahead of the ball. With the players covering the edge of the box, Arsenal’s counters could be controlled and slowed down giving time for the players ahead of the ball to work backwards and assist the counterpressing attempts. This marked a drastic improvement from not only the first half, but an issue they had shown in recent weeks, and combined with their monopoly of possession it gave City complete control of the second half.

City’s ball-oriented counterpressing

Conclusion

Victory meant back to back victories for City at a ground they had not won at since September (their own). A dominant second half display was key to their triumph and the most pleasing aspect was their excellent control of defensive transitions, an aspect that had been poor particularly in defeat to the champions. Guardiola will be hoping this victory over fellow title rivals gives his side confidence particularly with a busy festive period and the clash at Klopp’s 2nd placed Reds on New year’s eve on the horizon.

By contrast defeat marked back to back defeats for Wenger’s men which raise doubts, yet again, over their ability to challenge for the title. The game followed a rather common pattern in Wenger’s defeats against Guardiola whereby Arsenal’s passivity eventually led to large fatigue and worse defensive cover in turn. With a number of winnable games on the horizon, Wenger and the Arsenal faithful will be hoping the squad show an ability to bounce back from these set backs.

11 games, 11 wins, 25 goals scored, 2 goals conceded, from 8^th place and 8 points off the pace to 6 points clear at the top of the table. This is, of course, Chelsea’s record since Conte changed to a 3-4-3 formation. These results are impressive regardless, however, they become even more impressive when the quality of the opponents are taken into account. On this stellar run the Londoners have beaten, Leicester, Man Utd, Spurs, Everton, Southampton and Man City amongst other tough challenges. Formations are, of course, merely a starting point; this piece seeks to analyse the finer details of Conte’s system and why it has been so successful.

General Line-up and Player Movements

Improved central occupation

One of Conte’s preferred attacking methods is the use of combinations in wide areas. Thus he sets his teams up with movement patterns that facilitate this. However, in Chelsea’s early season 4-3-3 shape, this often led to a major problem; namely the lack of central occupation.

A strong central occupation is naturally important due to the advantages it has in connections. By occupying the centre, teams can switch the ball through it to different areas of the field if they cannot break through in the initial area.

In the 4-3-3 shape, the wide movements of the central players left the centre of the pitch largely unoccupied and Chelsea thus experienced difficulties in connecting attacks from wide areas to other areas. This was at times the case in deep midfield but a lager problem was a weak occupation of central areas behind opposition midfield lines. With little threat of recipients behind them opposing midfield lines could press forward more aggressively and limit the space for the likes of Kante, Matic and Oscar. This contributed to the difficulty Chelsea experienced with switching attacks. Whilst switches were at times executed, they were often done through lofted balls from one flank to the other.

Whilst these passes can change the point of attack, they can have a number of natural disadvantages. Firstly, an aerial ball naturally becomes more difficult to control which is not a problem in itself, but becomes one when the recipient is under pressure. This pressure becomes more likely with lofted aerial balls as the time it takes to reach the recipient gives the opponent time to get into position.

However, within the 3-4-3 shape Chelsea have found a greater capacity to connect wing attacks through the centre to other areas. With a number of simple but effective dynamics the Stamford Bridge outfit are able to retain central presence, width and structures for wide combinations. Key to this is the positioning and movement of midfield pair Matic and Kante.

Matic & Kante the connecting agents

To create a stable structure to connect possession from the flanks the ball-near midfielder often moves in a way to create a diamond shape. This shape theoretically offers the ball-carrying wing-back a diagonally forward and backwards pass as well as a simple sideways pass back infield. As such, the ball-near midfielder is tasked with moving into the nearby half space to offer the sideways pass. The focus on wide diamonds allows for adaptable behaviour, meaning they are required to interpret the shape and fill any vacant position to make a diamond.

An example of opponents focusing too much on preventing midfield connection: this pass went straight from Moses to Costa!

The routes Chelsea use to connect back from wide areas infield is dependent on the behaviour of the opponent. When opponents focus on preventing the back pass to the side back or Luiz, space often opens up in midfield for the ball-near midfielder to receive and switch the ball across. However, switching via Luiz/the side back is often a possibility against opponents who focus on blocking routes to switch the point of attack through the midfield.

Some opponents however operate in an intensely man-oriented fashion on the ball-near side allowing them to press the pass into midfield and the back pass to Luiz. In these situations, the movement of the ball-near midfielder is vital. With slight adjustments to their position they have the ability to open passing lanes to escape from the opponents’ pressure.

This is at times done through the ball-near midfielder moving up. If they are successful in taking their marker into a deeper position the route to switch the ball across to the ball-far midfielder often becomes available.

By connecting possession through central areas Chelsea access another benefit which is the ability to create increased space in wide areas for the eventual receivers. Since the centre of the pitch provides the quickest route to goal it is the immediate priority of defensive teams. Therefore when a team are able to play through central areas opposing wide players can be drawn infield to press whilst the ball goes out wide into the space they leave. This ability to “mis-direct” an opposing defence (go against the grain) is crucial and is a tool for creating time and space on the ball.

With the midfield pair being primarily responsible for creating basic connections from the wing back to the centre, another pair of players are responsible for creating the base for the wide diamond structures…

Advancing side backs

The base of Chelsea’s wide diamond shapes is largely filled dynamically by the side backs; Azpilicueta and Cahill. With 3 players in the first line of build-up Chelsea can effectively cover and circulate the ball beyond the width of both half spaces. This increases the distance opposition forwards need to make up to create access and gives the London side a stable base for circulation. This is particularly the case since their back 3 often gives them an immediate overload against the opposition’s front line.

This stability, overload and security of the extra man in the first line allows the side backs to advance with the ball aggressively into midfield.

One interesting aspect is the side backs’ movement after switches, and in particular the timing of their advances. If Matic were to receive a pass from the right and opens his body out to play to the left flank, Cahill will be seen advancing in the left half space to receive, the same is evident on the right. This timing allows them to receive the ball with a positive momentum, which allows Chelsea to maintain a strong circulation rhythm.

This is, of course, a small detail but one that can have a positive impact on the rhythm of a team’s possession game, and its efficacy.

With the two midfielders focused on the ball-near half space and centre, it is important for the receiving side back to carry the ball forwards into a midfield position. This is particularly important after the ball has been switched since the midfield pair will require a period of time to shift over and occupy positions closer to the ball.

The influences on the pass selection of the side backs in these situations is an important aspect in Chelsea’s possession game and perhaps the major influence is the structure of the team. A particularly important structure that is key in influencing the decision making is the level of support around the potential receivers. As noted earlier, the midfielders Matic and Kante require time to fill the nearby half space and centre after switches. Thus the support in wide areas is not immediately optimal, this makes the side backs reluctant to pass the ball out wide in fear of the wing-backs being isolated.

There are a number of typical reactions to this issue. Firstly the use of the dribbles are highly strategic, one if its several uses is to control the rhythm thus giving the midfielders time to shift across and support the ball in wide areas. The primary option, however, is to look for a pass into central areas, often a vertical one into the inside forward. If the opponents press intensely in these situations and the receiver cannot turn out, the ball can be set back to the wing back who curls a first time long pass beyond the opposition defence.

If there are no available passes into the centre for Cahill or Azpilicueta to play into the centre they can use the pass to the wing-back as a last resort but they may be required to offer the passing option back infield. In these situations a simple rotation occurs whereby the nearby midfielder would drop to occupy the base of the diamond in reaction to the side back remaining high in midfield.

3^rd man runs & Conte’s trademark combinations

One of the most distinctive features of Chelsea’s current game is the methods they use to bypass pressure after making a progression. Of course advancing towards goal is the objective of the possession team and preventing this is one for the defending team. It follows, therefore, that a level of pressure will follow when a possession team make significant progressions towards goal.

Within the early season 4-3-3, the wide players; Hazard and Willian were required to give width which often led to large distances between them and Costa up front. Since they were acting far apart from one another Chelsea’s attackers struggled to combine between themselves consistently, and Costa was at times isolated up front. However in the current formation the wing-backs provide the width meaning Chelsea’s attackers can operate with shorter distances between them thus facilitating more consistent combinations.

One interesting factor in the 3-4-3 how the roles and positioning of the forward players changes slightly when Chelsea progress from deep. Initially the forwards have their natural roles in maintaining strong spacing for a strong circulation game. This often sees Hazard positioned high in the left half space, Pedro the same on the right and Costa occupying the centre.

However once one of them receives the ball, the positional freedom is greatly increased and they can be seen moving to create structures for dynamic combinations. Chelsea use a number of combination patterns to bypass this pressure as they seek to secure the ball in the advanced area and gain a dynamic advantage to create a dangerous attack.

One such method is a Conte trademark 3^rd man run and his Chelsea side have even displayed a number of different 3^rd man patterns. One of these is a pass to one of the wide forwards who drops towards the ball, dragging an opposing full-back with them. Hazard or Pedro would then let the ball run through their legs turning the pass into a through ball for the onrushing wing-back.

Most players are taught to defend the most immediate danger, thus when the wide forwards look primed to receive in a central position Alonso/Moses’ original marker often become drawn in. However, in this situation Hazard/Pedro simply act as a decoy, and these features allow the wing-back to receive in space on the flanks.

Another 3^rd man variation can be seen when the opponents are sufficiently un-compact and leave central spaces exposed. The key to this pattern is the ability to pass into Costa in advanced central areas. This is a trigger for one of the wide forwards to make a diagonal run between the opposing centre back and full-back.

By running between two opposing defenders Chelsea can cause miscommunication and overcompensated positioning. This can make the centre back and full-back move deeper and more narrowly respectively as they attempt to cover the run.

The pass selection in response from Costa is based on the reaction of the opponent, particularly the full-back. If the opposing full-back holds their position in anticipation of the pass out wide, Costa can play the inside forward through the space between the opposing full-back and centre back.

If the opposition full-back moves infield to track the run, Costa can turn and pass into the wing-back who is often in large space to receive and advance the attack down the flank.

There is a common theme with all these combination variations; namely the focus on using the opponents’ pressing dynamic against them as a tool to progress into more dangerous areas. With opponents naturally drawn to press intensely when Chelsea make a progression, the Blues create the capacity to advance beyond the opponents’ pressure.

Two crucial factors in this are; re-locating the attack and possessing superior timing to the opponent. By re-directing the attack Chelsea can retain the advantages of advancing towards goal whilst moving the ball away from the pressure that often forces turnovers. Of course to do this it is vital to possess superior timing to the opponent. Without this, the likelihood of attacks breaking down increases as the pressing advances of the opponent becomes more problematic.

One factor that assists the attackers in these situations is a natural result of beginning their runs before their opponent. Due to this, the likes of Hazard and Costa can create the necessary separation from their opponents to receive the ball, whilst still enticing them forward to press.

Hazard’s freedom

The system switch has also had positive effects on the individual performances of the agents within it and this is perhaps most notable in the case of Eden Hazard. On the most basic level, the width from the wing-backs allows Hazard to act not only closer to his fellow attackers, but also more consistently in his favoured action zone; namely the left half space.

Since they occupy the same role, Hazard and Pedro have many of the same action patterns, however there is one major difference which is the higher level of freedom the Belgian forward is afforded. With the ball on the left side, Pedro is often tasked with giving depth with advanced positioning and threatening the opposition’s defensive line with diagonal runs.

In Hazard’s case, he has the licence to drift over to the right flank, create overloads and participate in combinations there. His diagonal runs beyond the oppositional full-back are another interesting feature of Hazard’s role, and these runs often allow him to reach the byline to look for a cutback, cross or even shooting opportunity.

Transitional defending

It often follows that the players responsible for providing connections are also tasked with providing cover and stability against turnovers. Since providing connections requires constantly good distances from the ball in possession, this easily translates into good positions to defend in the immediate aftermath of losing the ball.

Matic and Kante therefore are the primary individuals concerned with stopping counter attacks. When in advanced attacking positions they are generally positioned on the edge of the box to block the main exit routes for counter attacking opportunities.

In order to cover the centre and both half spaces the midfield pair are often joined on the edge of the box by either the ball-near side back or the ball=far full-back. In addition to the two remaining centre backs, this gives Chelsea the ability to either force quick regains or simply control counter attacks by slowing the opponents down giving the rest of the team time to drop into the defensive shape.

5-4-1 against the ball

The system change has noticeably had a positive effect on Chelsea’s game without the ball, with 9 clean sheets in the 11 games since. Perhaps the biggest benefit is the greater width in the defensive line.

Chelsea’s base defensive shape, and the areas of prime responsibility across the backline.

Against the ball Chelsea operate in a 5-4-1 shape with the wing-backs acting alongside the 3 defenders to make a back 5 whilst the inside forwards drop to positions alongside Matic and Kante to create a line of 4 in midfield. Many teams struggle to defend the width of the field effectively in a back four shape, whilst retaining an adequate presence in the box to defend any potential crosses. This leads to the situational use of midfield players to cover spaces which often manifests in wingers dropping into full-back positions or at times central midfielders covering channels between pressing full-backs and centre backs in central areas.

Within Chelsea’s early season defensive shape it was often the former, with Hazard or Willian situationally being used as 5th defenders to assist with more effective width coverage. However this can lead to a number of problems; firstly the constant re-adjustment in terms of operating in the midfield or defensive line can create difficulties in co-ordinating effective positioning. This is particularly the case against opponents who shift the ball quickly and can therefore take advantage of any issues in the timing of dropping into the defensive line.

Furthermore this can at times mean using players who have sub-optimal defensive instincts in important defensive positions, which can create a target for opponents. Most of these issues can of course be neutralised with strong and effective team tactical training, however it is more difficult to co-ordinate. Another issue is directly related, since the use of players like Hazard in such deep positions creates longer distances to join any counter attacks.

With the constant back 5 shape and effective work on the training field, Chelsea have been able to solidify their game against the ball. The 5-man defensive line means the defence can cover more width on the field whilst retaining adequate distances between themselves. This means the ball-near wing-back can defend wider and move to defend opposition wingers quicker, with this they are able to prevent opponents from gaining a dynamic advantage for take-ons and can force them to go backwards.

The level of cover is an important influence on the level of pressing individual players feel comfortable enough to execute. This sounds obvious, but has an interesting natural effect in different defensive shapes. On a simple level, the line of defence where a team has the highest number often becomes the area of most intense pressing. This is due to the level of cover for each individual player being at its highest.

In a 4-5-1 defensive shape this can lead to particularly aggressive midfield pressing, but in Chelsea’s 5-4-1 it creates a “last-line security” for the individual defenders to aggressively close spaces in front of them. This security that the 5 man defence creates, naturally allows the ball-near defenders to situationally mark their direct opponents, at times following deep in their attempts to prevent them from receiving in space between the lines or turning towards goal.

This creates an interesting effect in the event of the midfield line being penetrated in central areas. In these situations Chelsea pair aggressive pressing from one of the defenders, depending on the part of the pitch, with backwards pressing from the midfield players. This creates a high intensity, high pressure environment that allows Chelsea to force the ball away from these dangerous areas.

The four midfielders defend in a position-oriented manner with their focus being primarily on occupying strong positions in relation to the ball’s location to block important spaces in front of the defence. However, the scheme is not wholly passive as the nearest midfielder to the ball steps forward to press the ball carrier. Regaining the ball is not the primary intention, but by applying a level of pressure on the ball they seek to control the opposition’s circulation by reducing the ball carrier’s time to make dangerous passes.

Within the position-oriented zonal defence, as with any other zonal defence, there is a high level of team-mate orientation this means the players are constantly adjusting their positions based on not only the ball but also the actions of their team-mates. When a midfielder steps forward the surrounding players narrow up and deepen slightly to provide extra cover in the space just vacated. Furthermore, with the 5-chain in defence able to defend large width, the midfield can focus on securing the centre with less emphasis on shifting to wide areas.

Conclusion

On this run, Chelsea have shown their ability to beat a range of strategically variable opponents and in different fashion. Goal filled and wholly dominant wins over Everton and Man Utd have been accompanied by tough and transition focused wins over Southampton, Spurs and Man City and single goal wins over West Brom, Middlesbrough and Crystal Palace. This is perhaps the most imperious aspect of their title charge thus far, and it is no surprise that they have more points than any of the last 4 teams to be top of the table at this stage.

The formation switch has certainly had positive effects on the side in all phases of the game and the Stamford Bridge outfit now resemble a typical Conte team more closely. Over the last 11 games the London side have arguably been the finest side in the league from a tactical perspective with a particularly strong balance between stability and creativity. If Chelsea are able to maintain this balance between defensive stability and offensive output the Italian coach could well be celebrating the Premier League title in his maiden campaign.

Jürgen Klopp’s Liverpool played host to Stoke City in the sole Premier League fixture on bank holiday Tuesday. Stoke arrived at Anfield in relatively poor form, without a win in their previous three matches. On the other hand, Liverpool came into the game fresh from a hotly contested victory in the Merseyside derby, giving them local bragging rights as well as back to back wins after a small blip in form at the start of the month.

Stoke’s strong start

Stoke’s attacking strategy was very effective over the opening 20 minutes of the game, generating two good chances as well as several moments of confusion and disorganisation within the Liverpool defence. Their main plan of attack was to try and find Peter Crouch with a long, high pass and then rely on him to retain the ball and bring others into the fold. Moreover, they looked to get players (particularly Jonathan Walters) close to Crouch in an effort to try and retain the ball should the initial long pass be heavily contested or escape the control of Crouch.

This caused a number of problems for Liverpool, as the direct nature of Stoke’s attacking strategy meant that their ability to press and force turnovers of possession was limited due to the Stoke defenders looking to play long at every opportunity. This was a good decision by Mark Hughes as it took away a key part of Liverpool’s game whilst minimising the exposure of his centre-backs rather poor ability to play through pressure.

In addition, the long balls aimed at Crouch often caused the Liverpool defence to collapse around his position. This created lots of space for the Stoke attackers to use, should they be able to retain the ball and find the free player who was most often in a wide area.

The clearest example of this strategy can be seen in the build-up to the opening goal. Whilst the long goal kick does not reach Crouch immediately, Walters is able to win his header and get the ball to his strike partner. From this, Liverpool collapse to press Crouch who is able to play a simple pass back to Joe Allen to escape the pressure and allow his team mate to receive the ball with a forward facing view.

Unfortunately for the away side, this attacking approach was not sustainable over the course of the game. The accuracy of the passes towards Crouch as well as his ability to keep hold of the ball dwindled as the first half went on. This meant that Liverpool were able to generate considerable attacking pressure due to regaining the ball more frequently and closer to the Stoke goal.

It should also be noted that Liverpool afforded the Stoke defenders far less time on the ball as the half progressed. They were also quicker to apply pressure to all ball carriers as well as being more coordinated and effective at preventing their ability to play backwards or to the other side of the pitch. This meant that Stoke defenders and midfielders were often starved of options and forced to play within a much smaller area of the pitch. As a result of this, Liverpool often trapped Stoke against the touchline or in wide areas forcing easy ball recoveries and then tried to transition quickly into the spaces left by the Stoke players attempting to take up attacking positions.

Liverpool’s early struggle against Stoke’s man-to-man marking

Stoke positioned themselves in 3-5-2 shape when defending and opted for a passive man-to-man approach in picking up the Liverpool players. As a result of this, when Liverpool had the ball in early build-up, Stoke adopted a 3-4-3 with Allen joining Walters and Crouch in the first defensive line. This meant that they were effectively able to match Liverpool’s attacking positional structure right across the pitch. With Sadio Mané and Roberto Firmino wanting to move inside and try to combine through the half-spaces, it was easy for the wider of Stoke’s three centre-backs to pick them up.

The effect of this was that Liverpool initially struggled to generate free players in between Stoke’s lines of defence as they would be tightly followed by their marker. Both Glen Johnson and Bruno Martins Indi would leave the defensive line in order to track Firmino and Mané should they drop deep to try and overload the midfield area. This was far more frequent with Firmino as he looked to aid his midfielders in creating chances whilst Mané was focused more on trying to move behind the midfield instead.

Furthermore, when the ball was with Simon Mignolet, the three Stoke players in the first line would prefer to stick tightly to Jordan Henderson and the centre-backs rather than try to press the goalkeeper. A recurring scene in the opening exchanges was Liverpool attempting to build play using Mignolet rather fruitlessly. With his immediate options covered, he was forced to try and either find the full-backs positioned high and wide or look to play a longer pass for Divock Origi to try and outmuscle Ryan Shawcross. Needless to say, this wasn’t particularly effective and as a result Liverpool looked rather toothless for the opening half hour.

Manipulation of marking sees Liverpool overturn the deficit

The role of Sadio Mané altered slightly after around thirty minutes. Instead of looking to move inside and try to receive the ball in front of the Stoke defence he began to hold his position slightly outside of the defensive block in order to try and generate opportunities to exploit his superior pace and dribbling skills one on one against a Stoke defender. This strategy can be seen in the build-up to Liverpool’s equaliser as instead of looking to move inside and combine with Origi, he spots that Erik Pieters is very narrow and waits on the blindside of the defender to receive the ball from Origi. With plenty of space to run into, as well as drawing a central defender away from his team mates into a promising one on one scenario, Mané is able to create space for the onrushing Adam Lallana to score.

After the equalising goal Liverpool began to look more dangerous. The primary reason for this was their intelligent use of player movement to manipulate the marking of Stoke’s wing backs in order to create space both out wide and in the half-spaces behind the midfield. This was most often achieved when James Milner and Nathaniel Clyne remained in conservative positions in early build-up, forcing the Stoke wing backs to challenge them much higher up the pitch than they would have during the opening exchanges. By doing this, it allowed a Liverpool midfielder to receive the ball free from pressure behind the first line of Stoke’s defence with space to dribble and assess passing options.

Liverpool used this method of attracting wing backs higher up the pitch in combination with attackers dropping deep to further disrupt the Stoke defence. Origi and Firmino in particular would look to drop deep to receive the ball in midfield. Whilst this isn’t too dissimilar to what they did during the stale opening exchanges the movement of Georginio Wijnaldum and Lallana is what made this method of attack more effective. As the forwards dropped, they would make diagonal runs to attack the space vacated by the defenders who followed either Origi or Firmino. The Stoke midfielders could not track these runs without completely opening up the centre of the field for Liverpool to attack through. This moment of indecision is all that is required for the midfielders to become free men and disrupt the man-marking scheme as another player must then leave his assignment to maintain access to the ball. This has the potential to become a chain of players become free from their markers due to defenders scrambling to try and reorganise their marking whilst preventing Liverpool from advancing into dangerous areas.

Conclusion

After a strong opening where they controlled the second balls well, Stoke ultimately faded as the game went on and the accuracy of their long passes faltered due to an increasingly effective Liverpool press. Once Liverpool were able to regain their composure after falling behind they were consistently able to manipulate Stoke’s man-marking in order to generate free players between the lines as well as imbalances in their overall structure.

The result means three victories in a row for Klopp’s Liverpool as they move above Manchester City into second place ahead of their eagerly anticipated encounter at Anfield on New Year’s Eve. On the other hand, Stoke are now without a win in four but still sit comfortably in mid-table.

Daniel Bower usually writes for City Watch. Follow him on Twitter @Unnamed_TBD.

Klopp’s Liverpool side hosted Guardiola’s Manchester City in the final league encounter of 2016 on Saturday evening. The opposing managers’ renewed acquaintance after clashes in Germany was one factor that ensured the game was eagerly anticipated. To add a further edge to the game, Liverpool were one point ahead of City coming into the game and the winner would take the title of Chelsea’s main challengers.

Guardiola targets the half spaces

City began the game in a hybrid system which appeared between a 3-3-3-1 and a 2-4-3-1 in possession with Zabaleta’s variable positioning meaning he acted at times as a right centre back and others as a right full back.

One feature of the system was the asymmetric staggering on the flanks with Kolarov acting high and wide on the left with Silva in the left half space and Zabaleta deep and narrow whilst Sterling held the width on the right. This freed De Bruyne and Silva to operate in the half spaces and this was key to the away side’s game plan. In Klopp’s defensive scheme Henderson operates as a lone holding midfielder, as such Guardiola aimed to create options to progress past the midfield line in front by occupying the spaces to either side of the Englishman.

Alternately this could give Toure and Fernandinho more space to operate if Liverpool reacted by dropping deeper to secure the the half spaces.

Operating with a back 3 could seem somewhat counter-intuitive against a Liverpool side that defend with a narrow front three since the numerical equality could lead to an unstable build-up. However this could encourage more aggressive pressing from the home side, in turn forcing Can and Wijnaldum higher meaning Henderson could become more isolated creating more space for Silva and De Bruyne to overwhelm him.

Liverpool’s high block and spatial control

Liverpool, as usual, operated in an intense and compact 4-3-3 shape against the ball. From the front Firmino would press aiming to force the ball towards one side and prevent switches back across the defensive line to reduce City’s options of circulation. Lallana and Mane, the wide players, were positioned further infield than usual to further block the half spaces.

Can and Wijnaldum operated in a fairly man-oriented fashion aiming to limit space for City’s double 6 and force the ball into wider areas where they could force worse actions by limiting options to play back into the centre. Henderson remained behind the midfield pair aiming to control the centre, though he often moved to reduce the distance to City’s ball-near 10 to create instant access in the event of the midfield line being breached.

Issues with this arose when Liverpool’s ball-far central midfielder followed their opponent too rigidly, isolating Henderson and leaving the ball-far half-space open in the process. In the initial stages, the man-orientation from Can and Wijnaldum played into City’s hands and City were able to break past Liverpool’s pressing to play diagonally beyond the midfield line.

This was an example of Pep’s game plan working almost entirely as he likely imagined it.

However this was all too rare, for most of the first half Liverpool controlled City’s circulation expertly with some particularly strong mechanisms allowing them to prevent the ball from entering their defensive block. When Stones had the ball in the centre Lallana and Mane would move slightly deeper and narrower to block the pass into De Bruyne and Silva respectively.

Lallana, Liverpool’s half space police.

Whilst they were not always directly in the passing lane, they were effective at preventing these passes in a number of ways. Firstly by moving deeper and narrower they were able to narrow the passing lane as much as possible increasing the likelihood of intercepting the pass. Furthermore, their infield movement meant it would be easier to intercept an attempted pass since they would only have to continue moving in the same direction.

This movement meant they temporarily lost access to Zabaleta or Otamendi, however once City’s side back received the ball they would move forwards to press. This movement and the proximity to the opponent gave them a larger cover shadow meaning they could simultaneously press and prevent passes into the space they just vacated.

This excellent defensive control restricted City’s options to circulating across and often being forced into more direct balls which were at times plainly inaccurate or on other occasions poor timing led to offside recipients.

City gain access to the half spaces

Towards the end of the first half Guardiola’s side were increasingly able to break through the half spaces, particularly on the left, and there were a number of factors behind this. On one or two occasions they were able to take advantage of transition moments whereby Liverpool were still transitioning into their defensive shape and momentarily lacked the compactness to block the passing lanes.

However on a few occasions they were able to take advantage of weaker orientation from Mane in particular. During ball-oriented shifts midfielders are often required to co-ordinate this shifting movement with scanning, allowing them to occupy positions blocking passing lanes and retaining vision of the ball carrier to be aware of their next action. This can of course be quite a complex task to achieve.

Thus it was no surprise that Mane’s orientation errors generally occurred after switches. In these situations Mane failed to scan the situation behind him and thus did not adjust his position, like previously, to block or reduce the scope of the passing lane to Silva. Furthermore he was now caught “flat footed” with low intensity shifting movements. This in addition to his wide shifting dynamic meant it would take him longer to react and intercept passes on his inside as he would have to change direction and start from an almost stagnant position.

Another factor that assisted City’s increased penetration was improved positioning from the midfield pair to avoid blocking the diagonal passing lanes to Silva and De Bruyne.

Although they were increasingly able to move beyond Liverpool’s midfield line, City lacked the immediate depth to use these progressions to move directly towards Liverpool’s goal. However, they gave City the ability to force Liverpool into deeper positions and attack from higher positions. A number of these opportunities were squandered through mistakes in technical execution, and this contributed to City’s stale attack.

Low quality 2nd half

For much of the second half Liverpool were able to relieve pressure on their defence by inviting City to press, playing long and taking advantage of the space behind City’s midfield to pick up 2nd balls. With this method they created the basis to sustain possession in City’s half as a way to control the game and prevent City from threatening their lead. However, on a number of occasions they were caught in possession by backwards pressing from City’s midfielders and this gave the away side opportunities to threaten in transition.

With the 2nd half being one of constant turnovers of possession, Liverpool also had a number of chances to double their advantage on the counter attack. Poor quality of decision making and execution was behind both sides’ inability not only to score but to move from good positions into actual shots on goal.

This was potentially a result of the accumulation of fatigue with little time for recovery between games in this period and manifested in two of the league’s top 3 sides producing a low quality half.

Conclusion

Victory for Klopp’s side marks them as Chelsea’s “chasers in chief” and capped off a strong first half of the season for the Anfield outfit. With their excellent defensive control Liverpool were able to dominate large periods of the game and with more consistency in their on-the-ball actions the home side would have been able to win by a larger margin. Furthermore the result meant Liverpool remained unbeaten in all games against fellow top 6 sides, with 3 wins and 2 draws which is a strong indication of their title credentials.

As for City defeat, in addition to results elsewhere, sees them lying in 5th spot 10 points off runaway leaders Chelsea far from the heady heights of fan and public expectation. Losing at Liverpool is no shame, and it is their general inconsistency that leaves them so far off the pace. Their inability to access advanced spaces and sustain attacks in dangerous areas was at the heart of City’s failure to threaten Liverpool’s goal. Whilst we can expect a level of improvement from Guardiola’s side, City fans will be hoping it does not come too late for a title challenge.

Guardiola suffers the highest league loss of his career against Everton. The formation of the team and the roles of the players were poorly chosen.

The orginal article was published in German on Spielverlagerung.de. Thanks for the translation to Stefano Soudias.

In a strange, tactically confused and slightly chaotic match the Everton Football Club have achieved a 4:0 victory over Pep Guardiola’s Manchester City on Sunday. The highly discussed Guardiola thereby suffers the biggest league loss of his career, which fueled the critics’ (and Premier League advocates’) fire. Furthermore he used fullback legend Zabaleta in central midfield.

Difficult overload attempts against flexible, central block

Unlike some depictions, Zabaleta was not used as a second pivot next to Yaya Touré, but as a right, central midfielder in a diamond (therefore wider and closer to his natural habitat). This diamond was completed by de Bruyne on the left and Silva as a freely moving number ten. Sterling did not play on the wing, but rotated as a left-hand second striker behind Agüero through the space between the lines.

Structures from the start, primarily when Manchester in possession

Everton used a 3-5-2 (or rather a 3-5-1-1) in which Gareth Barry was accompanied by the young Ross Barkley and the 18-year-old Premier-League-debutant Tom Davies. This game notably developed into a duel of these three players against de Bruyne and Silva. The latter attempted to orchestrate the game from unusually deep zones (they summed up 199 passes!). Often they dropped so far within the half space, that they received the ball even deeper than Touré. Zabaleta moved mainly to the right in order to open the space for Silva. Partially, Silva and de Bruyne together moved into the same space. In general there was a lot of movement and a broad variety of structures.

Everton played in typical Koeman-fashion with lots of man-orientations. Especially Barry controlled the space in front of the back by marking possible options. Davies and Barkley then defended the spaces and opponents very flexibly and intelligently. There even were scenes in which Barry moved away from the ball and in response Davies shifted to the left in front of him in order to protect the center.

Everton slackly organized, but smart

They were not extraordinarily well organized, but often this was compensated for by Everton’s very good pressing-decisions. They were passive when access was not possible and protected offensive passing lanes, but suddenly went for ball recoveries as soon as they could create defensive overloads and moments of isolation.

For this, Everton’s midfield-three was often supported by Lukaku and Mirallas. The latter dropped back as a fourth midfielder at times. Lukaku attempted to isolate Touré and waited for moments to create pressure in front. The tactical behavior of the Belgian developed excellently in the past years and therefore he was able to find good pressing moments in order to force City into a few bad wing progressions. It was eye-catching how actively he coached his teammates behind him in order to close possible ways of escape out of the isolated space.

Sometimes Everton even moved up into a high pressing and forced City into playing long balls.

Also the wingbacks and defenders of Everton acted flexibly and intelligently, moved up to press at times, dropped deeper at other times. In general Everton were not extraordinarily intense and rather laxly organized, but functioned due to all players being active and concentrated when defending, they communicated a lot among each other and especially re-oriented themselves well and did so constantly. Furthermore City were not well organized in order to exploit a 3-5-2.

Toothless horizontal and vertical structure by City

Usually, it is a lazy approach to view units of a team isolatedly in order to bring about tactical understanding – in case of this match it works well enough though: Everton’s three defenders could comfortably control Agüero and Sterling by them having one more player. Also because there were no wingers, which they would have had to flexibly hand over among each other. The space next to the back three was controlled by the wingbacks, who had a manageable task against Clichy and Sagna.

The City-midfielders rarely moved into these spaces; Silva and de Bruyne dropped extremely deep, as mentioned above. Their presence was therefore lacking in the spaces between defense and attack. The two of them basically undertook the task, which is usually done by one player, Gündogan (or Fernandinho), who additionally does it better than them. Especially Silva positioned himself slightly too ball-oriented and was not farsighted, which is why he rarely manged to create direct connection forwards out of his deep positioning.

Eventually this created some sort of 2-1-5-0-2 in which City could not advance to the attacking line, but were forced to circulate the ball in deeper midfield zones. By doing that they could hardly gain space though, because Everton’s midfield line defended cautiously and did not allow themselves to be drawn out of their positions.

Sterling comes too deep, can’t turn and is easily covered by Davies and Mirallas. Silva is marked by Barry but still comes deep for no reason just to play a backwards pass. The ball-far space is not used, the ball-near structure is not work.

Theoretically, City could have advanced on the wings in order to respond, where they could have overloaded with Silva, the near central midfielder, wingback and striker. They only did this partially though, often times with just two players – on the left with multiple times with Clichy and de Bruyne, on the right with Zabaleta and Sagna. Everton constantly managed to decelerate those attempts through the wingback orienting himself towards the player who was closer to their goal, so that their midfield-triangle could shift. City did not play quickly and dynamically enough in the wide areas, in order to exploit the underload around the wingback, but kept a calm, circulation-focused rhythm. Also the fullbacks did not move up a lot. It seemed as if Silva and de Bruyne should break through in the half spaces. This did not succeed though, because the connection between midfield and attack was lacking.

Zabaleta, Sterling, lack of routine and unclear roles

Basically, Sterling would have been the key-player in this structure. If he had integrated himself in the right moments, in order to turn behind Barry and dribble towards the back line, Everton’s defense would have gotten massive problems with him and Agüero. But that is not Sterling’s playing-style. His wide, horizontal movements indicate, that Guardiola also did not demand that of him, but rather use him for 1-v-1-situations against the halfbacks and to create overloads on the wings. But even this Sterling did not manage to do. He generally seemed overwhelmed with the positioning in this role.

The lacking routine of this combination of players in midfield and their versatile movement negatively influenced the build up play. The defenders – especially Clichy and Otamendi – seemed to be slightly confused by all the movements in midfield in these situations and played strange, hurried vertical passes in bad situations and occasionally to the opponents. Clichy initiated the 1:0 by a pass like that.

The roles of Touré and Zabaleta in this system seemed rather cryptic. Touré’s fitness and defensive strength are not on a level anymore that allows him to play the sole defensive midfielder role without problems. He also lost the ball before the 2:0 and opened the space in his position. He occasionally dropped rather ineffectively between the defenders or vertically moved up in order to use his creative abilities but did not manage to create connections to Silva and de Bruyne and additionally opened the space around his position for that purpose.

Zabaleta then strangely switched between a balancing and an attacking role. Sometimes he moved around Touré, partly secured him, or positioned himself in order to be available. More often he moved to the right where he theoretically could have overloaded together with Sagna, which was not really used though. Instead there were scenes in which it seemed as if his teammates consciously avoided to pass to him.

It is of course clear that in such a role he was supposed to participate primarily during movement and pressing, instead of acting in a playmaking role. If he is the only player available and unmarked he quickly should be integrated though. Especially since Everton did not defend the far half space intensely and Zabaleta therefore often had a lot of space to easily circulate the ball whenever he was integrated.

Evertons attacking structure

Focus on the right by Everton

An unlucky circumstance was that the Argentinian could rarely use his defensive skills against the ball because Everton did scarcely attack on his side. In possession Barkley moved more towards the ten space or into the attacking line while Barry and Davies created a structure with two pivots that was slightly shifted towards the right side. Often times Lukaku attempted to participate through dropping at half-right. That way he excellently assisted an offside-goal early on. Before scoring the 1:0 he could get rid of the defenders that way in order to receive the ball from Mirallas and before the 2:0 he played the second last pass into depth.

Three of Everton’s goals were scored after long balls into the right half space. They attempted to build up with clean passes, but City prevented that well. Agüero and Sterling blocked passes to the half- and wingbacks, Silva moved up between the two in order to apply pressure on Williams. That way they often provoked long balls for which they did not have great structures though. The fullbacks moved up early in order to attack Coleman or Baines, which destabilized the defensive line. In the space in front of the back they had to face Lukaku, Mirallas, Davies and Barkley.

That way all goals were created through the channel between Clichy and Stones. Apart from Davies’ exceptional run before the 3:0 it was the second balls after long passes to Lukaku, which created the goals. Thereby City especially had problems with their defensive orientation and communication: a pattern during all goals was players moving up to create pressure without anybody covering the spaces created by these movements.

Hosts not present, but stable

Despite of the great deficits in the Manchester-midfield, Pep Guardiola’s team was still mostly dominant. That was due to the good pressing patterns in the first line and the stable ball circulation throughout the defense together with Bravo: he solved some of Everton’s pressing attempts well. That way City basically controlled the game and only allowed a few attacks. Through individual quality – especially de Bruyne – they occasionally could create dangerous moments out of rather harmless structures. Apart from that they also had some giant chances after counter attacks when Everton moved up a bit.

The end of the match

Over the course of the game Everton got increasingly less present. Especially in the second half, where they dropped deeper and did not defend at the halfway line but rather in the final third. By doing that they could rely on the usual compactness of a back five with three defensive midfielder in front and therefore where hard to outplay. Additionally, Guardiola did not find functional adaptions – and also attempted surprisingly few things.

At first de Bruyne started much more active in the second half. He did not drop that deep to receive passes anymore, dribbled much more and moved into the center, between Everton’s midfielders. Oddly enough, that aspect disappeared with time. In minute 62 Zabaleta left the pitch for Iheanacho, who played as a left striker. Sterling played more like a number 10, de Bruyne moved to the right central midfield and Silva on the opposite side with a playmaking drive towards the center.

Now the build up became more asymmetrical. The right side acted much more offensive: Sagna moved up a lot and even orientated himself towards the central forwards position. That way he pulled back Baines and created space for de Bruyne to move into and deliver crosses from. The area in the right half space that was created by this synergy was filled by Otamendi increasingly moving up. The attacks on the right did not work well enough though, because Everton could defend the crosses with many players inside of the box.

Often City progressed over the left side now, where Silva, Iheanacho and Sterling had, ought or wanted to combine. Unfortunately, none of these players are real combination-players. Sterling’s timing and orientation was very problematic and therefore City hardly ever progressed behind the three defensive midfielders. In fact, one attempt to combine between Sterling and Iheanacho lead to the loss of possession, which initiated Davies’ run before the 3:0.

Conclusion: difficult topic

On the one hand the anti-intellectual Guardiola-critics are now happy to see the ‘professor’ and his weird experiments failing. On the other hand Guardiola was also heavily defended, especially on the basis of the statistics: Everton just had 6 shots, while City accomplished 13. According to ‘expected goals’ City were even more dangerous than Everton.

Actually, Everton were probably not good enough to justify 4 goals. City’s xG of 0,83 is still bad for a title contender though and illustrates a lack of offensive capabilities in this match. Due to their dominant style they still could control the opposition, yet Everton’s chances were probably better than their xG (all of their chances with hardly any pressure by the opposition, which cannot be tracked by the metric). Furthermore the chances were no lucky individual events but were already indicated by the offside goal and a few other dangerous scenes. The 4:0 is therefore an overly one-sided result, but that can happen when one is just equally good or worse then the opponent.

That Guardiola’s approach with a lot of possession and a focus on dominance is wrong cannot be derived from these events though. Actually, it was those aspects which kept his team in the match and resulted in relatively good statistics. How they played on the basis of these principles, the defending in the last line and the organization of their game through the midfield – was not good though. And also the choice of the system combined with the player roles did not function against this opponent. Therefore, the problem was not the strategy but the tactical application of that strategy which can be a deadly problem for any strategy. (If you try to sit deep and want to counter-attack but you lack compactness to recover balls, usually you will criticize the lack of compactness rather than the idea of sitting deep.)

It is also not the case that Guardiola’s many changes and adaptions are necessarily bad and cause insecurity. The structural advantages of the changing of system can outweigh the disadvantages, furthermore teams can also quickly adapt to new systems (if accordingly chosen) and work well within the new framework. However, not all changes of systems by Guardiola are equally good (or bad). Often times he can adapt and bring changes and impulses about which eventually lead his teams to victory. Sometimes his ideas do not work as intended and the changes are disadvantageous. Often times it is probably in between those extremes and is not that relevant. That might be why Guardiola says that he is still a young coach who learns a lot.

In this game Guardiola rather should have changed much more and much earlier. He might not have because he tried to build a new system during the training-week and wanted to wait for Sterling and Silva adapting to the new environment. This game is also noticeable and strange, because Guardiola actually departed from his usual playing style of the last years (wing-focus, fast switches, 1-v-1, crosses). He rather used the wings less, and attempted to integrate the 1-v-1-players in the center. All of them in spaces which are not their natural habitat though.

Eventually, this result might simply encourage to conduct discussions about coaches (and football-ideologies) in a more sober-minded fashion. Being a coach is extremely difficult. One can get a huge amount of things wrong. One can also make a ton of things right and still lose. One can also make a lot of things wrong and still win. One can also make almost everything right with one team and still get more problems in a different environment. There is simply no coach in football history, who was exceptional at every aspect. Everybody undergoes better and worse phases.

That people are bothered by a Guardiola-hype is one thing. When they therefore want to depict him as a failure and belittle all of his achievements despite of underlying facts then that is childish narrow-mindedness; especially because it’s a different standard applied for him then compared to all other coaches. At the same time it is true, that Guardiola is no magician and also makes mistakes. Of course the style that made him, was also created by his players and neither style nor success can be exactly transferred from one team to another.

Differentiated points of view are cool. Ciao.

Guardiola’s Manchester City hosted in-form Tottenham in a highly anticipated clash on Saturday evening. Fresh from their 4-0 defeat at Everton City were under pressure to win to keep alive their increasingly slim title hopes. This task was made tougher since they welcomed the league’s most in-form side with the North Londoners enjoying a 6 game winning streak.

City’s intense pressing out of 4-1-4-1

Perhaps the most impressive aspect of City’s performance was their intensity in high pressing actions. Starting from a base 4-1-4-1 shape City were able to prevent Spurs progressing from deep with a combination of sprints, man-orientations and accurate shifting movements.

From the front Aguero would press either the central defender (Alderweireld) or Lloris depending on who the phase started with. With his pressing run and use of his cover shadow he prevented direct passes into midfield and directed the pass into a wider area. After the pass went beyond him, Aguero’s positioning had interesting effects. From his position behind the Spurs defence (particularly if he pressed Lloris) he could prevent Spurs from re-circulating the ball across by anticipating any passes back to the French keeper. Furthermore the distance between Aguero and Alderweireld was small enough to ensure he could prevent any passes to the Belgian by threatening with aggressive backwards pressing.

When one of Spurs’ side backs received the ball City’s ball-near wide man would sprint out towards them again using their cover shadows to prevent easy passes into midfield. The timing of these runs were crucial, if made too late they would be easily sidestepped and their efforts would be wasted. However, by timing these runs in line with the pass being played they could reach the Dier or Wimmer almost immediately after they received the ball and their proximity gave them the ability to cover a wider distance.

City’s ball-near midfielder would cover any dropping movements with a man-oriented coverage and their close proximity was often enough to prevent passes into the likes of Dembele with the threat of immediate tackles or even interceptions. If Spurs passed from side back to wing-back, City’s ball-near full-back would rush forward to engage them and often ensured that the advantages built up through the last few actions were not lost. With Rose or Walker receiving passes on the touchline from players only metres behind them, they at times received the ball facing their own goal, and City’s full-backs aimed to prevent them turning.

These pressing movements were supported by effective layering in deeper positions. The ball-near central midfielder (De Bruyne or Silva) would move slightly deeper and assist Toure in covering the space in front of the defence. At times the Ivorian was required to drop into the defensive line to cover for advancing full-backs.

The away side experienced large difficulty in coping with this pressure and their build-up was severely disrupted leading to low stability in the game and several turnovers inside their half thus giving Guardiola’s side numerous opportunities in transitional attacks. However the home side squandered several of these opportunities blighted at times by indecision, poor decision making and at times inaccurate finishing.

City’s diagonal attacks

One key feature of City’s attacking game was diagonal entries into attacking areas and moving to attack Spurs’ backline directly from there. At times this was done through vertical passes into one of the forwards who would then turn their opponent and dribble diagonally towards Spurs’ backline. On other occasions City were able to set up these attacks after beating Spurs’ pressing with diagonal passes into one of the forwards.

Sane and Sterling in particular at times used intelligent double movements to get free in the half spaces. On other occasions the distances between them and their direct Spurs opponents (Dier and Wimmer) meant they had small time frames to receive the ball free from pressure. They could then use the Spurs defenders’ pressing momentum against them to turn.

The key to these attacks were effective balancing movements from the likes of Aguero and De Bruyne. By moving from the centre or half space to the flank they could open space for the ball carrier to dribble diagonally into the centre. Alternately their runs into depth could offer through ball options if Spurs did not track their movement.

In line with this City’s ball-far winger, Aguero and at times De Bruyne would offer runs in behind either giving the ball carrier more time to take the ball forward or giving options to break through Spurs’ last line of defence.

Spurs switch to back 4

Pochettino’s side had issues in trying to retain offensive presence for counter attacks and higher pressing whilst covering the half spaces in front of their defence. At times when transitioning from higher pressing in their base 5-2-1-2 shape to defending in their own half they struggled to defend the large spaces to either side of the midfield pair.

After around 20 minutes of the first half Pochettino switched to a 4-3-1-2, the individual positioning was still shuffled as Eriksen started as a number 10 before moving to the right of the midfield 3 and Dembele moving behind Alli and Eriksen. The intention behind the switch was not clear, however Spurs began to establish more stability in their game.

Through Alli or at times the full-backs the London outfit won a number of set-pieces through counter attacks which they indirectly used to maintain possession within City’s half. This allowed them to use their presence in central areas to combine, narrowing City’s defensive shape and creating space for Rose and Walker on the flanks in the process.

They were still largely unable to progress cleanly when attempting to build from deep in their own half and City’s pressing still forced turnovers, however Spurs now faced these situations less regularly than in the opening exchanges.

Pochettino modifies player roles

After the interval Son came on in place of Wimmer as Spurs moved to a 4-2-3-1 that acted in a 4-2-2-2 shape against the ball. With this formative change came an adaptation of the player roles. Son acted as a last line roamer who gave depth with diagonal runs from the wings. This meant Alli could join Eriksen in giving the away side a strong presence behind City’s midfield line to improve their capacity to develop attacks through the centre.

The half continued in a similar manner to the end of the first as Spurs continued to play direct balls to gain territory. Additionally the substitution of Son gave them a better ability to attack the space behind City’s defence. By positioning themselves effectively for 2nd balls Tottenham could either start attacks in City’s half or create opportunities to press City deep into their half if the long balls were inaccurate.

Whilst Eriksen and Dembele seemed to have swapped in this scene, it was a good example of the new structure.

Whilst Spurs were gradually gaining a foothold in the game City were now increasingly able to create dangerous opportunities on the counter attack. Two of these situations led to City’s goals and a number of other wasted opportunities. Part of the issue for the London side was that their direct nature meant the midfielders were not given enough time to get into adequate positions to defend transitions. Wanyama and Dembele were at times tasked with defending the counters in midfield whilst the front four attacked. This was predictably insufficient to protect the width of both half spaces and was thus a part of Spurs’ inability to control these situations.

The flow of the game had changed and City’s two goal lead served to enhance this. Tottenham benefitted from their increased offensive presence to create dynamic combinations whilst creating space in wider areas for the full-backs. The adapted player roles had an effect in both of the away side’s goals with Eriksen and Alli connecting attacks in advanced areas before a direct involvement in the goals.

Guardiola’s side were still able to create some dangerous situations partly through the away team’s inability to control the half spaces in front of their defence. In their 4-2-2-2 shape the 2 wide players did not prioritise defending the space on their inside strongly enough and the likes of De Bruyne and Silva were able to receive in these gaps besides Tottenham’s midfield pair.

Conclusion

Guardiola’s men put in a vastly improved performance and were able to dominate one of the league’s strongest outfits with their aggressive pressing. Unfortunately their luck in front of goal was not much better and they squandered several opportunities which was behind their inability to close out the victory. Pochettino will be pleased with his side’s reaction to come from behind and the way he adapted the roles of his attackers increased their attacking threat immensely.

Klopp’s Liverpool hosted high-flying Tottenham on Saturday evening still looking for their first league win of 2017, with a poor run of form that saw them drop from 2nd to 6th, albeit temporarily. Pochettino’s men however were unbeaten in their last 9 league games, winning 7 and earning the title of Chelsea’s main “challengers”. The clash between both sides’ high intensity approach was an element that added further intrigue to a tie which already had the league’s attention.

Liverpool shut down Spurs’ build-up

Both sides are renowned in the league for their high pressing, counterpressing and generally intense defending, thus it was no surprise that these were a major part of the game. Liverpool’s ability to prevent Spurs building attacks from deep effectively stood out and had a large effect on the flow of the game. One major factor was Liverpool’s typically strong ball-orientation which allowed them to prevent easy progressions on the ball side. Furthermore it invited difficult, long distance passes to the seemingly open side, where the time taken for the ball to land allowed Liverpool to create pressure in the surrounding area.

When Spurs tried to build-up from Lloris, Liverpool often left Spurs’ centre backs free to receive the first pass before they started pressing. By doing so Liverpool could tempt Tottenham into passing out and thus attempt to force turnovers in their half leading to more dangerous transitional attacks. When Dier or Alderweireld received the ball they would be pressed diagonally by Liverpool’s ball-near winger, with this pressing angle designed to block the pass into the nearby full-back.

Firmino would drop deeper slightly to block the passing lane into Spurs’ nearby midfielder. Whilst he was not always directly blocking the route into the centre, his positioning allowed him to threaten these passes with interceptions or aggressive backwards pressing. Due to the large distance between the Tottenham centre backs in these situations, Firmino was not concerned with blocking switches between the pair.

Liverpool’s ball-far winger would move centrally to block diagonal routes into midfield but was also constantly aware of switches to the nearby centre back, and the long distance the ball would have to travel encouraged them to press these passes aggressively. In midfield the ball-near 8 was initially responsible for pushing forward to mark Spurs’ closest midfielder whilst the ball-far 8 would assist Henderson control the 10 space, whilst retaining access to Spurs’ ball-far holding midfielder.

Full red arrows indicate actual movements, whilst the more transparent arrows are movements they often made out of the shape.

When the London side made switches in deep build-up the winger on the ball’s new side would approach Dier or Alderweirled with a different body position, aiming to block the central pass instead. This gave the midfield players more time to shift across, and the nearest 8 would move wide to press the full-back if the ball was successfully forced out wide.

For much of the first half, Pochettino’s men were unable to build-up effectively against this pressing. Liverpool’s ball-near mechanisms and intensity blocked easy routes forwards on the near side, and their positioning allowed them to press long switches intensely.

On the occasions that Spurs were able to pass into Wanyama or Dembele in build-up, the pressing from Lallana or Wijnaldum respectively prevented them from turning out, forcing return passes to the centre backs in the process. The pressing Liverpool midfielder would use this momentum to press the receiving centre back whilst covering the midfielder behind them. This combination of increasing pressure and restricting passing options was often enough to force the ball long or back to Lloris.

By unsettling the away side’s build-up, Liverpool were able to set-up advantageous opportunities to counter against a team still transitioning from their shape with the ball to close spaces without it.

Liverpool’s counter attacks

Both goals, and several other chances came from Liverpool’s threat in counter attacking situations and there were a number of aspects behind their efficacy in transition.

One interesting feature was how they recovered the ball to set up these transitional attacks. Through players such as Firmino working back from higher pressing, or at times the likes of Mane pressing aggressively towards the centre from wide; Klopp’s men were able to benefit from the advantages of blind side pressing. By approaching opponents from the blind side, they could nick the ball away from unaware opponents. This was clearly a result of trained instincts to collapse on the ball in central areas, allowing players to press in a multi-directional manner.

Perhaps the key factor of these counter attacks was diagonal runs from the likes of Firmino and Mane. Firstly these runs offered the ball carrier the chance to split the opposing defence with through balls. Furthermore, the diagonal movements from Liverpool’s forwards moved Spurs’ backline into narrow positions to cover, allowing more space for counters from wider areas through the likes of Clyne. These movements also acted as space openers, creating more room for the ball carrier to dribble by tying Spurs defenders back into deep positions.

Through their runners in either half space, Liverpool often had the ability to switch the direction of their attack. This was crucial in giving them a level of unpredictability and allowing them to access the far side quickly. This was particularly useful in allowing the likes of Clyne and Mane to use their superior speed against Davies to enter the box and create dangerous situations. The London side often lacked directional access in their counterpressing, meaning that they could put pressure on the ball, but couldn’t prevent Liverpool from exiting the surrounding area and countering through the far side.

Scrappy 2nd Half

The 2nd half was a largely low quality encounter with very little flow to the game due to a number of issues on both sides’ part.

In the early part of the 2nd half, Liverpool were able to sustain periods of possession in Tottenham’s half, allowing them to wind down the clock with little danger posed to their lead. One factor behind this was their pressing, although Pochettino had moved to a 4-3-1-2 earlier in the first half it failed to have the desired effect in build-up. The Argentine’s plan may have been to have a wider base in midfield, occupying Liverpool’s wingers, and thus creating more space for the full-backs to build. Or to engage both Liverpool’s 8s in a higher press, opening passing routes to the likes of Kane and Alli in the process.

However Liverpool were able to deal with Spurs’ wider midfield by adjusting the positioning of the ball-far winger. They would now play even narrower than previously give immediate access in the event of Spurs’ playing diagonally to Eriksen or Dembele/Wanyama. However they were still able to combine this with sprinting forwards to press any switches between the Tottenham centre backs.

The home side themselves rarely attempted to build attacks from deep, perhaps wary of Tottenham’s pressing, instead focusing on a direct approach and positioning themselves for 2nd balls and counterpressing. Wijnaldum and Lallana were key to this, starting in narrow positions near the ball they were also positioned fairly deep, allowing them to run onto loose balls or use their forward momentum for counterpressing.

With both sides unable or unwilling to build attacks cleanly through the pressure of their opponents there were numerous sideline battles in the 2nd half. Under intense pressure, long balls to the flanks were often the go-to option since they initially represented the areas of greatest respite from the opponents. However, players on both sides struggled to combine their pressing in wide areas, with an adequate awareness of their team-mates’ positioning and viable exit routes. Thus, both sides were often forced into aimless long balls when regaining the ball in these situations.

Alternately these sideline battles led to a number of set-pieces caused either by the proximity of the touchline or over-zealous challenges in an attempt to prevent the opponent escaping and accessing the underloaded flank.

Conclusion

Klopp’s side finally secured their first league win of the new year and the convincing manner of the victory will have the Anfield faithful hoping of a return to their form of the first half of the season. The impact of Mane’s presence was visible, as was their continued ability to dominate clashes against fellow top-6 rivals. With only league games left in the season, and the return of Mane Liverpool look primed for a strong finish to the season. Although it appears too late for a title challenge, it will give them a strong chance of a top four finish.

Defeat for Pochettino’s men leaves them in danger of losing 2nd spot, and only 2 points above 6th spot. The North Londoners are embroiled in a 5-way battle for the 3 remaining top four positions and the Europa League may take on increased significance as a back-up route to next season’s Champions League.

Mourinho’s United and Puel’s Southampton met at Wembley for the EFL Cup final on Sunday evening. Cup victory would be significant for either side, it would offer Europa League qualification for Southampton and a chance for Mourinho to be the first United manager to win a trophy in their first season.

Southampton’s 4-4-2-0 forces United long

In the early stages of the game, Southampton’s approach against the ball was key in setting the flow of the game. Without the ball, they would drop into a 4-4-2-0 shape, with no press on United’s backline. The two forwards, Gabbiadini and Tadic, were focused on blocking United’s midfield pair. This manifested in using cover shadows to block passes if United’s midfielders were positioned behind them, or moving slightly out of position to mark or press if Pogba and Herrera dropped into deeper positions.

The intended effect was clear, Puel aimed to make United reliant on longer passes and/or dribbles from Smalling and Bailly. With neither of them possessing strong distribution skills or being particularly comfortable on the ball; succeeding in this would de-stabilise United’s build-up and generally reduce the threat.

Alternately, the defensive scheme would cause Pogba and Herrera to drop deeper and thus have generally weaker connections to the likes of Mata and Lingard. This would also force more direct passes, giving Southampton more time to create access and generally make United’s play more predictable.

In reaction, Herrera and Pogba began dropping deeper and wider in the half spaces. This positioning would either give them the necessary separation from Southampton’s forwards to enjoy time on the ball. Or it would create large gaps in the centre of the field if Gabbiadini and Tadic moved out of position to mark them. This ended up giving the United midfielders more time on the ball, with Southampton’s forwards wary of totally vacating the centre.

At times this wide positioning from United’s double pivot opened space in the centre between Gabbiadini and Tadic, with the ball-near forward moving out to press United’s ball-carrying midfielder. In these situations, United often used Mata or Lingard to drop into this space to receive from the centre backs. However, they would often be pressed immediately by Davis to prevent them turning out, forcing them to return the ball to the centre-backs. This could have created routes to advance beyond Southampton’s midfield, however United’s advanced players often failed to re-adjust quickly enough to move into the space in Southampton’s structure.

Despite greater time on the ball for the midfielders, United’s build-up was still largely ineffective. Their deeper positions now meant larger distances to players like Lingard and Mata, and they were unable to access these players to advance the game. Combined with the position-oriented covering from the Saints midfield, this caused United to play longer passes, either to Ibrahimovic in the centre or out to the wings.

This inability to consistently progress against their opponents’ midfield press contributed to an uncertain start from Mourinho’s side.

United’s man-orientations lead to weak compactness

After going a goal ahead, United stopped pressing the Southampton backline, falling back into deeper positions earlier as they sought to protect their 1 goal advantage. However, Mourinho’s men had large issues in controlling important spaces whilst defending.

Southampton were frequently able to access the 10 space due to weak covering from United’s midfield. The biggest underlying cause behind this poor compactness was the individual approach to defending United employed. Man-orientations are quite common in high pressing phases, where teams seek quick and constant access to the opponents’ build-up. However, when teams defend in their own half, the level of man-orientations generally reduce as the effect of being closer to one’s own goal dictates that priority should be given to defending important central spaces.

However even when defending in their own half, United seemed unwilling to lay their individual man-marking assignments aside to generate greater compactness and protect the centre of the pitch. Mata and Martial were often too occupied with maintaining close distances to Bertrand and Cedric respectively to support Herrera and Pogba in controlling central areas. United thus displayed weak control of the half spaces, with the midfield pair given too much space to cover.

Furthermore United’s ball-far central midfielder was often occupied with marking their opponent to shift across and cover their midfield partner. This meant the ball-near midfielder at times had to push forwards to press the ball carrier, with little support to help protect the space behind them. This was confounded by a general lack of group-tactical intensity in these defending phases, meaning the likes of Romeu had plenty of time to play passes into Redmond or Tadic.

Southampton exploit United’s uncompact shape

Alongside the alarmingly poor compactness from their opponents, Southampton displayed a number of interesting features that allowed them to take advantage of the space on offer. In situations where the receiver would face backwards pressing by Pogba or Herrera; they displayed strong individual receiving patterns to increase the available space. By dropping a shoulder towards the ball, before letting it run across them, the likes of Tadic and Redmond could create more space ahead of them to run into.

Often, when players receive passes in the 10 space they are pressed by the opponents’ centre backs who aim to force them back by preventing turns. However this rarely happened to Southampton’s attacking midfielders, and this owed to the movement of Gabbiadini. By threatening to run in behind in these situations the Italian could take United’s centre backs into deeper positions. This meant Smalling and Bailly would be moving away as the likes of Redmond received the ball behind United’s midfield, which made it simpler for the receiver to dribble forwards with the ball.

When Southampton received these passes they appeared to have a clear plan for how to advance the attack. As part of United’s man-oriented defensive strategy, Southampton’s wide players were quite closely followed. This was particularly obvious with Rojo often following Ward-Prowse deep into midfield areas!

The recipient of these passes to the 10 space would often dribble towards United’s backline with the intention of drawing United’s full-back into a more central position. This allowed them to free the wide player to the byline for a cross. Southampton’s cross selection also appeared to be quite prepared, with low crosses favoured to target Gabbiadini’s near post darting movements.

All these aspects were clearly visible in Southampton’s opening goal, but the warning signs were there for United on several occasions beforehand.

2nd half

The 2nd half was characterised by an odd flow with neither side able to establish a consistent rhythm with the ball.

United improve against 4-4-2-0

Mourinho’s side showed some improvements in their ability to access advanced midfield areas against Southampton’s 4-4-2-0, this was due to a number of factors. Their most consistent route of progression in the first half was through the use of Rojo as a diagonal full-back.

The Argentinian defender would often stay deep in early build-up, often in line with the centre-backs, which forced a longer pressing run from Ward-Prowse for access. If the Englishman blocked the diagonal passes inside effectively, Rojo would dribble infield against Ward-Prowse’s movement. More frequently however, he used this time on the ball to make diagonal passes infield. The movement of Martial to get free in these situations was crucial, by moving deeper and towards the centre he could create separation, with Cedric reluctant to follow him that far out of position. This continued to be a big factor in United’s build-up in the 2nd half.

They were also able to progress through the centre. Carrick’s presence in deeper positions freed Herrera and Pogba to play more suitable roles in advanced positions. This contributed to United overloading Southampton’s midfield with the support of Lingard. With this overload, United could create a free man in the centre to break through Southampton’s midfield structure.

However, the Old Trafford outfit were unable to create dangerous situations consistently from here. Their offensive presence suffered a bit from the focus on overloading midfield. Zlatan, Martial and Valencia were often the furthest forward, but played too far apart to have interact with one another since Martial and Valencia focused on giving width.

Southampton inconsistent against man-marking

Southampton’s second half was characterised by their inconsistent actions against United’s man-marking. For much of the game, Southampton reacted to the man-oriented coverage with a possession game focused on dynamic combinations, one-twos and 3rd man runs. To facilitate this, they had a highly variable positional structure. The dynamic positioning allowed Southampton’s midfielders to create small time frames with no pressure to receive the ball, before laying it off and bypassing the pressure that their marker would eventually create.

The starting line-ups

In the second half, Southampton continued with this approach. They were, however, unable to consistently break through with these combinations. On a number of occasions they were able to open the centre well with intelligent movements, but lacked the follow-up movements to support the receiver and take advantage of the space on offer. This left receivers such as Ward-Prowse isolated against their direct opponents with their back to goal.

On other occasions however, they were able to release 3rd man runners through the wings or half spaces in a similar manner to the first half. These situations led to their most dangerous moments in the 2nd half.

Conclusion

Michael Caley’s expected goals model indicated Southampton’s superior chance quality with an expected goals figure of 1.3 to United’s 0.9 which supports the feeling of hard luck amongst Southampton players and fans alike. This figure doesn’t to be vastly different, but doesn’t include Gabbiadini’s wrongly disallowed goal. They can however be encouraged by their performance, in particular their flexible structuring and offensive gameplan.

This victory represents Mourinho’s 4th EFL Cup triumph, a trophy he sees as vital in establishing a winning culture within his teams. His side are still chasing victory in the FA Cup and Europa League as well as aiming for a top 4 finish, however they will need to display stronger performances if they are to achieve these aims. The recent fixture pile-up can be partially attributed to the weak performance. However the flaws in the defensive coverage were part of a strange defensive strategy from Mourinho, and they lacked a strong offensive rhythm to consistently create chances.

Following a prolonged period of mediocre form, including a defeat to Leicester City on Monday night, Klopp’s Liverpool returned to Anfield to face an Arsenal side who have been on an equally poor run, losing their last three Premier League games. Arsenal were one point ahead of Liverpool with a game in hand going into this match, meaning a win was crucial for Klopp’s side to keep their top 4 hopes alive. Bewilderment was created amongst the Arsenal faithful pre-match due to Wenger’s decision to drop Alexis Sánchez, with Olivier Giroud starting in his place. The hosts were still without captain Jordan Henderson and Dejan Lovren due to injury, whilst Ragnar Klavan replaced Lucas at centre back.

Liverpool’s commanding first half

Despite the heading, Arsenal started the game in a decisive manner that demonstrated signs of the direct, counter-attacking style of play Wenger intended to play. Immediately after Liverpool kicking-off, Arsenal fell into a deep 4-1-4-1 block that was horizontally and vertically compact, with barely 5 metres between the defensive and midfield lines. This limited space centrally for Liverpool, forcing their build-up wide, where Arsenal’s zonal block shifted horizontally in orientation to the ball. Arsenal were able to regain possession initially, such as in the third minute, where Liverpool attempted to access limited gaps in their compact central structure. This led to Arsenal outnumbering Liverpool on the counter, with Wijnaldum and Lallana being caught up-field in defensive transition after roaming through Arsenal’s defensive structure. When in possession in the final third, Arsenal predominantly found space in the wide channels due to Liverpool’s fairly narrow structure. On two separate occasions when Xhaka had the ball in the centre, Oxlade-Chamberlain and Monreal entered the space outside and behind Liverpool’s full backs, though the attempted passes from Xhaka were uncompleted.

So there were signs that Wenger’s approach may reap rewards, however that all changed after the 7^th minute following Firmino’s opening goal. From this point, the home side dominated the remainder of the first half.

Koscielny’s missed header and orientation towards the flight of Mignolet’s goal kick, dragging him forwards and out of position, left a 3 v 3 situation for Liverpool. This forced Monreal to move centrally to fill the void left by Koscielny, leaving Mane open on the right wing to play the cross to Firmino, who also found himself open on the other side of the box due to Arsenal’s defenders being occupied by Lallana and Coutinho in the centre

It was a similar story in the build-up to Liverpool’s second. Lallana’s central diagnoal run manipulated Monreal as part of Arsenal’s compact arrangement, forcing him to follow and occupy Lallana in a central position, leaving Mane wide open on the right-hand side of the penalty area to double the home side’s lead.

Wijnaldum’s off ball movement through Iwobi’s blindside and Lallana’s occupation of Monreal were key elements of the build-up to Liverpool’s second goal

Arsenal couldn’t deal with Liverpool’s intensity in all four phases of the game. When the home side were in deep build-up play, Arsenal would attempt to press Liverpool by either Xhaka or Iwobi stepping out of their deep 4-5-1 structure to help Giroud put pressure on Liverpool’s first line of play. However, Emre Can frequently dropped to create a three-man back line with Matip and Klavan, meaning that Liverpool repeatedly  bypassed this pressure by circulating the ball through their numerical superiority in these situations of 3 v 2. Arsenal struggled to win the ball high up the pitch all match.

Despite Xhaka and Iwobi’s pressing movements, Liverpool outnumbered Arsenal in deep build-up

This momentary 4-4-2 created by Xhaka and Iwobi’s forward pressing movements left central gaps and passing lanes between Arsenal’s midfielders, stretching Arsenal vertically and horizontally. This allowed Liverpool’s midfielders, especially Lallana and Coutinho to access dangerous spaces between the lines of Arsenal’s midfield and defence.

Arsenal’s pressing structure allowed Liverpool’s midfielders to access key central areas. Lallana’s occupation of Coquelin in this scenario is key in releasing space for Coutinho.

Liverpool’s defensive structure and pressing was considerably more effective than the away side. They adopted a fluid defensive structure on the occasions that Arsenal had the ball inside their half that varied between a compact 4-5-1, 4-3-3 and 4-2-3-1, which limited Arsenal’s options to progress through the centre significantly. The fluid nature of the hosts’ pressing shape allowed players such as Lallana to step out of the midfield line and press Arsenal’s central midfielders, whilst the other Liverpool midfielders would fill in behind and remain compact to leave Arsenal no central passing options to progress possession. The timing of these pressing actions by Lallana in particular was exceptional. He started his pressing movements at exactly the right moment, whether that was in anticipation of a loose first touch or if an Arsenal player had his back turned to him, and he could close them down through their cover shadow. Francis Coquelin was particularly vulnerable under these circumstances, who showed poor anticipation, intelligence and technical ability to evade the pressing intensity. This occasionally led to Liverpool regaining possession in areas that presented opportunities to run at Arsenal’s defence and develop promising counter attacks, but they failed to extend their lead further by wasting these situations. This was predominantly through poor final pass choices and off ball movements that weren’t complementary in relation to one another and the ball carrier.

Arsenal were reluctant to play out from the back the whole match. Čech heaved goal kicks forward into the midfield time and time again, where Liverpool were increasingly able to win possession due to their effective structure surrounding the ball, giving them good access. This allowed them to win an abundance more loose balls than Arsenal. After claiming possession, the forward momentum of Liverpool’s midfield runners compared to Arsenal’s retreating midfielders allowed them to access the space behind their midfield between the lines. This was because of their superior running dynamic compared to Arsenal’s players who had to turn and face their own goal before running. Therefore the red shirts were already beyond them by the time they turned. This was a common occurrence due to the visitor’s recurring directness from goal kicks.

Furthermore, the horizontal compactness that served Arsenal well in the very early stages of the match evolved to become a vulnerability. Their structure became relatively central and lost it’s ball orientation, meaning their positioning was immobile and passive. This left the wide channels easily accessible for Liverpool, and they were able to progress possession via these areas with relative ease. The development of this space on the wing was also aided by Liverpool players making diagonal runs off the ball.This was especially the case down the left flank, where Coutinho, Lallana, and Wijnaldum’s movement in particular dragged Arsenal defenders away from the flank, giving Milner time and space.

Arsenal’s half time refresh

Wenger’s approach in the first half had evidently backfired, which led to Alexis Sánchez being subbed on for Francis Coquelin at half time. This saw Arsenal move to their more familiar 4-2-3-1 base. Oxlade-Chamberlain formed a double pivot with Xhaka, whilst Sanchez was positioned on the left wing due to Giroud’s presence up front.

Arsenal began to find more space in and around Liverpool’s midfield, and enjoyed a greater percentage of possession compared to their hosts following the break, contrary to the first half. They primarily found space on the left wing. Mane’s half-space and central orientation when Liverpool had possession meant he was often too far away from Sanchez and Monreal once Arsenal won the ball back, and he was consequently unable to cover their runs down the wing. Additionally, Liverpool’s central midfielders were sometimes over-active, meaning they drifted out of a stable defensive position at times, and Arsenal used their ball circulation from right to left in particular to exploit this.

Sanchez was repeatedly able to find space on the left wing and half-space following his introduction at half time

This shifting from right to left resulted in two quality chances for Arsenal. One in the 47th minute where Monreal had space on the wing to deliver a cross to Giroud, whose header produced an excellent Mignolet save. The other was in the 56th minute, which resulted in Welbeck’s goal. Mane was caught too far forward, which left Sanchez unmarked with space to advance and to deliver a defence splitting pass through to Welbeck.

Nevertheless, despite the improvements they showed after the interval, these were the only clear cut chances Arsenal generated all match. Liverpool often found little space in the centre to combine and penetrate into The Gunners’ penalty area, but they were largely able to retain control of proceedings following Arsenal’s goal. Despite some late pressure, a wonderful Liverpool counter attack in the 91st minute ended with Wijnaldum scoring a third to secure all three points for Klopp’s side, temporarily moving them up to 3rd in the league table.

Conclusion

The result of this match didn’t come as a surprise. Liverpool extended their exceptional record against the Premier League’s top 6 this season, whilst Arsenal on the whole looked disorganised and lost, especially in the first half. This has been an increasingly common occurrence in recent times under Arsène Wenger. Klopp’s side were much more dynamic and intense than Arsenal, whose set-up to be direct and counter attack actually left them vulnerable to Liverpool in defensive transition. The decision by Wenger to leave Arsenal’s best player, Alexis Sánchez, on the bench remains a puzzling one. Although subsequently after the match, rumours of a training ground bust-up involving Sánchez arose. Wenger denied these speculation, but the Chilean’s future in North London is becoming increasingly uncertain.

Arsenal are in unfamiliar territory. They are in a period of poor form, where tactical, technical and mental issues hang over the club. They continue to drop points compared to their rivals, and it’s looking increasingly likely that they will finish outside of the top four come the end of the season. The dominant view is that Wenger needs to leave the club in order to fix their issues, but whether that will happen in the near future or not remains to be seen.

Inconsequential—this it the word that characterises both Manchester sides appropriately when they met last Thursday. The Battle of Manchester saw both committing to their respective roles but lacking some tweaks and turns in order to win the match.

Formations

Pep Guardiola decided to field Manchester City in a 4-2-3-1/4-1-4-1 hybrid, with Yaya Touré as the central midfielder who constantly switched between a no. 6 and no. 8 role, while Fernandinho stuck to the holding position. On paper, Kevin De Bruyne was City’s attacking midfielder in the middle, but the Belgium standout was moving to the left and right over and over again throughout the 90 minutes. Meanwhile Leroy Sané stayed on the left and Raheem Sterling was mostly seen on the right side, although he occasionally left his position when centre-forward Sergio Agüero was moving wide.

Manchester United started in what looked like 4-3-3 with a tendency to turn into a diamond formation, as Henrikh Mkhitaryan was, at first, fielded in the middle of the park and dropped behind Marcus Rashford and Anthony Martial. Later, Mkhitaryan and Rashford swapped positions, and United started employing a 4-3-3/4-1-4-1 shape and continued to do so for the rest of the first half.

Elusive dominance

As expected, City saw far more of the ball than their opponents. The number fluctuated between 65 and 70 percent for most of the time. And speaking of numbers, when the final whistle blew the Citizens had 19 shots with 6 on target, while United only had a single shot that threatened Claudio Bravo. These stats alone could tell the story of a one-sided encounter between both Manchester sides. That said, it was more complicated than that.

In the first phase of the match, City started out using Fernandinho close to the back four when building up. The Brazilian midfielder often roamed in front of United’s first block and supported the initial ball circulation. Interestingly, both City full-backs were hesitant to move up the pitch early on, while Touré made runs right into the De Bruyne zone, which created a situational 5-0-4-1. Naturally, Fernandinho and his colleagues had a hard time playing the ball behind United’s highest pressing line, without fearing to cause interceptions.

Early on, United sometimes even decided to pressure City, with Ander Herrera moving up and making runs towards Fernandinho. The decision to do that was likely made because of City’s inability to bypass the first block via ground passes through the middle. United saw a chance to push their opponents back and completely neutralise the hosts’ ball circulation. All in all, City certainly dominated the match when you purely look at the ball possession percentages, but, in fact, their attempts to break through United’s lines were not as effective as in other phases of the game.

That also had to do with the positioning of De Bruyne and Agüero and the lack of overloading movements in several situations. Especially, when City could not advance through the middle, De Bruyne was isolated in the no. 10 space, while both wingers were waiting on the outside lanes not intending to drift to the inside in order to disrupt United’s fairly customary defensive scheme. Moreover, as Agüero tended to move to the right frequently and Touré dropped deep increasingly, both left De Bruyne alone in the centre.

City’s attacks were more threatening to United, when De Bruyne or Agüero moved towards one of the sidelines during the second phase of the build-up play, so that the respective winger on that side would drift inwards. City’s full-back now could play a short pass to De Bruyne or Agüero who then was able to forward the ball through a diagonal passing lane immediately. City would move the ball around United’s midfield line and get in between the lines while transforming the own shape to disrupt the opposing man-orientated defence.

If City did not try this play, the lack of overlapping runs from the full-backs led to several long balls out of the full-back zones without any considerable success. The picture slightly changed as the first half went on. Agüero, in particular, improved in terms of being in the right position to receive passes. The Argentinian looked effective when he waited in the ball-far right half-space outside of Marouane Fellaini’s visual field, when City’s initial build-up balance shifted to the left.

Distinctive passiveness

Meanwhile, United started becoming more and more passive defensively after the early phase of the game. While the Red Devils tried to pressure City initially, after Mkhitaryan and Rashford swapped positions and United played in a defensive shape with only one player up front and a line of four behind him, City did not have to be concerned about a possible loss of ball possession in the own half of the pitch.

Even in the first few minutes, Rashford and Mkhitaryan occasionally swapped positions, though in that case to create a high three-man block in the middle, involving Fellaini as the third man, in order to guide City’s build-up play to the wings. Later, however, José Mourinho’s side allowed City runs through the middle when United’s defensive shape was less compact. But as the lines moved back and compressed the space in between them and with the lack of presence in the centre shown by City, the hosts only could advance through the wings.

On the other side of the pitch, City’s midfield line was also fairly passive when defending the rare United attacks. But the line stayed more compact horizontally than United’s, which closed the gaps between the plays and did not allow United to move through the half-space. Instead, City gave up space in ball-far zones in which Rashford or Mkhitaryan drifted on occasions.

Guardiola’s team just saw more danger in exposing space in the centre of their formation which could have helped the United side to set up quick combination plays. Sacrificing ball-far zones which were attacked once United moved the ball there seemed like a wise strategy to keep a narrow defensive shape, which is also a key part of Guardiola’s concept to overload ball-near areas, increasing pressing pressure and the effectiveness of transition attacks.

Second half

Following the interval, it became clear that Mourinho was now determined to ‘park the bus’, as both Mkhitaryan and Martial were positioned very deep in the second and third phase of defending. United’s shape was, in fact, a 6-3-1 with occasional advancing runs from one of the central midfielders to pressure Touré or Fernandinho.

But, in general, the passiveness of United’s defence was counterproductive to their plan of hitting City on the break, as the distance between the core of the formation and the goal after winning the ball grew to an extent where it seemed unlikely that United would get through City’s counter-pressing and initiate combination plays to reach the opposing box.

In addition, because Touré and City’s centre-backs were allowed to advance and penetrate United’s formation, City could hold up the pressure. On the other hand, the effective pitch became smaller and City’s ball circulation was deep in the opposing half which, of course, reduced the space City could make use of. While the Citizens’ shape was sometimes stretched too much in the first 45 minutes, the opposite was the case after the break—to the detriment of their attacking efforts.

Approaching the end of the game, United started applying man-orientated runs towards the opposing central midfielders. City’s centre-backs, however, remained unmarked and did not feel pressure, while the passing lanes between them and the full-backs were not threatened. Nevertheless, United showed the intention to close down the middle more effectively. This changed when Fellaini was sent off in the 84th minute. Afterwards, United just tried to secure one point which worked out for them.

Conclusion

Until the 80th minute, both coaches did not make changes personnel-wise to expose a particular weakness of the opponent. Instead, both sides followed their initial plans and only adjusted their systems a bit here and there, while not pushing things to the extreme. Seemingly, City feared United’s threat in terms of counter-attacks, and United feared City’s ability to break through the lines. Granted, City had chances to win the match, but the surprising moments and the quick adjustments a Guardiola system usually needs—in addition to a dominant ball circulation—were lacking.

The first season in Manchester under Pep Guardiola has been a little inconsistent, although the clear signs of improvements are steadily visible. With the arrival of Guardiola a whole adaptation process started for the team, which was basically and most importantly the presentation and implementation of the Positional Play. Here TP in August has already previewed the issues City has had in the previous season, and the possible changes that Guardiola may bring to Manchester City.

Early stages of the season

They have started the season in 4-3-3 formation, with using the false full-back approach, which Guardiola has already used at Bayern with Lahm and Alaba.

This approach resulted in creating more and isolated 1v1 situations for Nolito and Sterling on the flanks, especially the latter could create huge advantages of that. In possession it formed a 2-3-5/-2-3-2-3 shape, with narrow full-backs in the halfspaces, and wide wingers at the flanks, although understandably their individual and collective movements and orientations was a bit far from the orthodox positional play requriements – zonal attack/responsibility. Nevertheless the 2 central-midfielders -mostly De Bruyne and Silva- were often able to create a decisional crisis in the opposing defense, as the defenders were not able to react and adapt to their positioning in between the lines –in the halfspaces-, therefore they could often offer an easy option in between the lines. Also, the 2 full-backs often moved into higher positions, which in one hand created and overload at the ball’s zone, created more options in depth, and kept –forced- the opponent’s second-line narrower, which opened up spaces next to the sidelines for the wingers. Although on the other hand it had a negative effect of leaving the players from City’s first-line without proper options as the spatial distribution wasn’t optimal to maintain the constant horizontal circulation in order to move the oppositional shape and open up spaces or passing lanes.

This movement created a 3-2-2-3 shape in possession, with the defensive midfielder dropping into the first line, in between the centre-backs, which on fact could often cause issues for the oppositional side and gave a structural flexibility in the middle third. Occasionally they have used a 2-3-5/2-3-2-3 with deeper and wider full-backs, but that was mostly used in the second half of the season.

Issues

In a lot of cases they couldn’t control the tempo of the game well both individually and collectively. Mostly the two centre-backs and the defensive-midfielder failed to perceive if the collective structure is optimal –every player is occupying their respected zones- and make a decision according to that, therefore they often accelerated the tempo, even when it wasn’t functional.

The two central-midfielder, whom basic positioning is in between the lines often dropped in front of the oppositional second-line, which in fact slowed down the progression through space, as the structural adaptation was missing – meaning there was no one who took their positions in between the lines.

When the ball reached a zone in between the lines, the progression from that wasn’t ideal. The receivers often just played a simple back pass, instead of turning towards the oppositional goal, even when they had the opportunity for that.

Serious issues in building from the back under pressure, which mainly came from the inability of perceiving and finding the free-man and know how to progress through that. In the first months the full-backs took a more central role under pressure and as the wingers often followed them to the inside, it opened up the direct passing lane towards the wingers and also as an oppositional central-midfielder often stepped out to close down the defensive-midfielder –Fernandinho-, the central-midfielders were in a 2v1 situation against the remainder central-midfielder. With opening up the direct access towards the wingers, they could gain more space in depth, however with having a higher emphasis on the flanks they could have been isolated easier. The same issue arose in the connections with the central-midfielders: the full-backs central positioning tightened the second-line and also left the centre-backs without a connection at the sidelines, resulting no access towards the central-midfielders from these build-up movements.

Tons of times when they were able to create a positional or situational superiority from their structure and movements, they couldn’t exploit these because of technical errors, coming from mostly orientation issues –not optimal body-posture, passing onto the wrong foot in many cases.

Whilst in possession, there were too much movements at the back –from the back 5 players-, as they didn’t stick to their positions, which resulted inviting the pressure –a basic positional play principle-, but lacked the structure to overcome it, which made them vulnerable against the press.

From a strategical point of view the weakness of these movements were that most often the full-backs became the free-man –instead of the central-midfielders for example-, and they weren’t able to progress from these situations in an effective manner.

A situation to summarize the early issues: as Fernandinho finds Iheanacho –who drops in the centre to provide a vertical option- he is left without any kind of support. The centre isn’t occupied to provide an option in between the first-second line of the oppositional shape, also De Bruyne’s positioning is an issue, as he moves towards the ball, not away from it to increase the potential space, plus even the Sterling-Nolito-Silva trio don’t try to manipulate the last line, therefore the CB may step out with Iheanacho without causing any danger.

In many cases when the centre-backs started to drive forward with the ball, the defensive-midfielder –Fernandinho- automatically moved back to take the teammate’s position, didn’t even try to stay and offer a short option or to manipulate the oppositional first line, with creating a decisional-crisis –until when to cover the defensive-midfielder and go out to press etc.

Vulnerability against pressure: at the moment when Stones passes the ball back, Otamendi should already be in position to help the progression, but not being there gives just enough time for the opponent to force out a long ball from Bravo –as he has no immediate option to advance. Also, the full-backs occupy a higher positioning, although with this positioning they weakened the offensive connections –especially with the centre-backs-, and were easier to be closed down from a defensive point of view.

Another issue was at the build-up phase –under pressure- that the centre-backs often occupied a too wide position, nearly hugging the sidelines, but with this they have decreased their own possible space and time on the ball, which led to significantly worse options. E.g. it forced the full-backs to a higher position, increasing the distances in between the player. This caused that the centre-backs – full-backs connection wasn’t ideal at the build-up phase, therefore even the defensive-midfielder(s) were not accessible for the centre-backs.

The 3-2 system at the back

In the first half of the season they often used a 3-2 positioning at the back –with 3 centre-backs and 2 defensive-midfielders. A possible advantage of using 2 defensive-midfielders is a better way of manipulating the oppositional second-line, and also this system looked a better fit for Gundogan –alongside Fernandinho-, because in this structure he was able to play facing the oppositional goal, whilst Silva and De Bruyne could stay in between the lines.

As Everton’s first-line is staying higher it’s much easier to manipulate the second-line, here Gundogan could immediately rotate to the ball-far halfspace to KDB, who is in positional superiority and is able to turn towards the oppositional goal. Also important to mention the occasional false-nine movement from the strikers –here Iheanacho-, as his dropping movement forces the centre of the oppositional second line to defend narrower in order to cover the centre, which opens up more space for KDB to receive and turn at the ball-far halfspace.

In the 3-2 the 2 defensive-midfielders took a higher position, occupying the space in between the oppositional first- and second line, therefore the 3 centre-backs had the responsibility of the circulation at the back. With this system they could open up space for the centre-backs to drive forward, although they have often been left without options, especially in a horizontal sense. If they couldn’t find a vertical option, then they didn’t have an ‘escape-route’ towards the flanks to maintain possession. Thus, diagonal balls towards the ball-far side got a bigger emphasis, with direct switches towards the ball-far wingers –including the ‘fake’ runs from the central-midfielders.

A possible advantage of this positioning is that with having 2 defensive-midfielders in between the first- and second line provides a better structure to manipulate the second line’s behavior. Especially Gundogan excelled at this, who purposefully moved towards the centre from the halfspaces to force the oppositional first line to cover him, thus opening up space for the centre-backs, plus even manipulates the oppositional central-midfielder to step higher towards him, which in fact opens up space in between the lines or creates an open man at the flanks.

Another important movement in this system was that when the 2 defensive-midfielder could face the oppositional goal with the ball then the side-backs –in the 3 defender system- took a wider position to give a horizontal option, plus to force the oppositional winger into a wider positioning.

Inviting the pressure and escaping from it against Liverpool at the last day of the year. Using wall passes at the back to invite the press, then finding the free-man –De Bruyne-, who is in positional superiority.

At this point the composure at the back got much better, players started to play from the respected zones and positions, passing onto the right foot with a more conscious purpose, so the receiving player was able to handle the pressure. With having 2 defensive-midfielders the free-man often became one of the central-midfielders in between the lines. The 3-2 functioned more effectively, when one of the defensive-midfielders took a wider position in order to pull an oppositional central-midfielder out, thus forcing the oppositional second line to adjust with a shift towards the ball’s zone more. This movement cleverly opened up space on the ball-far side. Although this shape still arose some problems: often the cooperation between the defensive-midfielders wasn’t effective, plus the movements to functionally manipulate the oppositional second line were missing. The centre-backs got occasionally isolated at the wider zones, because of the structural and connection issue, especially towards the flanks, as they didn’t have a safe escape route after driving forward. If the wing-backs/wingers wanted to provide a better connection they had to drop too deep, which prevented the collective task to advance the ball, also without having an immediate option at the flanks, they could have been closed down easier with simple tight marking –preventing them to turn towards the oppositional goal. If they occupied a higher position, then the centre-backs didn’t have the direct connection from the halfspaces or even if they had, the defensive side could adapt to it easily.

The occupation from the central-midfielders in between the lines –in the halfspaces basically- creates a decisional crisis in the defenders: if a winger decides to defend wider, it may create easier access to the central-midfielder with a clearer passing lane, if he defends narrower, then it opens up the direct passing lane towards the flanks for the winger, who has to adapt his positioning in depth constantly according to the oppositional winger’s positioning to help the progression of the ball. Also, the central-midfielder may make a vertical run to pull the whole defensive shape at the ball’s zone to a deeper positioning, which opens up space for the defensive-midfielders and the full-backs, as the oppositional shape is forced to defend deeper.

As I wrote before the issue of being isolated at the flanks often arose in the 3-2 structure. Here is an elegant solution against that, the key movement is from KDB to create space diagonally, where Yaya Touré is able to step up, avoiding the oppositional first line to press and isolate the possession at the sidelines.

A slight issue with this 3-2 positioning is that it doesn’t provide enough horizontal stretch to move the opponent in the middle third. It may open up central spaces in a better way, although the ball cannot be moved horizontally with such flexibility as in a 2-3 formation. Therefore Silva and KDB often drifted into a wider position to create a better horizontal connection.

Movements to create space at the wider areas

An important movement in their positional play is the usage of the ‘fake’ vertical run from Silva and KDB. They make their runs in between the oppositional full-back and centre-back, which on one hand gives a possible through ball option behind the last line, on the other hand it tightens the oppositional last line –forcing the full-back to cover him and be narrower-, which opens up more space on the wider areas for the wingers for a possible direct switch.

This movement occasionally was able to manipulate even 3 defender, which opened up space for the winger, to create a 1v1 with situational and dynamical superiority- also, as the side-backs -Stones- moved wider they were able to keep the oppositional winger in position to open up the direct channel towards the wingers -Sane.

In the evolution of City’s positional play throughout the season a key factor was the central-midfielders positioning: with their positioning in between the lines they were not only able to manipulate the oppositional second line, but the last line as well. They were trying to maintain an equal distance from both lines –defender- forcing them to a crisis, on whose task is to cover him. With the vertical runs or space increasing movements they were able to pull the second line with themselves, with creating just enough separation that the last line has to adjust to it as well – usually a centre-back shifted there to cover the run. As a result of this space opened up at other zones of the pitch, usually at the flanks for the wingers, but occasionally at the centre as well for the dropping centre-forward.

Using the N#9 to rotate

Analyzing City’s in possession strategy, we can all see the huge emphasis on getting the ball towards the central-midfielders in between the lines. As a result of this the opponents tried tons of different ways to neutralize this strategy, with more or less success. The common similarity in these approaches –man-marking Silva and KDB, narrower defending from the wingers etc.- was that it could still stretch the oppositional second line with opening central spaces and passing lanes towards the N9 position. It was mostly successful from the central 3 channels, especially when the centre-backs were the ball carrier. Because of the staggering at the back, the defensive-midfielder could often force the centre of the oppositional second line to step out, opening up the passing lane diagonally towards the forward. Besides the striker’s dropping movements were not always being closed down by a centre-back –as the wingers occupied a high positioning, they were immediately able to exploit the space with a diagonal run, if the centre-back decides to step out with the striker-, resulting the oppositional central-midfielder being doubled by the striker and the central-midfielder –decisional crisis.

In reaction to this defensive approach the central-midfielders often moved towards the outside areas with ‘fake’ move a  to manipulate the defender –like De Bruyne here-, to open up the direct passing lane through the central channel. This is a typical City action, at the end the goal is still to rotate towards Silva or De Bruyne into positional superiority, then trying to create a dynamical one with the wingers –who hug the touchline as long as they can, which offers them enough separation to create a dynamical superiority.

In the latter stages of the season they created another kind of advantage of this defensive approach, mainly with Fernandinho at the right-back position. He mostly stayed in the right halfspace and from here he was able to dictate the progression of the ball better, and as the oppositional winger and central-midfielder were trying to block the access to Silva and KDB, it increased the space and time on the ball for him. When having the ball diagonal spaces often opened up, as the oppositional central-midfielder was trying to close down the space in between the lines, therefore Fernandinho was able to cut inside diagonally many times –lot of long diagonal balls from here towards the ball-far side, using the central-midfielders’ ‘fake’ run to open up space for the wingers.

Outward movements from the central-midfielders

As I wrote earlier City had to adapt to the defensive approaches focusing on neutralizing the connection towards to the central-midfielders, therefore Silva and KDB occasionally moved towards the flanks from the halfspaces with a simple outward movement –this mainly happened, whilst the full-backs or the centre-backs were the ball carrier. This forced the oppositional central-midfielder to decide: if he moves out to follow him, then he risks opening up space in the halfspace for a vertical penetration, although if he doesn’t follow him, then the central-midfielder is able to receive and turn towards the oppositional goal.

In connection with this movement the wingers also had an important function, which relates strongly to screening in basketball: when perceiving the movement from the central-midfielder, they tried to increase the space for the teammate, and also to keep the oppositional full-back in position –mostly with vertical movements. When the central-midfielder made this movement they did even like to sign the block for the wingers with their hands to open up space for themselves.

When the wingers and -central-midfielder- saw that the oppositional central-midfielder is not following this movement, they tried to keep the full-back in position, although when the central-midfielder decided to follow it, they immediately tried to moved inwards to exploit the generated passing lane.

The 2-3 structure & rotation at the back

Using either structure at the back, the key is to have flexibility in order to be able to adapt to different game situations. Therefore the 2-3 may easily turn into a 3-2 and vice-versa. Usually the first happened, if the 2-3 structure weren’t able to penetrate in an effective way, then the defensive-midfielder dropped in between the centre-backs and the full-backs moved inside to occupy the central zones. Although the strategic disadvantage was that in this structure the free-man often became the 2 full-backs, because of the central-midfielder orientated defending from the opponents. Even with being in a positional superiority the full-backs weren’t able to exploit this as well as a central-midfielder or defensive-midfielder could have.  Still, being able to flexibly change between the two had the advantage of causing adaptation problems for the oppositional side.

The 2-3 with flexible full-backs although were tougher to press, because of the better connections it provides at the back. Tons of times they were using simple wall passes to invite pressure and open up spaces at the wider areas. Lot of times these wall passes were being used in between the oppositional first and second line to manipulate the latter, although the orientation of immediately exploiting the open space vertically was missing, as these wall passes were much rather used gather the opponent around the ball –tightening the second line- to open up spaces at the back for a horizontal switch.

Overloads

Basically, the players tried to act within their respected zones, but Silva and KDB often moved to the other side, to create an overload there with each other. This connection often resulted successful penetration, because of the better manipulation it allows against the oppositional second line to create a free-man in between the lines. It mainly happened, when they were in a losing position, and was often helpful for a better penetration, but hurt the collective structure, as it didn’t allow the quick switch to the other side to move the opponent.

Dynamism at the wider zones

With having dynamic wingers –Sane, Sterling- the emphasis at the wider zones was understandably to create a dynamical superiority either with exploiting the individual speed of the faster players or with having dynamical movements at the flanks. The former often happened because of the constant width by the wingers, which allowed them create enough separation from the full-backs to create a dynamical advantage –mostly when the central-midfielders were able to receive and turn in between the lines, then it was the trigger to get behind the oppositional last line using the wingers. When the ball arrived to the flanks without having a dynamical or situational superiority they used different movements to create an advantage, mostly by using overlapping and underlapping runs or making various rotations between the full-back, central-midfielder and the winger.

The wingers in depth occupation is also a key element in City’s positional play. Fundamentally they attack the last line, but it may vary according to the situation: for example if the ball is at the centre-back who is driving forward it’s functional to occupy the same depth as the last line, because in this way he is able to manipulate the oppositional last line’s behavior. If the oppositional centre-back decides to step out of the line to close down the central-midfielder in between the lines, then the winger is immediately in position to exploit the generated space with a diagonal run.

A simple rotation at the flank from an overlap movement.

The wingers positioning relates with the full-backs positioning on the flanks. In the last months City used wider and deeper full-backs, which clearly had it’s own advantages and disadvantages. A possible advantage of the deeper full-backs is that the oppositional winger can’t really have an optimal access to him, because if he moves out of the shape too much, then it opens up the direct passing lane towards the winger and creates a better access towards the central-midfielder as well. Also, this deeper positioning may be a better way to invite more pressure from the second line, though at the same time holds the risk of being isolated at the wider areas, if a route out of the press is not assured.

Key players

Obviously the team’s key players were Silva and KDB mainly, who gave the basis of a balanced system. Without them City had serious issues in almost every phase of their positional play, as they didn’t have the personnel to replace these key players -being able to receive and turn in smaller areas. Therefore Pep often tried different structures and specific roles, like Navas or Kolarov being a lone wing-back on the flanks, or using Touré and Fernandinho to occupy the space between the lines at the central-midfielder position, but they lacked the abilities to effectively function in these roles.

At first Aguero lacked the functional movements required for positional play, although in time his movements and positional consciousness did clearly develop. For example in the early stages he made lot of dropping movements without clear purposes -just to had some touches on the ball-, which has had a negative effect on the collective structure. With the introduction of Gabriel Jesus he got a rival for this position, as Jesus’ participation in the combination play was better and more effective.

For months the biggest issue was to find the ideal player for the defensive-midfielder position. At first Fernandinho got the chance to play in this position, although seeing the lack of control at the back Pep changed to the 3-2 structure, with putting Gundogan next to Fernandinho. This structure looked better for a while, although with Gundogan’s injury the issues arose again. It was when Pep finally put Yaya Touré into the team, at first in the 3-2, then in the 2-3 structure. Although as the 2-3 allows only one defensive-midfielder, therefore Pep had to do something with Fernandinho: the solution was to put him into the full-back position, from where he is flexibly able to participate in the circulation of the ball.

Manipulating the man-orientation

At the beginning of the season they’ve got huge issues against man-oriented approaches, as they couldn’t have the adjustments to that. As a result of the man-orientation a centre-back often left open, although collectively they couldn’t advance through that without having a clear plan how to exploit that and also even the centre-backs fell into the trap of having tons of spaces in front of them, but as they couldn’t find vertical options, it resulted with forced long balls –as the centre-backs didn’t have the necessary escaping option, and they tended to drive forward too much. In time, the movements got better, as they used the man-oriented approach to open up the direct access from the central zones towards the wingers.

An example of manipulating the man-orientation to create a situational superiority. As Silva perceives that he is being man-marked, he makes a blind-sided movement inwards, which opens up the direct passing lane towards Sané.

Offering an escape route for the wider areas

An important aspect of the positional structure is to allow the specific needs and goals for a given team. As in positional play a basic goal is to ‘move the opponent’ the structure should be organized in a way to make it possible. Speaking generally one of the biggest issues that must be avoided whilst having the ball is to be isolated individually and collectively. That’s most likely to happen at the wider areas of the pitch, where the number of attacking options could be limited the most efficiently from a defensive point of view.

At the latter stages of the season City used a 2-3-2-3 (2-3-5) structure in possession, which is an optimal one to offer an escape route, when the ball is at the wider areas.

First of all both centre-backs should provide a depth option for the ball carrier to make a back pass available. The ball near centre-back should move towards the ball –even into the flanks-, whilst increase the space in depth, to create a separation from the first line, who is in a decisional crisis about which centre-back to cover. The ball-far centre-back should be ready to make the direct switch available –with a blind-sided movement-, or to offer an affordable passing option for the ball near centre-back to help the progression of the ball horizontally –important from the ball carrier to read the first line’s defensive behavior properly. A defensive-midfielder’s role is to offer an option in between the oppositional first- and second line, which creates a free-man at the back –a centre-back. Even if an opponent defends for example in a 4-4-2, the defensive-midfielder’s positioning divides the first line, as the ball-far forward should move to cover him, because if the second line wants to cover him, then it creates an easier access to the players in between the lines for the ball possession side. In a situation like above, a defensive-midfielder may be used for a simple wall pass, to reduce the oppositional cover of the first line, making a back pass easier and less risky. Important to mention the ball-far full-back’s behavior as well, who makes a movement inwards to the halfspace, to create a better connection with the ball-far centre-back –and also gives cover in case of a ball loss for a defensive transition. He may also give an option for the ball-far centre-back in case of a defensive pressing movement –leading with the ball-far winger-, even at the halfspace or at the central channel. Also from the halfspace he has a direct connection with the ball-far winger, therefore the structure not even allows moving the opponent horizontally, but vertically as well.

Positioning in between the lines

There are several ways for the positioning in between the lines, in City’s system the players –the central-midfielders- basically tried to occupy an equal distance, sometimes closer to the second line, then closer to the last line –varies, according to situation. With holding an equal distance it creates an uncertainty in the oppositional defense on how to adapt to that –from which player from which line to follow him if needed etc. For example if the central-midfielder stays closer to the last line and the forward decides to drop, then it forces the oppositional centre-back to stay in position as the central-midfielder is immediately able to exploit the open spaces behind the last line –interconnection between the offensive players’ movements. Also, if the central-midfielder is closer to the second line, then the emphasis is on being able to receive and turn in between the lines –as staying further from the last line in order to avoid being marked tightly with man-marking from the back.

Possible movements depending on the oppositional defensive adjustments. For example, if the central-midfielder tries to cover the RCM in between the lines with his cover shadow, then the CF has to adapt and offer a vertical option at the centre -which may also create an indirect connection towards the DM and the RCM. If the winger decides to defend in a heavily narrow manner, then the RW may drop a bit, to open up the direct passing lane towards himself, helping the progression of the ball diagonally, which also could also create an isolated 1v1 in a situational -and possibly dynamical- advantage. From this equal distance the RCM may manipulate both the second and the last line, and may offer a passing option in several areas. With the distance from the second line he has a better view to read the defensive behavior, therefore able to create a more functional separation into the open spaces. If he is being heavily man-marked he may move towards the centre, to open up a direct access towards the winger. He may also make the outward movement towards the flanks to stretch the second line horizontally and force the oppositional central-midfielder into a decisional crisis, to follow him or not. It mostly happens when both the central-midfielder and winger are covering the access towards him. Last but not least from this positioning he has the option to make vertical runs behind the last line -in between the full-back and centre-back-, which may open up space for the winger at the flanks. This movement happens, when the ball carrier is one of the players at the back. He may also make this movement, when the winger has the ball: if the oppositional winger is defending narrowly and the direct passing lane towards the RW is open. From trying to maintain the equal distance, the separation it creates helps him to create a positional and most importantly a dynamical advantage against the defenders. Depending on the defensive behavior space may open up diagonally inwards for cutting inside or the direct access towards the RCM may be open, which means that he receives the ball in a positional advantage behind the last line.

The vertical runs from the central-midfielders behind the last line gives two basic options for the ball carrier:

1. With their runs they are able to pull a defender –central-midfielder- from the second line with themselves, opening up space for dribbling inwards diagonally.
2. If this space is blocked by the oppositional full-back with his cover shadow, then try to advance through using the run from the central-midfielders behind the full-back. The key is to read the full-back’s defensive behavior properly.

In City’s positional play approach the emphasis is much rather on creating a free-man in positional superiority in between the lines, who is able to receive and turn towards the oppositional goal, than using lay-offs or faster combinations in between the lines. Occasionally faster combinations may happen if there is space and adequate connection in between the lines, but it’s not the usual pattern.

Centre-backs on the ball

Usually the centre-backs often had the opportunity to drive forward with the balls. As I wrote earlier they’ve got issues with exploiting this, as the centre-backs tended to drive forward too much, isolating themselves from the teammates. When a centre-back drives forward they should be a limit in space to don’t weaken the offensive connections by disrupting the structure itself, in City’s system the limit is approximately the height of the ball near full-back. Therefore when the centre-back drives forward but can’t find a vertical option, he just lays it off for the full-back wide. In that way he can still provide an option for a back pass in case of being pressured. With this space limit he may still help the progression of the ball, as when he drives forward it forces the oppositional shape to defend in a narrower and a deeper manner –as the defending sides try to delay a pressure on the ball in this situation as much as possible, to decrease the available space for the opponent-, which usually opens up more space at the wider areas.

Clearly visible improvements for the end of the first season. A much better understanding and implementation of the positional play principles. As the ball gets to the flanks, to structure must offer an escape route. Whilst having the ball at one side it gathers the opponent there, which opens up space at the ball-far zones for Otamendi, who drives forward, respecting the space limit and uses the players in between the lines to rotate towards Touré, who is in positional superiority in between the first and second line.

Build-up under pressure issues

Mainly the centre-backs didn’t occupy the ideal positions in time, which slowed down and negatively affected the whole build-up process, as the goalkeeper was vulnerable against the press –because of the inappropriate positioning of the centre-backs- and could only afford long passes. Not only the goalkeeper-centre-back, but also the centre-back – full-back connection was a bit dysfunctional, caused by bigger distances between each other, which created inadequate passing angles as well. For example using his cover shadow a winger could easily close down the connection in between the centre-back and the full-back at the earlier stages of the season. The fundamental principle of ‘inviting the press’ is already visible, although because of the positioning issues at the back they were not able to advance through that.

A much better connection now between Otamendi and Clichy, and also both centre-backs are now in a better position to give optimal options for the goalkeeper. Occupying the adequate positions also help in slowing down the press, as it divides the defenders’ attention in a more functional way. Besides the deeper positioning from the full-backs helps the centre-back to occupy a better position –not too wide, next to the sidelines-, which was also a big issue at the early stages. Still, as Touré and KDB moves into the same zone they are not able to advance through the press –whilst the winger’s defending to cover shadow Clichy opened up the direct channel towards KDB.

At the later stages Touré often dropped into a very deep position, which opened up space for the centre-backs –mostly they tried to open up space for Kompany- to drive forward. In these cases the ball-far full-back moved inwards to provide an essential option in the central zones. Also the central-midfielders often dropped deep to provide the centre-backs a vertical option and an indirect connection towards the flanks.

Movements in the attacking third

After breaking through the oppositional second line the aim is to maintain the situational and dynamical superiority, therefore lot of vertical and diagonal runs is being made to achieve that, especially from the central-midfielders –making runs in between the full-back and the centre-back, to divide the attentional focus. On one hand it provides a vertical option behind the last line, plus stretches the last line, and usually it opens up space diagonally.  On the other hand if the defensive team reacts with tightening the last line to defend this movement, it opens up space at the wider zones for the wingers, who are now in a dynamical superiority. Also the ‘runners’ make their runs from depth, to create an even bigger dynamical advantage against the defender. With a run from depth it’s possible to force the second line near the ball to adjust their positioning by dropping deeper, which often opens up a direct passing lane a space for the 3rd man.

Conclusion

Throughout the season City has improved clearly to implement the principles of positional play in a more functional way. As it is a complex system, the process to acquire and utilize it adequately requires time, it may be stated that their next season in this aspect is going to get better – as it took 3 season for Pep at Bayern. Although the personal changes are inevitable in some positions, especially at the back to provide an even better stabilization for the system –centre-back, full-backs, central-midfielders are definitely needed. Their biggest issue is still the build-up phase –especially under pressure-, this is the area they must improve the most in the upcoming season.

Following an eventful summer in the Blue part of Manchester, Pep Guardiola’s team started off their Premier League season with a comfortable win over Brighton, who were newly promoted from the Championship. Although the implementation of the game plan could be accurately described as lethargic, some of the potential themes and modifications of this new Manchester City group were shown, with room for improvement on display as City shake off the cobwebs. 

Changes in the Citizens’ Squad and Subsequent Tactical Implications

Before discussing the match, a brief discussion should take place about how exactly 2017/2018 Manchester City appears compared to Guardiola’s first season at the helm. While the hefty transfer fees for the new signings are always a point of contention among fans, the most notable component of this summer comes in the form of the departures. Nine first team players, most of whom made a considerable amount of appearances throughout last season, were told that they did not have a future at the Ethiad. Some examples that were influential (for better or for worse) to how City played last year include Aleksandar Kolarov, Nolito, Jesus Navas, plus every fullback on the books (Clichy, Sagna, Zabaleta).

Of City’s 5 new signings, all being under 28 years of age, three of them found their way in the starting XI today, with the former Monaco duo of Bernardo Silva and Benjamin Mendy not making their full debuts today (Silva would make a brief cameo in the late stages). Kyle Walker and Danilo each featured as wing backs on the day, while Ederson featured as goalkeeper.

Starting XI and Formations for both clubs

Bernardo Silva adds competition at the loaded attacking midfield spots for City, alongside a dangerous dribbling threat on the counter attack, which has clearly been addressed so far by the coaching staff. Ederson as a goalkeeper provides superior shot stopping to Claudio Bravo, accompanied by excellent long range passing and distribution that can offer an additional solution to teams that wish to high press City during their buildup out of the back.

With Walker, Danilo, and Mendy, the obvious upgrade from their predecessors at fullback is in athleticism. Through increased speed and stamina, the new signings will be better able to complete the physical expectations in attack and defense that Guardiola has historically asked of his fullbacks/wingbacks. Moreover, these newcomers offer a lot more from the wing as seen in their roles at their previous clubs. This allows Guardiola to have greater flexibility with his team selection, as it can allow him to put his better attacking talent in more central areas, rather than leave them in wider zones like he did last year at times.

It could also potentially increase the speed of ball circulation by having a better network of connections through intelligent spacing in the halfspaces and center. In addition, a better solution to preventing counter attacks could be developed alongside a more prolific attack, perhaps seeing a return to more risky, less conservative tactics from Guardiola.

City’s Attacking Strategy

Brighton and Hove Albion were aligned in a medium-low block of 4-4-2, demonstrating good vertical compactness between the two banks of four with the purpose of restricting the space available to play in between the lines. Due to the man-orientations of Brighton, this shape would situationally adjust from time to time and this is largely due to Manchester City’s attacking shape. Because of Brighton’s focus on individual players, the horizontal compactness was not a shining example of the concept.

To break down the hosts, City were set up in a 3-1-4-2 in possession, which was normally in Brighton’s half as they rarely applied pressure to the three center backs. Stones was the deepest of the three center backs in his central position, acting as a pivot, while Otamendi and Kompany took up positions slightly in front of Stones in their respective sides. Fernandinho meandered in front of the back three, while Silva and De Bruyne frequented the left and right halfspace respectively.

City’s general attacking positions against Brighton’s defensive block – with some movements found in this scene.

A short distance away horizontally from the skillful interiors was where Danilo and Walker typically were positioned, occupying the wings by themselves with support from the strikers and central players, while the closest center back would offer themselves as an option out to recycle the ball. Aguero and Gabriel Jesus would alternate between showing towards the ball and looking for penetration in behind Brighton’s defense, occasionally drifting into wider areas to ensure occupation of all areas of the field depending on the movement of their teammates.

The away side allowed for greater positional fluidity in the final third, with Walker’s movement in particular of note. In multiple situations, Walker would run inside from his wide starting position, using his dynamical and speed advantage to offer a dangerous solution in behind the opposition which when paired with a well-timed pass, could be one of many weapons at the Citizens’ disposal. When this occurred, the nearest player would occupy his vacated position, showing a high frequency of interchanging and moving from their base positions throughout the match in several instances, not just Walker’s movements.

Despite the previous words, the intended focus of City’s attack was trying to penetrate through central areas, using Silva and De Bruyne in advanced spots to be able to link up with with the tandem up front while using wide areas as a means to get behind. Therefore, it was imperative that the speed of play was high in order to be able to unbalance the block of Brighton to get the star men on the ball. Despite being in Brighton’s half for most of the match however, City found quality chances difficult to come by for the majority of the match for a myriad of reasons.

Issues and Adjustments

In the match however, some issues arose with Manchester City’s positional play and decision making that prevented them from consistently threatening the home side. Of course, it’s natural to have some things to iron out on the first match of the season, but Man City’s performances in preseason foreshadowed a high chance of starting with a bang. Prior to this season, IB wrote about City’s positional play issues from last year, which can be found here.

A likely reason for these complications with City’s performance is Guardiola’s conservatism that has been deployed away from home. Pep in the past has opted for less adventurous tactics on away days, preferring to have more structural stability to prevent conceding goals off of counter attacks. This trade-off between safety and risk can lead to the use of the personnel of the squad not being optimized when choosing safety, such was the case today.

The desire for safety throughout the team was evident in the decision making of the center backs, who rarely exercised any kind of risk in their passing. The pass selection from the trio rarely went in between the defense of Brighton, rather around them. Typically, the back three just passed among themselves and with Fernandinho, who either was way too close to the back 3 to be an effective option for the build up, or too advanced to be considered an appropriate option.

A lack of speed of play on the ball from the back three and Fernandinho is a large part of why they struggled to seriously penetrate the home side in central areas. While constructing the attacks, each of these players took excessive touches and dribbles in unnecessary situations. During this time, Brighton can adjust to the new positioning schemes of the players higher up the pitch. By the time Otamendi for example contemplated playing the forward option centrally, Brighton had already covered the player and it was no longer an attractive choice. If the time on the ball were to be decreased, so would the time Brighton has to react to any movements, leading to more lucrative and successful attacks for City.

Since there weren’t many attractive options centrally, that led to a lot of wide distribution from the back 3. A common means of progressing forward was via the dribble of Danilo and Walker, who would have the player closest to them delay them in order to preserve the organization of their defensive block. From there, attempts three man combinations in wide zones would occur, but Brighton generally dealt with these well. Once City began to realize this, they began to switch the play through the center backs via flighted diagonal pass. While these passes are technically difficult, Walker or Danilo would receive the ball and not have adequate support around them due to the team positioned around the side the ball just came from, just restarting their build up woes again.

Unsatisfied with their influence in the match, De Bruyne and Silva began to drop deeper in order to receive the ball since they weren’t getting many touches previously. While this sounds like a fine solution for that issue since it will increase the time on the ball for those players, it creates a superiority a part of the pitch where it is not needed. With both Silva and De Bruyne dropping, a 6v2 superiority formed in an area of the pitch that offers no danger.

Both Silva and De Bruyne should be higher up the pitch, in order to position themselves in more dangerous areas closer to the goal. Instead, they drop deep to get the ball.

This stifles the progression of the attack and leads to not having adequate options higher up the pitch. To provide better options, both should’ve remained in their respective horizontal lines to move the opponent to free space up the pitch, rather than drop deeper and receive the ball in nonthreatening spots. Spielverlagerung writer @feyre9251 sums this up nicely with the following quote.

“When you try to execute a positional idea… you should move players from the first lines to next ones, not the opposite.” – feyre9251

Of course, those positional components depend on the players with the ball willing to make the pass into players in those spots. The forwards experienced their own frustrations with the risk averse passing tendencies of the deeper players. As Aguero and Gabriel Jesus would make runs in behind the defensive line, Duffy and Dunk would follow their man in order to reduce the danger in the event of them receiving the ball.

At times, Brighton were unaware of how large the gap was in between the center defensive duo, which City could’ve capitalized on if a second movement into the space took place. By using the first movement as a decoy, the visitors could’ve penetrated by playing long into the space provided that the run started from a deeper position so that the runner can time the ball well and break away from his marker more easily. In addition, it forces the defender with a man occupied into a decisional crisis, as he has to choose between staying on the player he was initially covering, or follow the runner close to him that is on path towards goal. This is one method of how the away side could’ve found themselves in more dangerous positions on the afternoon.

Aguero takes his marker away, leaving large space open in the middle. If a second run followed, City had a good opportunity to break in behind via the long pass.

Lastly, City’s attack was not optimized due to the wrong footed wing back that was Danilo. When wingers play on the side opposite to their natural foot, it is done with the idea that by cutting inside, they can balance the defense better and create scoring opportunities for themselves and their teammates. It is a common sight to see fans moan (or celebrate) when Arjen Robben scores one of his trademark goals where he cuts inside on his left foot, because it is extremely predictable since he is extremely one footed.

However, Danilo is not Robben (shocker), and he does not offer that same sort of threat on the opposite side. He does have a similar level of predictability though. Since Danilo was so reliant on his right foot throughout the match, Brighton effectively didn’t have to defend the left wing when he was on the ball, and it essentially reduced the amount of space they had to defend. In response, most of City’s attacking chances were developed on the right side, because there was a superior dynamic on that side and less of a predictable element.

Halfway through the second half, Leroy Sane was introduced in place of Danilo. The affect he had on City’s attack was evident, in that they became less reliant on the right side for chance creation. Sane offered more of a dribbling and scoring scoring threat than Danilo, and within moments of him coming on, the tempo of the attack for Manchester City increased. Sergio Aguero put away the first goal shortly after, and after an own goal from Lewis Dunk following a cross six minutes later, Guardiola’s men were able to coast to victory.

Manchester City Out of Possession (and their anticipation of these moments)

In the rare moments that Manchester City did not have the ball, their counterpressing was impressive to deny Brighton from being able to play forward. De Bruyne was instrumental in this regard, as his timing and application of pressure was strong both in transition, and on Brighton’s technically shaky defenders. Both Silva and Fernandinho were valuable in applying immediate pressure to the ball carrier, but the frequency of fouls was high relative to how little they were out of possession thanks to how they pressed.

City’s pass map with average positions for each player. Special thanks to @11tegen11

When Matthew Ryan received the ball, Aguero or Jesus put him under pressure to force the ball long. City won a fair share of the aerial duels in the contest, bolstered by the back three who are all physically impressive. When Brighton would clear attacks using their heads, Kompany and Otamendi each took up advanced positions relative to Stones in which they were in spots that they could attack the ball right away.

Rather than stay near half, they gradually moved up the defensive unit so that Brighton could even manage to get a sniff of possession when they were in their deep block. The newly promoted club seldom had a counter attack, and when they did, City’s line stepped up intelligently to force them offside.

Conclusion

Manchester City will be satisfied to have gotten a win from their first game, but will hope to make improvements in their attacking play, as many English teams throughout the season will use a similar strategy as Brighton against them. With Guardiola in charge and a new slew of players joining the crew, they are a popular pick to win the Premier League for this coming season. However, it is still evident that there is a lot of learning and adaptation from the players required to fluidly play the positional play that Guardiola wants to instill. If this is finely tuned throughout the squad, Manchester City could be a dangerous team in domestic and continental competition.

The Champions League returned in mid-week with the first legs of the final qualifying round on Tuesday and Wednesday. Unfortunately, the draws pitched together a number of strong teams that could have a big impact on the competition, who would now have to battle over two legs to reach the group stages. Fortunately, this gave PR, AL and JD interesting ties to analyse, and each author summarises the key aspects in the clash they watched.

Sarri’s side in dominant win

From an asymmetric 4-3-3 with a narrow structure, particularly oriented towards the left sector, the Italians were able to have a stable build up. With the back line having close distances between them, they could circulate quickly against Nice’s passively centre-focused forwards. Ghoulam, the left back, had more freedom to move higher in the pitch overloading and giving a passing option to connect after the switch in a first moment. He was also able to manipulate Jallet through his movements thus creating exploitable spaces at times for Insigne or Hamsik.

The three midfielders played between the lines overloading the left sector particularly, and attacking aggressively with great mobility the spaces behind the opposing midfielders. Particularly in the attacking left halfspace, they gave vertical passing lines for the centre-backs and each had near support to make quick one touch combinations. The close distances between them and the support at times of the forwards created the connections from where the central combinations arose.

In the starting first quarter of the game, Nice’s 5-3-2 mid-block was easily manipulated by Napoli’s right to left circulation in the first line, in the process creating a free man in the left halfspace. In that sector, Nice’s defensive structure was completely unbalanced due to the lack of access from forwards and the deep position from Jallet, therefore Koziello was unable to deal with the movements and combinations between Hamsik, Ghoulam, Insigne and Jorginho borne out of the aggressive vertical passing from the centrebacks.

The created dynamical advantages were followed usually by a quick pass to the forwards attacking the space behind the defense or playing outside to Insigne and at times Hamsik or Ghoulam. From here Sarri’s men were able to create a dynamical advantage through the provoked manipulation of Nice’s defenders, by their movements dropping and running through the halfspace.

Due to the height of the defensive line of Nice, the vertical runs by Napoli’s forwards behind the last line were very successful and easily exploited. Napoli mixed the short and quick combinations in the left sector, with more direct passes behind the last line towards Mertens and Callejon’s runs well. From one such situation they scored the first goal.

The forwards were willing to create many runs behind the last line when Nice tried to hold it high. However, they were also able to drop deep to give passing options overloading the centre to have more connections in the combination play.

After the goal, the visitors dropped deeper trying to block the depth runs from forwards. In this context Italians were able to execute a more horizontal possession moment in the last third but keeping the characteristic combination play and overloading the left sector. They were especially successful with the diagonal and chipped passes to the box targeting usually Callejon’s well timed runs through the right halfspace, after attracting the opponents (in position and attention) to the left sector.

Callejon’s runs were usually effective due to the positioning in the blind side of Le Marchand and the timing of the runs along with the group manipulation provoked by the overload in the left sector explained before. This allowed Callejon to manage the timing and direction of the movements along with a threatening diagonal passing lines from the midfielders.

Later in the first half Napoli players started tying also to exploit direct central combinations since the central defenders were even less challenged and thus trying to create quick vertical passing options and layoffs to penetrate the French defence. The overload in the centre with the three midfielders and at least two forwards manipulated Nice, provoking their midfielders to press. This enhanced the situational advantage that allowed Napoli to create successful depth dynamics, and also to counterpress effectively if the ball was lost.

Furthermore, the Italian dominance wasn’t limited only to the possession moments. Without the ball, even if not displaying an avant-garde sophistication, they executed a rather effective high pressing orienting the circulation (within a poor build up structure indeed) through Nice’s left centreback forcing long direct balls which were intensely challenged and usually recovered in the second ball or picking the rebound. Along with their strong counterpressing due to the style of the attacks and dynamics in their combination play, Napoli shut down almost every possible attacking option from Nice. In fact, the French players were able only to create a few chances from recoveries after ball loses from Napoli.

A final note on Napoli’s strategy

The offensive strategy was consistent in forcing/provoking the press in the vertical axis rather than in the horizontal one with the first line (with the Italian team’s back four) This creates a very stable build-up, avoiding being underloaded. Since the opponents are not going to get easy access, they push forward which creates space either behind the last line or between the lines. This is combined with a structure that has several players between the lines, allowing for quick vertical combinations and progressions through dynamical advantages, and also connecting passes to the forwards running behind the defence.

Apart from a stable and more horizontal possession moment in the first line before passing the ball to the midfielders, the attacking process of Italians was rather vertical and risk oriented. They attempted to get a depth option in the same sector where the attack takes place as quickly as possible, thus avoiding the use of unnecessary horizontal shifts or backwards passes to re-start the sequence in a controlled way. Instead, the midfielders and forwards made quick and short movements to manipulate and then exploit the dynamical advantages created behind the last line or direct passes into the box.

Celtic too strong for Astana

Celtic flew to a 5-0 lead against Astana on Wednesday night in the first leg of their crucial Champions League qualifying play-off tie. Despite a messy start to the game, where neither team looked in control, Celtic were eventually able to assert themselves, blowing the Kazakh champions away in an extremely assured performance.

Initial stages

Astana started the game engaging Celtic high up the pitch in a bid to disrupt their rhythm. Celtic’s usual rotation from a 4-2-3-1 to a 3-2-4-1 (led by Tierney’s advancement from left back) saw them build up with a clear 3-2 structure in the first lines. Astana’s 4-3-3 gave them good pressing access to players across this structure, making it relatively easy to dissuade central progression, thus forcing Celtic to the flanks. Man-orientations on the ball-near side made breaking through this flank-pressure uncomfortable. This, coupled with ball-far players indenting to maintain access and providing decent spatial coverage, made it easy for Astana to regain possession after long passes or clearances.

The away side compounded this pressure on the Celtic back line through their direct approach. A couple of clipped passes into Kabananga up front early on were well supported by Astana players – both from behind and from the side – giving him the ability to lay off to a teammate or for a number of players to be involved in retrieving the second ball. From these initial direct incursions, the Kazakhs could establish themselves in the Celtic half and bring their dynamic wingers into play.

As the initial chaos subsided, Astana started to allow Celtic possession slightly higher up the pitch. When in this medium block, the visitors engaged around the halfway line, set up more often in a 4-5-1 shape as opposed to a more commonly seen 4-1-4-1. Celtic struggled for large portions of the first half to break through this midfield wall, due to the enhanced horizontal coverage afforded to the away side through this structure. With more players in the midfield chain, the horizontal distances each of them were responsible for was reduced. This led to a number of attempts to play passes between players in the line of five being intercepted, in turn leading to dangerous counter attacking opportunities.

Even when these passes were completed (usually to Sinclair through the left halfspace), Astana were initially able to prevent any further progression. A reception between the lines was usually met with a centre-back stepping out to aggressively press the receiver, the midfield line intensely collapsing back towards the ball, and occasionally the central midfielder of the five, Maevski, who would situationally drop slightly deeper to maintain access to any players looking to move behind the midfield.

The result of all this was a period of play – roughly 25 minutes long – where neither team was able to make significant inroads through organised phases. Due to Astana’s fairly strong compactness, Celtic struggled to gain control of possession in their opponent’s half – unable to form strong structures around the ball due to their lack of control in progression, unable to gain control due to their lack of strong structures in possession to support their counterpressing.

Celtic gain midfield control

Celtic eventually managed to settle the chaos of the opening minutes through their midfield dynamics. Captain Scott Brown made frequent dropping movements from around the 30-minute mark to the left-back position opened by the advancing movement of Kieran Tierney. Due to the slight man-oriented behaviour of the Astana eights, this had the effect of bringing one of them out of the super-compact midfield that had blocked so much of Celtic’s central advancement in the early stages.

Brendan Rodgers’ side coordinated these movements well, giving them maximum space between the lines to attack from. When Brown tilted to the left-back area, Ntcham would make a slight, mirrored movement on the right side to the same effect. If these players could attract Astana’s eights whilst making these movements, a large space was opened for Sinclair to move into. While Rogic’s drifting to the right side – allowing Sinclair to indent into the left halfspace – is a common occurrence in this Celtic side, the further space-opening movements from the sixes destroyed Astana’s previously strong midfield coverage.

Furthermore, Celtic were able to prevent the defensive line from pushing up to maintain compactness. Leigh Griffiths was instrumental in this respect, with his constant depth-seeking runs providing considerable problems for the Kazakhs, as they struggled to cope with his pace. Occasionally joined by Sinclair, the striker found great success running into space behind the back line that they left as they tried to stay vertically compact. The result was either a further opening of the huge space between the lines if they tracked his runs, or a massive area behind for Griffiths to run into if they didn’t.

Griffiths’ influence, though, was not merely reduced to destroying vertical compactness. When Celtic have the ball on the right side, Forrest’s natural inclination to position himself on the touch line, and not right on the last line of the defence, invites the opposing left-back out of the defensive chain to press him, while Griffiths positions himself in between the centre-backs in a fairly central position. In these situations, the ball-near centre-back is reluctant to shift to cover his full-back, for fear of leaving a direct lane open for Griffiths. This has been a common scene in most Celtic games this season, though Rogic’s goal was a rare example of the Australian using this space to break through into depth.

Conclusion

As far as European performances go, this was certainly one of Celtic’s most mature. A low-risk approach – while still managing to pose some threat through Griffiths’ running – when the guests tested the back line, and their wrestling of control & organisation from the hands of chaos made Brendan Rodgers’ side good value for their comfortable win.

Clash of the 3-chains in Hoffenheim

Klopp’s plan

In his pre-match press conference, Klopp stressed that Liverpool “know everything” about their opponents. For the viewers then, it would be interesting to see how this knowledge translated into a game plan. With Liverpool’s narrow 4-3-3 pressing shape up against Hoffenheim’s 3-1-4-2, the key question was how Liverpool would prevent the wing-backs receiving in space, whilst having access to the back 3, and covering the defenders against Hoffenheim’s attacking midfielders, and strikers.

To create access against Hoffenheim’s defenders, whilst blocking the wing-backs, Salah and Mane would press the ball carrying side back with a curved run to cover the lane to the ball-near wing-back and force the German side into the compact centre. In higher pressing, Liverpool’s ball-far 8 would stay higher to man-mark Demirbay (Hoffenheim’s defensive midfielder), whilst the ball-near 8 and Henderson would move across and block passes into Hoffenheim’s attackers. In these situations Firmino could press Hoffenheim’s first line, often forcing them back to Baumann.

In midfield pressing however, the responsibility for blocking Demirbay fell to Firmino, who would move deeper when Hoffenheim’s side backs had the ball. This meant Liverpool weren’t able to block re-circulation, since Vogt (the central centre back) was constantly available for a back pass to relieve pressure. Uncharacteristically, Klopp’s men spent large periods with a high focus on blocking passing options, and little or no pressure on the ball carrier.

Hoffenheim’s routes of progression

Due to the little pressure on them, and Liverpool’s focus on blocking passing options, the Hoffenheim defenders had to dribble to manipulate and open passing options. To progress against Liverpool’s 4-3-3, the key was challenging the decision/positioning of Firmino and the Liverpool 8s, who had to focus on blocking re-circulation via Vogt, blocking Demirbay, and blocking Hoffenheim’s large presence between the lines. Based on the decisions made by Firmino, Can and Wijnaldum there were a number of different ways the home side were able to progress;

1. When Liverpool’s winger pressed with a curved run blocking the near wing-back, and Firmino stayed deep to block Demirbay, Hubner or Bikakcic could return the ball to Vogt in the centre who could then play diagonally into the nearby wing-back.
2. When Salah or Mane pressed the side backs with a curved run, and Firmino blocked the back pass to Vogt, Hoffenheim could play into Demirbay, who could play into the open wing-back.

3. When the ball carrying side back was pressed with a curved run, Firmino blocked the back pass, and Liverpool’s ball-near 8 moved up to block Demirbay, they could play into the open channel between Liverpool’s pressing 8 and winger, using one of the forwards for a wall pass into the open wing back.

4. When Firmino moved up to block Vogt, and the ball carrying side back couldn’t progress, Vogt would move higher and form a double pivot with Demirbay, opening the back pass to Baumann and allowing the German side to re-start their build-up. Alternately, Vogt could receive the ball behind Firmino, if the Brazilian moved in anticipation of the back pass.

Hoffenheim’s attacks

Whilst they dealt impressively with Liverpool’s pressing, and were able to progress into dangerous areas regularly, Nagelsmann’s side didn’t often arrive in the final 3rd with good conditions to create chances. When Hoffenheim progressed, it was usually through passes into the forwards behind Liverpool’s midfield either from the centre, or from the wing-backs. Of course they faced high pressure in this space, so they had to combine quickly to bypass the pressure.

However, too often these combinations were from static positions, without runners clearing space for the player on the ball to dribble forwards. Therefore, they often combined without gaining space, and Liverpool were able to regain their defensive balance through recovery runs.

Part of this was due to how efficiently Liverpool defended these situations. When Hoffenheim played into their forwards diagonally from the wing-backs, Liverpool’s defenders pressed whilst directing them back towards the wing. This is a factor in Hoffenheim’s inability to move these combinations into dangerous areas.

Liverpool’s asymmetry and adapted roles

An interesting adaptation from Klopp’s side was the positioning of the full backs and wingers. Liverpool typically play with very high and wide full-backs, and very narrow wingers creating a combinative front three. However, against Hoffenheim’s 5-3-2 defensive structure the positioning was tweaked to exploit the spaces Hoffenheim leave open.

In the 5-3-2, the midfield and forward line are very narrow, whilst the defensive line can cover large width. Liverpool’s typical structure has huge width on the last line (advanced full-backs) and are narrow in the defensive and midfield lines. This creates a 2-3-5 in possession, and this would theoretically give Hoffenheim’s 5-3-2 natural access to every line of Liverpool’s structure.

To counter this, Liverpool used Alexander-Arnold deep and narrow, creating a back three alongside Lovren and Matip, whilst Moreno had a more typical role on the left. With the young right back positioned deep and narrow, Salah would play high on the right touchline.

Alexander-Arnold’s positioning had big effects in two particular phases. By creating a back three in the away side’s early build-up, they could outnumber Hoffenheim’s front two, and the young right back was often the free player to start Liverpool’s build-up in the right half space. From here he could drive forwards and attract one of Hoffenheim’s midfield 3 to press, freeing one of Liverpool’s midfielders to receive the ball.

Secondly, when Liverpool had the ball on the left side, the young right back would be free in the right half space (due to Hoffenheim’s narrow forward and midfield lines) to receive a switch. He could thus use the space ahead of him to drive forwards, advancing the ball deep into Hoffenheim’s half. In these situations Salah’s positioning high on the right touchline, helped in pinning Zuber back due to the threat he could pose running into any space left behind.

When reaching Hoffenheim’s box, Alexander-Arnold would pass into the Egyptian winger, and either over or underlap him creating varied situations for Salah’s dribble.

Halfway Conclusion

A high class encounter finished 2-1 to the away side, making Klopp’s men the favourites to progress to the group stages. The adaptations to the structure of the opponents was clear from both managers, and it will be interesting to see what changes and what remains for the 2nd leg.

For much of the early stages of this season I have been unable to write for various reasons. During that time there were a number of interesting games and impressive performances. In this series I will analyse aspects of some of these matches.

Offensive strategy

Throughout the game there were a number of aspects of United’s attack that appear to hint at a long-term strategy, some of which are consistent with Mourinho’s general approach to offensive play.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the attack was the narrow positioning of the wingers; Rashford and Mata. This was particularly striking because asymmetry has been a feature of United’s wing attacks for the last few seasons. Whilst Valencia (being a former winger) can patrol the right flank largely on his own, United have lacked a left-back with the same capacity. As such, United’s right wingers (often Mata) have often played narrow, on the left side however the wingers typically display a more conventional interpretation of the role.

In this game however, both wingers spent most of the game in central areas. When combined with Mkhitaryan and Lukaku, United had large presence in the space behind West Ham’s midfield line.

United’s base attacking structure

Another visible aspect was the approach to space, the dynamic approach to finding space is a common factor in a typical Mourinho attack. In dynamic space occupation, as the name suggests, movement is the tool used to create the conditions for dangerous attacks. Attackers are given positions, but a high level of freedom to move away from it as they see fit. The three attacking midfielders in particular would often move out of their nominal positions and closer to the ball, creating more options to move the ball at speed.

Whether it was an intended tactical decision, or simply a continuation of the general attacking strategy, United’s dynamic attack created favourable situations as it interacted with the man-oriented nature of West Ham’s defending.

One of the features of dynamic space occupation is “unbalanced” attacking structures. (this isn’t a criticism, merely a description) Unbalanced here meaning that the positions of the team can often become asymmetric, and appear chaotic at times due to the constant movement. Due to the freedom to move out of position, moments of weak co-ordination between attackers can lead to them moving into the same space.

For coaches that use this approach this isn’t a problem, in fact the moments of unbalanced structures create problems for the opponents who must either defend with an underload in particular areas, or create unbalanced defensive structures in response. Furthermore, these moments of unbalanced structures create the potential for quick combinations due to the number of players around the ball. The unpredictable nature of resulting attacks is the main advantage of the dynamic space occupation approach.

With quick combinations in small areas, often one wing or half space, United could easily retain the ball in offensive areas. This gradually baited West Ham defenders out of position to press. When pressure arrived, one or two United attackers would move away from the group combination. This movement would either allow Mourinho’s side to break through in the surrounding area, or open the route to larger spaces which West Ham left in order to press. More on this later.

Interestingly, the positional freedom often creates a natural focus on particular areas of the field as the qualities, and intuitive styles of the players interact. In this game, United displayed quite a heavy offensive focus on the left half space, likely due to the preference of Pogba, Matic and Mkhitaryan to act in this part of the field.

Diagonal movements

For much of the game, diagonal movements were central to United’s approach to break down West Ham’s defensive block. One type of diagonal run the Old Trafford side often used was an inside to outside movement from the wingers. Whilst the wingers started in narrow positions, when the full-back on their side had the ball, they would often run into depth slightly towards the touchline. Zabaleta and Masuaku often followed Rashford and Mata into more central positions, as such there was often large space in depth and width for the United wingers to run into.

In this scene, Zabaleta does well to recover and intercept, but a better pass from Blind would have created a very dangerous situation.

With these movements United could reach strong crossing positions when Blind or Valencia managed to play the wingers through successfully. However, if these runs were tracked well, space would be opened further infield for the full-back to dribble or pass into. This potential to move into the open half space was largely under-utilised by the home side in this game.

On a number of occasions Mata made diagonal runs from the right half space to the left one whilst United developed the attacks from deep on the left. This movement was particularly dangerous when West Ham lacked access to the ball in front of their defensive line, and such situations led to dangerous breakthroughs for the red devils.

There were a number of reasons behind the success of the diminutive Spaniard’s diagonal movements. One of these was the difficulties in tracking such extreme movements for a man-oriented defence. In moving from the right half space to the left, Mata’s movement was in line with the concept of “vacating position” which I analysed as part of my theory article on dismarking.

The movements required from Masuaku to track Mata would create a heavily unbalanced defensive structure, and open large space on the right which Valencia could attack. The alternative, was to pass him on to one of the defenders on the left side. At times this could create issues if they already had opponents to mark. However, if they were free they would have a dilemma of whether to hold their position, press the ball in front of them, or track the run.

Even a decision to track the run would create an issue since Mata would have a significant dynamic advantage by the time he reached the left half space, meaning the likes of Reid would immediately be at a disadvantage.

Counter attacks

Another factor in the impressive performance of the Mancunian outfit was the ability to create chances on the counter attack as well as through longer possession phases. In fact it was through one of these counter attacks that the red devils took the lead. Interestingly, a number of characteristics from the positional attacks were also evident in the counter attacks.

United’s approach to counter attacks relied on direct dribbles to advance the ball with speed, avoiding low percentage forward balls. As soon as a United player had clear space ahead of them, they would dribble as far forwards until they were confronted by an opponent.

Whilst the ball carrier dribbled, nearby attackers would run into depth, interestingly the direction of their runs differed depending on the position and direction of the dribble. When the ball carrier dribbled from the wing/half space towards the centre, United would have one runner moving in the opposite direction. These diagonal runs worked in a similar way to Mata’s as described above when United had a linear runner in the far half space.

Lukaku’s run also opened the switch to Mkhitaryan in the far half space

The presence of the diagonal runner (often Lukaku or Rashford) would make the West Ham defenders retreat initially, reducing their access to the dribbler and allowing him to reach dangerous areas before being pressed. Once a West Ham defender moved out to press the dribble, the diagonal runner could create the option to breakthrough into the space left by the presser. Alternately, his movement would open the switch to the far half space if the far side West Ham defender followed the diagonal run. One of these situations led to Lukaku’s opening goal.

In the lead up to the opening goal, Lukaku’s initial movement when Rashford won the ball, was away from the ball towards the right half space. This adjustment was important in allowing the Belgian to make the subsequent diagonal run towards goal, rather than too far towards the touchline.

When the initial dribble went through a more central area, the diagonal runs would be made by the wingers. A similar principle in not releasing the ball until the dribbler is confronted, was also evident during these counter attacks. This created a very simple and efficient way of gaining space, and profiting regardless of the decisions made by the opponents.

Central dominance as West Ham switch to 4-4-2

Later in the game, as the London side sought a way back into the game, they moved from their 4-1-4-1 to a 4-4-2 with Sakho supporting Chicharito in attack. Perhaps partly due to fatigue, and partly due to the idea of remaining high up the field to secure long balls, the West Ham strikers rarely worked back to support their midfield. This combined with Arnautovic and Ayew’s focus on marking United’s full-backs left West Ham understaffed in central areas.

In addition, to the Matic-Fellaini-Pogba axis, Martial and Mkhitaryan/Lingard moved so far infield into positions that the West Ham full-backs weren’t comfortable following. This created huge overload situations for Mourinho’s men. At 2-0 down, West Ham couldn’t afford to defend passively, this combined with the central underload created huge problems leading to United doubling their lead.

As described by MR, closing passing options is a vital pre-requisite to create pressure on the ball, and constrain the options of the ball carrier. If the player on the ball has options to pass the ball, opponents running towards him will have little effect asides from opening more space for the next player on the ball. From the defensive side’s perspective, if the first presser leaves options open for the ball carrier, the supporting defenders cannot move out of position early enough to create pressure on the next receiver, because they cannot be sure where the ball will move. This creates the chain reaction that MR refers to.

Due to the heavy underload, West Ham were naturally unable to close passing options. However, they still attempted to create pressure on the ball, but could only move out to press after each pass. In their attempts to cope with the underload in the centre, West Ham would often commit their central defenders higher to support the press. This succeeded only in opening further space for United to attack in depth, and was a feature of United’s third and fourth goals.

Reid tries to cope with the central underload by pushing forwards. However he is too late, and opens space for Pogba to attack behind him.

 Conclusion

This was a very impressive start to the season from Mourinho’s side. The structural changes from last season appear to create more fitting roles for players like Pogba, Mkhitaryan and Mata who are the vital creative hub of the team. Lukaku’s directness creates new potential for counter attacks, whilst Rashford and Martial offer varied qualities which could be useful against different opponents, giving the team tactical variability. Whilst United have since shown their improvement in similar games, it will be interesting to see if Mourinho’s approach to games against fellow top 6 opponents will also change.

For much of the early stages of this season I have been unable to write for various reasons. During that time there were a number of interesting games and impressive performances. In this series I will analyse aspects of some of these matches.

Bournemouth’s early pressure

In the opening exchanges of the game, the home side were keen to keep the game in City’s half and create a frantic opening period. Bournemouth were able to achieve this due to a number of reasons;

Direct play and 2nd balls

When Bournemouth won free kicks, goal-kicks or possession in open play they often played long towards City’s defence. King and Defoe were tasked with creating duels for these long balls. Although they weren’t expected to hold the ball up, the duels would reduce the City defenders’ ability to make accurate nodded passes. Gosling, Surman and Arter were key in staying close to the game, and anticipating where the ball would land to either win the second ball, or create immediate pressure on the receiver.

High pressing

From the base 5-3-2 shape, Howe’s men pressed aggressively with high levels of freedom to leave the lines of defence and create pressure. King often dropped deeper, making a 5-3-1-1, from here Defoe was focused on pressing City’s centre backs whilst blocking passes across between them, this was a vital job. Due to the narrowness of Bournemouth’s first two lines, switches would break their access allowing City to push them deeper.

Behind Defoe, King was focused on blocking Guardiola’s men from using Fernandinho in build-up. At times King’s pressing position between City’s midfield and defence meant he had brief separation from City defenders when Bournemouth regained the ball, he was thus a good target for the first pass to start counter attacks.

The wide midfielders in the line of 3, Arter and Gosling moved out of position early to press City’s build-up when the ball was on their side, whilst Surman constantly moved across to cover spaces behind them. Daniels and Smith (the wing-backs) also had the licence to move out of position quickly, and importantly created access as soon as a City full-back received a long pass, preventing them from moving forwards.

Bournemouth’s pressing was based on blocking City’s short passing options and having access to the ball carrier, this would force City to play longer passes out of pressured areas. Forcing these longer passes gave the defenders furthest away from the ball time to step out and create pressure around the area the ball would arrive in.

Blocking City’s short options existed in both a vertical and horizontal dimension. Due to City’s spacing in the first two lines, Bournemouth’s attempts to create pressure would mean opening space in spaces within their defensive shape. This was particularly evident in the half spaces behind Gosling and Arter who moved high to press De Bruyne/Silva.

Backwards pressing & wide triangles

Whilst the aggressive pressing positions of the Bournemouth players opened spaces behind them, they were able to cope well with this due to strong backwards pressing. From his position blocking switches between Otamendi and Kompany, Defoe would work across and could press from the blind side if the near City centre back received a back pass. This was in line with the general strategy of blocking City’s options of playing short, and forcing them into hasty attacks under cumulative pressure.

The advanced positioning of Arter and Gosling at times opened space behind them for Bernardo/Sterling to receive. Again, Bournemouth’s backwards pressing allowed them to cope with this and regain possession from potentially dangerous situations. Although Bernardo/Sterling appeared to have space, these passes would be met with backwards pressing from the nearby central midfielder, Surman working across from the centre, and the near wing-back moving forwards. As such they created wide triangles, creating pressure and taking advantage of City’s weak supporting structures due to the hasty progression.

This ability to force City into longer passes and risky progressions were behind the transitional nature of the opening exchanges, and when Daniels opened the scoring it was a fitting reward for Howe’s men’s strong start to the game.

GK press

When City tried to build-up from Ederson, either from goal-kicks or in open play; Arter would move into Bournemouth’s front line, creating a 5-2-3 structure. This allowed Bournemouth access to both centre backs and Fernandinho. The 5-2-3 allowed the home side natural access to City’s build-up, with each player having a clear opponent within their region, man-orientations were thus used to block short passes on the near side. When Ederson received back passes he was pressed by the nearest player in the front 3, whilst using their cover shadow to block the pass into the opponent they were marking. As such, Ederson was forced longer.

City settle into rhythm as Arter drops

Around the 20th minute, Arter stopped joining the first line, presumably an intentional decision to sit deeper particularly since Howe’s side were in the lead. However, initially the strikers still pressed aggressively, with the use of Ederson, the centre backs and Fernandinho they were surrounded by a build-up diamond. With this 4v2 underload they were realistically unable to  challenge City’s build-up, and in fact opened large space in front of the midfielders for City to progress through.

With the reduced aggression in Bournemouth’s general pressing positions, City were able to establish their possession rhythm. Within their possession phases there were a number of interesting aspects;

De Bruyne, Silva and half space switches

Positioning

With the full-backs playing high and wide, and the wingers playing narrow, City’s midfield maestros were positioned deep in either half space, acting as the base of the wide triangles. In this position they were in space besides King and Defoe, as well as being positioned in front and wider than Gosling and Arter. As such, they could often receive the ball in space with opponents having to move out of position to press them. Fernandinho’s position between King and Defoe was vital in creating space for the playmaking midfielders.

Alternately, if Gosling or Arter moved out of position to block the pass into De Bruyne or Silva, they would open the passing lane into Sterling/Bernardo in the advanced half spaces. These players could then lay the ball off into De Bruyne/Silva who would receive the ball facing forwards, and with runners to feed.

The positioning of the creative midfield pair also led to constant half space switching to relieve pressure and gain territory. When the ball was on one side, Bournemouth’s furthest midfielder had to shift across to keep small distances to Surman who had large covering responsibilities. As such, the far City 8 was often in large space, these half space switches created the possibility to attack through the half space or wing with temporary 3v2 situations.

Diagonal orientation

Interestingly, the right footed De Bruyne played in the left half space, whilst the left footed Silva played on the right, this created a diagonal orientation in the actions of the midfield pair. With the time and space their positioning often allowed them, Silva and De Bruyne often dribbled/passed diagonally due to the preference to use their stronger feet.

With this diagonal orientation, they were able to keep several options open, such as the vertical pass into the winger ahead of them, the diagonal into Jesus, diagonal into Bernardo and crucially the half space switch to the ball-far 8. This led to hugely dominant spells of circulation where City could relieve pressure with switches to the far half space.

Freedom

The only part of the field that wasn’t immediately accessible for De Bruyne and Silva was often the near wing (mostly in

The starting line-ups

Bournemouth’s 2nd half 5-4-1 where the wide midfielders cut City’s access to the wing after switches). In situations like these, the ball-far 8 often overlapped, due to the direction of their movement they could receive the ball with a field of view facing the open wing.

This freedom to move from their half space position was also used to create overloads and breakthroughs on the ball side when Bournemouth’s defence were able to defend stably against the 8, full-back and winger triangle.

Offside positions and combinations

On several occasions in the game, the Citizens’ forwards could be seen remaining in offside positions whilst their team-mates began attacks from deep, this was an interesting tool. By staying offside, they were out of the immediate perception (as per the blind side) of their opponents, and with late dropping movements into the space behind Bournemouth’s midfield they could present themselves as an option to advance.

Ake, Cook and Mings often pressed forwards to close the space behind the midfield when a City forward received the ball in front of them, and they had the licence to do so due to the extra cover of a 5 man back line. However, the offside positioning of Jesus, Sterling and at times Bernardo meant they were unaware of when exactly the City forward would offer themselves to receive the ball. This led to a number of successful progressions with lay-offs, adding quick breakthroughs to the stable possession that Guardiola’s side enjoyed.

Bournemouth’s build-up struggles

Later in the first half the home side experienced issues in trying to build attacks from their defence. They were consistently unable to play into midfield, and were forced to pass along their back line and into the wing-backs. Analysing the cause of this brings up interesting points about structural interaction.

The Cherries tried to build from a base 3-1-4-2 shape, with Surman as the deepest midfielder in the centre. The match-up that this created against City’s narrow 4-3-3 pressing structure was hugely problematic. When Ake had the ball, Jesus could press him vertically blocking the lane to Surman in the process, the distances between Gosling to De Bruyne and Arter to Silva were constantly very small, making Bournemouth avoid these passes. As such, the ball had to be passed to the next defender, and the near winger in City’s front 3 would step out to press diagonally, again blocking the pass into Surman.

This left the ball Cook or Mings under pressure, and with only the pass to the near wing-back available. This pass was also met with pressure as City’s near full-backs stepped forward early. As such, the wing-back would often receive the ball on the wing, facing backwards and under cumulative pressure. It was no surprise that this often led to losses of possession.

A common scene Bournemouth experienced in their build-up

Far from merely talking about numerical match-ups, this was a clear problem of the interaction between Bournemouth’s structure and the opponents’ creating unfavourable situations. The 1-1 in the centre (Ake and Surman) made Jesus’ job of pressing Ake and blocking Surman very simple. The large width covered in the back 3 meant that Howe’s side lacked a short sideways option in the first line to move the ball away from Jesus’ cover shadow and open the lane into the holding midfielder.

A potential solution

A 2-3 structure in the first two lines would create the aforementioned short option to open the lane into Surman. However, another solution requiring a smaller structural shift was possible. Namely; a 3-2 structure.

With two players at the base of midfield, Ake would have had two options behind Jesus, with both able to split and stay out of his cover shadow. Interestingly, there were one or two occasions where Gosling or Arter played deeper alongside Surman creating a 3-2 build-up structure. However, this was still not effective in creating a more advantageous interaction because they lacked a threat behind Silva/De Bruyne. Without the threat of players behind them, the ball-near City 8 could simply follow their man higher, preventing Gosling/Arter’s participation in the build-up.

A 3-2-4-1 could be a functional adaptation to create a better build-up. In addition to two options to play beyond Jesus in the centre, there would be players in either half space behind Silva and De Bruyne. This would pin City’s 8s back, creating more space for the two deep midfielders. Alternately, they could play directly into the half space if Silva/De Bruyne moved out of position early. Cook and Mings would be at the base of a diamond structure, creating diagonal options to play inside outside, as well as a vertical option, depending on the pressing direction of Sterling/Bernardo.

The threat of runs in behind from King and Gosling could also prevent Mendy and Danilo from pressing high on the flanks, giving more space for Daniels and Smith to receive the ball.

Howe moves to 5-4-1 & City’s structural response

In the last few minutes of the first half there were a couple of instances of Defoe dropping into a left midfield position, creating a 5-4-1 defensive shape. This was done inconsistently until half time when they switched to constantly defend in a 5-4-1. This was a reaction to the issues City’s half space switching was causing. With a wider midfield line, Bournemouth would theoretically be able to create access after half space switches and thus not be pushed backwards as easily, as well as forcing City wider earlier in build-up.

In response to Bournemouth’s 5-4-1, Silva and De Bruyne were positioned higher, and more narrow behind the home team’s midfield line, this was a logical response. In the 5-4-1, the lack of presence in the first line meant Bournemouth could no longer disturb City from building through Fernandinho and the centre backs. As such, City’s 8s were no longer required in deeper spaces to stabilise the build-up, and could now add to the offensive presence needed to break Bournemouth’s 5-4 block.

The more advanced roles of City’s interiors led to Mendy and Danilo playing deeper on the flanks, creating bigger separation between them and Bournemouth’s wing-backs. By positioning the 8s inside and behind the Cherries’ wide midfielders (Gosling and King), they could either receive directly from the defenders, or open space for the pass to the full-backs if Gosling/King stayed narrow to block them.

The distance between City’s full-backs and Bournemouth’s wing-backs meant Smith/Daniels had to make longer runs for access. Theoretically this could have created space for City to break through the wing behind the pressing wing-backs. However the movements to exploit this were used all too rarely.

For Howe’s men, the change allowed them to force City to use the wings earlier in their build-up, with the wider midfield line they were better able to control the half spaces. This made City’s possession game less threatening than it was towards the end of the first half. However, probably by conscious decision, the deeper defending and lower presence in offensive areas meant the home side lacked a threat on the counter attack. With Defoe often facing duels against Kompany, Otamendi and Fernandinho to receive possession, it was little surprise that Bournemouth struggled to move up the pitch for long periods in the second half.

Conclusion

This was a highly interesting encounter which was eventually decided with a last-gasp winner from Raheem Sterling. Although it meant beginning the season with 3 straight losses, there were a number of positives to take away from the performance for Howe’s men, not least the efficacy of their early pressing.

Guardiola’s side displayed several interesting structural adaptations from last season in the 4-3-3 shape. A lot of the plays were spoiled by weak technical execution, and at times weak individual decision making, however there were hugely impressive signs which have since manifested in consistently large victories.

Manchester is Blue. Pep Guardiola’s team continue their quest to the Premier League title with a key win in the 175th playing of the Manchester Derby. After the match, City extend their unbeaten streak to 16 games, drawing only once in the league in that time and setting a new record of winning 14 consecutive matches. City also have an 11 point gap over their crosstown rivals. Manchester United remain in second place, but this result makes their quest for the league title a difficult task.

Starting Lineups and Movements

The largest talking point going into the match was who wasn’t going to be playing, specifically Paul Pogba. The exuberant midfielder out of this match due to suspension, receiving a straight red card during United’s away win at Arsenal. To replace the Frenchman, Ander Herrera was slotted next to Nemanja Matic. Jose Mourinho opted to change his team’s formation back to a 4-2-3-1, as seen in numerous teams he has managed over the years. Ashley Young was put in at left back following his performances over the past few weeks as a wingback in United’s 3-4-1-2 formation, while Martial and Rashford flanked Jesse Lingard to form the trio of attacking midfielders.

Manchester City were afforded the luxury of being able to rest their key players in the midweek Champions League game, so their starting selection was as expected, with perhaps the exception of Gabriel Jesus getting the nod over a recuperating Sergio Aguero.

Mourinho’s Matchplan

Rashford and Martial dropped into the midfield line when defending to form a 4-4-1-1 shape, with Lingard responsible for covering the space that Fernandinho occupied. Lingard would periodically step up in line with Lukaku, creating a 4-4-2, and these moments would take place when City were building up along the halfway line. United were reluctant to apply pressure in these instances, preferring to cover the options that could be played to and applying man-orientations to the dangerous player.

Mourinho set his team to have Silva and De Bruyne to be essentially man-marked by Herrera and Matic respectively, while Romelu Lukaku aimed to prevent the ball from going toward City’s left side by using his cover shadow to block Otamendi from receiving the ball. Otamendi would solve this later in the match by stepping up into the midfield when Kompany received the ball so he could carry it out of defense and move up the field easily, as United defenders did not want to leave their man to pressure the Argentine on the ball.

Once Kompany received the ball, United’s would pressure slightly more, with the likely intention of rushing Kompany to make a decision on the ball and having him force passes into avenues where United could win the ball. If they won the ball, they could counter through the pace and individual abilities of Rashford, Lukaku, and Martial, with Lingard acting as a central running option to switch the ball from one side to the other if the far side was open.

United’s Defensive Strategy, showing man-orientations, Lukaku’s cover shadow, and the vacated space centrally due to the man-orientations.

For those familiar with Mourinho’s work, this is hardly a surprising approach for his United team. However, due to City’s positional structure and the manner in which United defended, they struggled to generate attacks that weren’t predicated on individual skillful dribbling.

United’s Shortcomings

The aspects of Manchester City’s play in possession will be discussed in the next section, but through the way that United set out to defend City, large spaces were found centrally at various moments in the match. For example, just like the graphic above, it was common to find large spaces centrally because of Herrera and Matic being so preoccupied with the player they were marking. This allows for easier passes for any players moving into that space. Another outcome that was common to see was for a City player to take the ball and dribble up the middle, with no pressure being applied until he was close to United’s penalty area.

Due to the reluctance of United to apply pressure onto the visiting club, Man City could easily establish themselves inside the opponent’s half, while the home side would drop off and focus on defending the central areas in the penalty area. United’s crowded box defending made it so City struggled to finish off decent moves that were often generated in wider positions from Sane and Jesus. But the manner in which United defended for large portions of the match made it challenging for United to effectively counter.

When Manchester United had possession after a failed City attack, all of their players were so close together that they were an easy to counterpress, as many options could be eliminate just by providing a decent cover shadow. To alleviate the pressure then, many long balls were directed towards Lukaku, and the Belgian was helpless because his support that would be behind him normally in any counter attack was too far away to link up productively. This led to City regaining possession, and the cycle would continue once again.

Due to the deep nature of United’s defending, Rashford and Martial had long distances to make up in order to provide Lukaku, outnumbered here, with any options

There is a quote from Juanma Lillo, in which he states “The quicker the ball goes forward, the quicker it comes back“. This is essentially how the match played out from United’s point of view. Manchester United were very direct in how they moved up the field, as if it wasn’t a long ball aimed for Lukaku, it was a through ball from the midfielders, or a marauding dribbling sequence taking advantage of the advanced positions of City’s fullbacks.

Sometimes these attacks work, as seen with Marcus Rashford’s goal on the stroke of halftime, but relying on them against a team intelligently positioned when your team is so deep is not optimal. When the wingers and midfielders move up to be part of the attack, they have to travel large distances to participate in the attack. As the ball moves faster than the players, the rate at which they support is usually too slow to keep up with the play if they are excessively deep. When the opposition win the ball, there exists a large gap in between the lines of players because of the movements that take place during attacking transitions. This leads to the opponent easily progressing up the field back to where United were fighting tooth and nail to protect.

Such was the nature of Manchester United’s counterattacking on the day, as they were heavily reliant on the talents of their attacking players rather than a cohesive counterattacking strategy aimed at a particular zone of the pitch. United were in a pendulum between attacking and defending, with City moving up the field quickly when the attacking 4 players moved up to attack while the rest of the team failed to move up sufficiently in anticipation of the next City attack. Later on in the match, Lingard, Martial, and Rashford became restless and tried to initate a higher press of their own, but City were able to navigate this easily.

This was due to how United’s back 4 and defensive midfielders were focused on covering rather than pressuring, and this discontinuity between the front and back of the team led to large gaps for City to play into. Overall, a better approach I feel would’ve been to force City to play long balls by implementing a higher offside line and pressure in a similar manner to how United operated against Arsenal in the prior week. The absence of Paul Pogba was a big loss, but strategically, Mourinho gave Guardiola spaces for his side to establish their superiority over the Red Devils.

City vs. United’s Defense, Adjustments to beat Man-Orientations

For Manchester City, they employed a slight variation of what has been used in the past few weeks. Rather than having Gabriel Jesus central, he was slotted out left and Raheem Sterling was placed centrally, playing as a False 9 and checking deeper into midfield to create 4v3 situations with De Bruyne, Silva, and Fernandinho. Sane was positioned on the right flank on the touchline, occasionally looking to run in behind and get on the end of long passes from the back, but these were sparse and he mainly sought to challenge Young on the dribble.

The best attacks in the opening stages of the match came from switches over to Sane, and he would frequently look to cut the ball for any runners to finish. These were anticipated and dealt with by United, meaning not many quality shots arose from these.

In an effort to gain more of the ball, Silva and De Bruyne began to drop back closer to Fernandinho. This did escape them from their marks, but offered little solution to actually breaking down United. What it did accomplish was keeping possession and have United chase to cover their spaces, leading to eventual zones that City tried to beat by combination play.

Sterling’s movement as a False 9 then acted as the main solve up the field, since Rojo and Smalling did not follow him into the deeper spots. De Bruyne and Silva were too far however to be effective options for Sterling once he got the ball, which led to many stagnant City attacks that had a lot of side to side circulation once they were high up the field.

The most amount of success for City took place when the ball went from the central areas to wide spots, as the large gaps mentioned earlier in the piece allowed them to get near the penalty area with relative ease. De Bruyne would drift righward in support of Sane, with Silva just behind him often. This made the game quite small sided and on occasion played into United’s hands. Mourinho’s team was heavily protective of the center however meaning that either shots were blocked, passed out wide and easily saved by De Gea, or cutbacks were cleared away.

One example where the movement of the false 9 was used to play forward by City. United’s front players are overzealous in the pressing, creating a gap centrally where Silva is found by Walker.

Ilkay Gundogan was brought in at halftime for Kompany, moving Fernandinho to center back for about 15 minutes, before Mangala replaced Gabriel Jesus. These shifts led to Silva playing as the false 9, Sane back to the left, and Sterling to the right. The same patterns and themes took place in this timeframe, but as United began to pressure haphazardly, Gundogan was a great asset in circulation leading to several chances for City, but were unable to convert any of these.

A Tangent on Deep Defending

Jose Mourinho said the following quote to the media after the match.

“They scored two goals which were quite unbelievable to concede. They scored two goals out of nothing with rebounds….two easy goals. We did good things, we did bad things… I think they are a very good team, they are lucky, they have decisions in their favour.”

Pep Guardiola commented about how his team had not worked on attacking set pieces all week and managed to score two of them during the match to come away with three points. While set piece goals may be a byproduct of luck, the goals themselves came from long spells of defending deep. The first corner kick goal originated from a sequence which ended in a save from Leroy Sane’s shot on target, while the second was a freekick that unfortunately deflected off a United player during a clearance into the path of Otamendi.

Perhaps Manchester City are lucky in that Ederson had a couple of world class saves 5 minutes from the injury time. However, for the sake of a thought experiment, if the events that take place in a football match are random, but somewhat determined by the positioning of players in your team, then by being close to your own goal for such a large portion of the match, you are subjecting your team to a higher risk of having one of these random events leading to a goal.

With Manchester City being so far from their goal for a majority of the game, they are subjecting themselves to less risk of conceding because United have a large distance to travel in order to score. Therefore, Mourinho’s tactics of sitting deep and hitting on the counter do not in fact provide the best chance of winning big matches against opponents of equal or superior skill. While it does work sometimes, it is pretty risky and very dependent on having certain “random” events, like set pieces, go in your favor (in terms of not conceding, or scoring them) for 90 minutes. Football doesn’t always work like that, and managers should have tactics that don’t depend so much on chance.

This may be expanded on the future in a tactical theory piece in the future, but for now, it should be stated that defending deep is not the most risk averse strategy a manager can employ. As we saw with PSG-Barcelona earlier this year or even BVB against Schalke, this instinct of protecting your own goal at all costs is counter productive and just increases the amount of opposition attacks and places constant pressure on your defense.

Conclusion

While this wasn’t the spectacle of previous Manchester Derbies or prior encounters between Jose and Pep, the loss will sting from United’s point of view, as Manchester City inevitably look like they will march to the title. In a less than top performance, City still demonstrated their quality over their neighbors. Even though both teams have about equal squads in terms of ability, Manchester City were better on the day, and saying Guardiola has nothing to do with that is naive. His way is working in England after all.